



THE LIVING STONES OF THE HOLY LAND TRUST

Registered Charity No. 1081204

'An ecumenical trust seeking to promote contacts between Christian Communities in Britain and those in the Holy Land and neighbouring countries.'

You are permitted to redistribute or reproduce all or part of the contents of the Yearbook in any form as long as it is for personal or academic purposes and non-commercial use only and that you acknowledge and cite appropriately the source of the material.

You are not permitted to distribute or commercially exploit the content without the written permission of the copyright owner, nor are you permitted to transmit or store the content on any other website or other form of electronic retrieval system.

The Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of the contents in its publications. However, the opinions and views expressed in its publications are those of the contributors and are not necessarily those of The Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust.

The Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust Yearbook and its content are copyright of © The Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust. All rights reserved.

editor@livingstones.ngo

LIVING STONES YEARBOOK 2014

LIVING STONES YEARBOOK 2014

*Christianity engages with Islam:
contexts, creativity and tensions*



LIVING STONES OF THE HOLY LAND TRUST

Registered charity no. 1081204

© Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Living Stones Yearbook 2014
Christianity engages with Islam:
contexts, creativity and tensions

First published 2014 by
Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust
(Regd. Charity no. 1081204)
www.livingstonesonline.org.uk

ISBN 978 0 9552088 3 6

Managing Editor
Leonard Harrow

Editors
Mary Grey
Duncan Macpherson
Anthony O'Mahony
Colin South

Produced by Melisende UK Ltd
Printed and bound in England by 4edge Ltd

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL	ix
CONTRIBUTORS	xvii
TOLEDO GUIDELINES AND THE MYTH OF THE ANDALUSIAN CALIPHATE— <i>James C Conroy</i>	1
CHRISTOLOGY OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH — <i>Vrej Nerses Nersessian</i>	19
Christianity in modern Turkey: an overview — <i>Anthony O'Mahony</i>	41
THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE GREEK MINORITY, IN THE CONTEXT OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES — <i>Nikodemos Anagnostopoulos</i>	64
THE <i>DHIMMI</i> : <i>DHIMMI</i> AND <i>DHIMMITUDE</i> IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE— <i>Robin Gibbons</i>	87
THE CHALDEAN CHURCH IN MODERN TIMES — <i>Suha Rassam</i>	107
'PICK UP THE PEARLS OF KNOWLEDGE AND ADORN OURSELVES WITH THE JEWELRY OF LITERATURE': AN ANALYSIS OF THREE ARAB WOMEN WRITERS IN AL-NASHRA AL-USBU'IYYA — <i>Deanna Ferree Womack and Christine B Lindner</i>	125
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEOLOGY OF ROWAN WILLIAMS: THE QUESTION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS — <i>Philip Ind</i>	158
THE LEGACY OF CHARLES DE FOUCAULD— <i>Ariana Patey</i>	187

LIVING STONES OF THE HOLY LAND TRUST

‘An ecumenical trust seeking to promote contacts between
Christian communities in Britain and
those in the Holy Land and neighbouring countries.’

Our SPIRITUAL PATRONS include

In the Middle East:

Archbishop Elias Chacour, Melkite Archbishop of Galilee
Bishop Suheil Dawani, Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem
HB Patriarch Gregorius III, Melkite Patriarch of Antioch
Bishop Gianos-Boulos Marcuzzo, Latin Patriarchal Vicar for Israel
Patriarch Emeritus Michel Sabbah, formerly Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem
HB Patriarch Fouad Twal, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem
Archbishop Theodosios of Sebastia, Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem
(Nizar Hanna)

Elsewhere:

Archbishop Yeghishe Gizirian, Armenian Church
Rt Revd and Rt Hon The Lord Hope of Thornes, formerly Archbishop of York
Cardinal Cormac Murphy O'Connor, formerly Archbishop of Westminster
Archbishop Vincent Nichols, Archbishop of Westminster
Canon Paul Oestreicher, Anglican and Society of Friends
Revd Kathleen Richardson, Baroness Richardson of Calow, former President of
Methodist Conference and Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council
Bishop Desmond Tutu, former Archbishop of Cape Town
The Most Reverend Kallistos, Metropolitan of Diokleia (Timothy Ware)

COMMUNICATIONS

www.livingstonesonline.org.uk

Communications with the Chair or Editor can be made through:
chair@livingstonesonline.org.uk
or editor@livingstonesonline.org.uk

All enquiries regarding subscriptions to the Honorary Treasurer:
treasurer@livingstonesonline.org.uk

NOTE

It is appreciated that articles derive from authors in a range of disciplines and demonstrate a variety in approach. The spelling of some specialised terms, local place-names and proper names in particular may vary considerably according to the contributor and discipline. These variations, however, should cause no problems to readers.

Submissions for inclusion in the *Yearbook* are welcome and papers for consideration should be sent to editor@livingstonesonline.org.uk. Notes for submission of papers and house style are available upon request from the editor.

EDITORIAL

Volume III of the Yearbook (2014) appears during troubled times for the 'Living Stones' of the Middle East, as was the case with the previous volume (2013). The violent conflict in Syria is no nearer a solution; now, militant Islam (ISIS) has begun to attack cities in Iraq. Both Christians and Muslims— are persecuted across a range of Middle-Eastern countries. Yet to sink into despair is to ignore certain signs of hope. A bright beacon must be the visit of Pope Francis to the Holy Land and his subsequent invitation to both political leaders—Shimon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas—to come to Rome and pray with him on Pentecost Sunday June 8th. That both events occurred without violent incident was itself a sign of hope. Even without being able to estimate long-term benefits, the hope given to suffering people of the region has echoed around the world.

In this same spirit of hope the third Volume of the Yearbook is published in the 10th anniversary year of the death of Fr Michael Prior, in the context of a Memorial Conference at Heythrop College. It is fitting that the first article is written by Professor James Conroy, a former student of Fr Michael Prior at St Mary's College. Called *Toledo Guidelines and the Myth of the Andalusian Caliphates*, it was presented at the 4th International Conference of Bethlehem University (2013). This paper's subject may seem tangential to the issues confronting Muslims and Christians living in the West Bank; however, for Palestinians seeking a template for religious freedom and education in the civil society of a future Palestinian state it is extremely relevant. *Tolerance* is the key term—as it will be for other contributions—meaning the tolerance of Islam with regard to other faiths especially Christianity. Dr Conroy challenges the idea that the Toledo Guidelines of the early Middle

Ages—from Andalusia, ‘which have come to both reflect and define approaches to the teaching of world religions is based on tolerance of the other, a recognition of religious commonality and the confluence of belief’: rather, he argues, it is based on a misunderstanding of tolerance. Andalusian Muslims were little different from their neighbours and advanced territorial claims with some brutality. Dr Conroy’s article pursues richer notions of religious pluralism, suggesting that the starting point is a psychological and pedagogical scrutiny of the self. Drawing on a range of texts, he illustrates how what binds human beings together is our being *enstranged* (made strange to ourselves from within) and not being made strange by being different from the other. Finally, he suggests that a re-understanding of otherness might open up new spaces for dialogue in the conflicted context of Palestine.

From Andalusia we move to the Ottoman empire, with four different contributions. The first is a careful historical study of *Armenian Christology* by one of its most eminent scholars, Dr Vrej Nersessian. The focus of his study pre-dates the Ottoman empire by a thousand years, taking us to the roots of Christianity in Armenia, spreading from Caesarea in Cappadocia. For readers unfamiliar with this history, the richness of Armenian theology is revealed: Fr Nersessian explains both the divergence of this from Western theology:—this is the Church of the first 3 Councils, Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381) and Ephesus (431)—as well as the increasing points of convergence and hopes of agreement with the Chalcedonian Churches. The heart of the issue is how to understand how the two natures of Christ—divine and human, united in the incarnation of Christ.

The second article is a historical study of Christianity in Turkey, bringing us into the present: Anthony O’Mahony, Director of the Centre for Eastern Christianity at Heythrop College discusses *Christianity in Modern Turkey* in many key aspects. From its early beginnings, the article discusses the impact of the arrival of Islam (1000 AD) and the fact that there was not automatically hostility between the two faiths. One link with the previous article on Armenia is the question of the survivors of the Armenian Genocide (1915–1916). Approximately 600,000 Armenians had perished in the deserts of northern Syria and Mesopotamia alone.

Another aspect is the fact that Christianity is often cast as foreign to Turkishness. While there are a large number of clandestine Christians

in Turkey, it is difficult to establish an accepted figure. In some contexts, certain minorities, especially Armenian, Greek and Syriac Christians are seen—rightly or wrongly—as the reason for the collapse of the Ottoman empire because they collaborated with foreign powers—although this accusation may have been made to create a climate of suspicion. The greatest change for Christianity was the establishing of the Turkish Republic after World War I and the potentially damaging impact of secularisation on Christian life. But, as the writer observes sagaciously, the soul of a people was not to be changed in a day, however intense the pressure. The new laws began to be observed in the big centres of population, but in remoter places life went on as before.

The next contribution, by Revd Archimandrite Nikodemos Anagnostopoulos, a Greek Orthodox priest from Istanbul, focuses also on Christianity in Turkey, but more specifically on the Greek Orthodox minority, with its religious and administrative centre in Istanbul, known as the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. His article describes the present status and challenges faced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a religious institution from the perspective of Christian-Muslim relations in the Turkish Republic. The notion of secularity here is an active one and he emphasizes the powerlessness of the minority group when compared to the majority. A result of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, a compulsory transfer of a large number of people, officially adopted in order to solve a minority problem based only on the religious identity of the population. According to the Treaty, all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on Turkish territory other than Constantinople on the one hand and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory other than the newly-acquired region of Western Thrace on the other were to be forcibly exchanged. A minimum of 1.3 million Greeks were expelled from Turkey and some 500,000 Muslims were sent to Turkey from Greece. All were dispossessed of their properties.

But a positive aspect of the Treaty was that the Ecumenical Patriarchate should remain in Constantinople. Despite the emergence of the Turkish Orthodox Church founded by Papa Eftim—an unrecognized Christian Orthodox denomination influenced by Turkish nationalist ideology—the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople since 2010 consists of six Turkish national metropolitans, based in Turkey and

six Turkish national metropolitans, based in Greece, Europe and the United States. Despite all the challenges that the patriarchate still faces as a Religious Institution based on the Turkish Republic Legislations in terms of religious freedom and practice, besides the spiritual growth and care of the Orthodox flock the patriarch has specific responsibilities for coordinating a common witness among the Autocephalous Churches.

The final article on Christianity in Turkey is by Dr Robin Gibbons, a Melkite priest and scholar. Called ‘*Dhimmi* and *Dhimmitude* in the Ottoman Empire’, this article provides the background for the previous three articles, and even connects with some roots and tensions within Christian-Muslim relations today. *Dhimmi* (‘protected’) was the name applied by the Arab-Muslim conquerors to indigenous non-Muslim populations who surrendered by a treaty (*dhimma*) to Muslim domination. ‘*Dhimmitude*’ as a historical concept, was coined by Bat Ye’or in 1983 to describe the legal and social conditions of Jews and Christians subjected to Islamic rule. Sometimes the *dhimmi* were quite harshly persecuted and at other times allowed relatively tolerable living conditions’. But these ‘protected ones’ or ‘people of the book’ had in return to pay a land and poll tax called *jizya*—and there was a sense of degradation attached to those who had to pay it. More than that there was also the implicit hope of conversion to Islam on the part of non-Muslim peoples.

The significance of this article is to explode the myth that under Islam in the Ottoman empire, Christians lived in a peaceful, protected manner. For the underlying reality is that of *jihad*, holy war. Since it was the duty of Muslims and Muslim states to spread Islam, ‘*jihad* is a kind of unrelenting and fervent missionary thrust that can be carried out either by persuasion or by the sword.’ *Jihad*, argues Dr Gibbons convincingly, is at the root of *dhimmitude*.

Further humiliation for the Christian communities existed through the practice of slavery: about one fifth of all slaves entered the Sultan’s slave family (*gulham*). Another practice was *devishrme*—a system aimed at taking children away from both their Christian family and ethnic communities—a highly contested practice. As Dr Gibbons concludes: the great elephant in the room of the Ottoman story is the problem of the *dhimmi*.

With Suha Rassam’s article on ‘The Chaldean Church of Iraq’ we move from the Ottoman empire to Iraq, where in our own times

bitter conflict between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims has recently been intensifying. The writer, a member of the Chaldean Catholic Church, explains that this Church developed in Mesopotamia independently of other Churches, became self-ruling in 424, and developed its own theology and culture with famous centres of learning, monasteries, saints and mystics. The Church then spread eastwards from Mesopotamia, where the patriarch resided, to Iran, Central Asia, India and China and southwards to the Arabian peninsula. Suha Rassam traces the history of the Chaldean Catholic Church from these beginnings to the present day, through all its significant changes, especially from the Ottoman empire to the creation of the modern state of Iraq.

Especially painful to relate is the treatment of Christians in the city of Mosul—even more poignant given its current suffering during the invasion of Sunni Muslims marching towards Baghdad. During the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 the city of Mosul had been devastated. Before 2003 there were eleven active Chaldean parishes in the Mosul diocese—but now only five.

The author concludes on a hopeful note: despite the devastation that occurred in Iraq after the invasion of 2003, and the emigration of large numbers of its community, the Chaldean Church, essentially and historically an Iraqi Church, still has a significant presence in Iraq. This is partly due to the election of Patriarch Sako in 2013. He is, she believes, a man of vision and wisdom—a powerful source of hope for the beleaguered Chaldean Church in adversity.

From Iraq we move to Syria, where there has been conflict since the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011. But this article, by Deanna Ferree Womack and Christine B Lindner, titled fascinatingly, “‘Pick up the pearls of knowledge and adorn ourselves with the jewelry of literature’”: an analysis of three Arab women writers in *al-Nashra al-Usbu'iyya*’ is a very positive and encouraging account of the contribution of Arab women writers in the *Nahda* or Arab Renaissance of the late nineteenth century. The three writers in *al-Nashra al-Usbu'iyya* or Weekly Bulletin of the Syrian Protestant community, are Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri. Understanding the context is vital: within the Syrian Protestant missionary activity, there was a burgeoning of educational activity, education forming a new cultural capital.

These women demonstrate a high regard for Arab heritage and culture, but also promoting the Bible and women's education as the path

towards modernity. Yet they criticize elements of contemporary Syrian society, particularly the hindrances to women's enlightenment and problematic manifestations of modernity. Mariam Zakka's article (1987), 'Diligence and Perseverance' urges these two qualities as sufficient to enable a person to overcome the most difficult of circumstances. Farida 'Atiya's article, 'Caution and Attentiveness', offers her own rendition of the story of Cain and Abel to establish her point that all of humanity—from the greatest of kings to her own Syrian readers—must approach every relationship with caution. Rujina Shukri tackles two problems that she identified in her contemporary Syrian society: the lack of interest in reading and the lack of effort to own books.

Whereas with Suha Rassam's article, the focus was on the Chaldean Catholic church, here we have a distinctly Protestant focus. For example, these women's views on individual agency parallel the Protestant message of individual responsibility over salvation. Conversion narratives, particularly those of Syrian Protestant martyrs, are based upon individual faith commitment in the face of persecution. The authors highlight the complexity of these women's context: the publication of their works may not necessarily be seen as a pro-proto-feminist attitude of the editors, but more as strengthening the missionary's position at a time of trial.

Revd Philip Ind's article on 'The Development of the Theology of Rowan Williams: The Question of Christian-Muslim Relations' addresses similar issues but from a different angle. The former archbishop of Canterbury's interest in Christian-Islamic relations is well-known. Although the discussion here focuses on theology, the background of conflict is never far away: even though Britain is the immediate context, there is awareness of the impact on conflicts already discussed here. The search of Rowan Williams is for assurance that Christians and Muslims can find 'enough of a common language' for working together as citizens of Britain living in harmony, and to promote world peace with justice for the common good of humanity worldwide.

Several of his key initiatives are discussed. Drawing on the Vatican Document (1991) *Dialogue and Proclamation*, four categories of dialogue—life, action, theological exchange and religious experience—are proposed. In Williams' *Building Bridges* seminars, (2002–2012) the third and fourth styles of dialogue have been successful. These have strengthened grass-roots partnerships and programmes to work for

justice, peace and the common good, and intensified shared theological discussions and researches of religious leaders and scholars. In her summing up, Professor Gillian Stamp spoke of it as *the beginning of a journey*, or rather four distinctive but interwoven journeys; *the historical, the public, the private and the reflective* journeys of the participants.

Another significant initiative was ‘The Archbishop of Canterbury’s Listening Initiative in Christian-Muslim Relations 2001–2004’, which led to the formation of ‘The Christian-Muslim Forum’. Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali reminds us that Christians and Muslims have a long history of living together but in our own days such living together has extended beyond Asia, Africa and parts of the Balkans to other parts of the world. Connecting with Dr Robin Gibbon’s article in this volume, he urges that ‘where Christians are in a minority, there may be a need to move beyond a *dhimmi* (protected) mentality and to see themselves as not merely tolerated and protected people but as full *citizens* with freedom of expression, belief and worship.’

The basis for dialogue is founded upon the sincerity (*ikhlas*) and ‘wholesomeness of heart’ of the participants as they strive for peaceful co-operation for the common good, rather than on an ability to pluck verses from Scripture (Muslim or Christian) to justify the process. The most hopeful dimension of this article, and of William’s contribution to dialogue with Islam in the midst of contemporary conflicts lies in his response to an entirely unprecedented Muslim initiative—an assembly of Muslim scholars in Amman in February 2007: ‘A Common Word between us and you’: the Muslim open letter, based its invitation on a reading of the Christian Scriptures of the New Testament. (Mark 12.29–31)

Williams acknowledges the generosity of the invitation, recognises the reality of difference yet concludes: ‘We interpret your invitation as saying, “let us find a way of recognising that on some matters we are speaking *enough of a common language* for us to be able to pursue both exploratory dialogue and peaceful cooperation with integrity and without compromising fundamental beliefs.”’

Our final article continues this note of hope with Dr Ariana Patey’s contribution, ‘The legacy of Charles de Foucauld’. It is fitting to end with a story of witness to inter-faith. Foucauld (1858–1916), after leaving the life of a Trappist monk for the eremitical (hermit) life, dedicated himself to the wellbeing of the Muslims of Algeria. His

support of local culture and interfaith prayer provide us, she writes, with a picture of someone passionate about pushing the parameters of interfaith connections. As her article explains, his transformative mission continues to inspire people, in no small part, thanks to the efforts of Foucauld's disciple, Louis Massignon (1883–1962). Massignon is perhaps the most respected Catholic voice on the issue of Christian–Muslim relations—an almost mystical relationship existing between the two men. Foucauld, believing that an imitation of Christ should be physical as well as spiritual, assumed the lifestyle of North African Muslims: their poverty, diet, language, and dress as an imitation of Jesus. After Foucauld's death, Massignon took personal responsibility for his legacy and personally introduced his work to his famous friends, such as Jacques Maritain and Thomas Merton.

One of the most recent manifestations of Foucauldian spirituality is the Community of al-Khalil (Abraham) founded in Syria. It was in Syria, at the monastery of Notre-Dame du Sacré-Cœur in Akbès, that Foucauld lived out his vocation to the Trappist Order, and, began to conceive of a new way to live out his vocation to Islam. Considering themselves as 'walk[ing] on the path of St Francis of Assisi, Ignatius of Loyola, Charles de Foucauld, Louis Massignon and Mary Kahil' the community, led by Fr Dall'Oglio SJ, has acted as a host for members of the Foucauldian spiritual family. In meetings with different factions, including 'militarized extremists', Fr Dall'Oglio SJ has attempted to help foster reconciliation in preparation for the rebuilding of Syria after the anticipated end of the war. Sadly, on 29 July 2013 Fr Dall'Oglio was kidnapped in Raqqa, Syria. Yet—with his fate still unknown—the monastery of Deir Mar Musa continues in its mandate of prayer and hospitality, protected by the surrounding Muslim population. As Ariana Patey concludes, in a manner fitting for the themes running through this volume, and for all concerned about the contemporary conflicts:

... it is in this legacy that sometimes has ended in violent death that Foucauld's desires are most clearly visible. He lived his life in the hope that someday people would no longer see him, but Jesus Christ: abject, humble, crucified love.

Mary Grey

CONTRIBUTORS

Revd Archimandrite Nikodemos Anagnostopoulos is a Visiting Lecturer at St Mary's University, Twickenham, and at the Cambridge Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies. He studied Social Theology at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and completed a Masters Degree in Pastoral Theology at St Mary's University. Currently, he is undertaking doctoral research at Heythrop College specializing in Muslim-Christian Relations in south-eastern Europe. He is an Orthodox priest, under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, and since his ordination in 1996 he served at various parishes in Greece, Turkey and the UK. He worked as a Religious Education Teacher at British Secondary Schools and as a Healthcare Chaplain for the British National Health Service. He is a member of the Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust and of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Theologians. He has contributed with papers at National and International Conferences in UK, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Serbia, Palestine and Lebanon.

Professor James Conroy is Vice-Principal (Internationalisation) at the University of Glasgow where he has held the position of Professor of Religious and Philosophical Education since 2005. He joined the University in 1999. Professor Conroy was Dean of the School of Education (from 2006 to 2010), Head of the Graduate School, Head of the Department of Religious Education, College International Lead and International Dean for Europe (from 2012 to 2013). He holds his teaching certificate from St Mary's University College, Strawberry Hill and degrees from the University of London (IoE), Lancaster

University and Vrije Universitet, Amsterdam. He was Director of Religious Education and Pastoral Care at St Andrew's College and Senior Lecturer in Theology and Religious Education at St Mary's University College, Strawberry Hill before joining the University of Glasgow. Professor Conroy has held visiting professorial positions in Australia, Brazil, North America, and Europe (most recently as EU Visiting Professor at the University of Warsaw), and has published extensively in the areas of philosophy of education, religion, education and liberal democracy.

Robin Gibbons is one of the Greek-Catholic Melkite priest chaplains in the UK and also an International and Ecumenical Canon for the Anglican Diocese of Edmonton, Canada. He is Director of Studies for Theology and Religion at the Department For Continuing Education, Oxford University and also member of the Faculty of Theology and Religion. He has recently become Co-Director of the 'Religious Diversity, Freedom and Society' Programme of the Centre For Christianity and Culture at Regents Park College, Oxford. He is also a Visiting Fellow of the Centre of Eastern Christianity at Heythrop College, University of London.

Revd Philip Ind is a priest of the Church of England. He studied for an MA in Christianity and Interreligious Dialogue and presented his M.Phil thesis 'Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, February 2003-December 2012, and his Relations with Islam' (2013), both at Heythrop College, University of London. He published an article on the question of scripture in dialogue between Christianity and Islam in *One in Christ: a Catholic Ecumenical Review* (2002).

Christine B Lindner is the Director of the Preserving Protestant Heritage in the Middle East project at the Near East School of Theology in Beirut, Lebanon. She obtained her Ph.D. in Middle East History from the University of Edinburgh in 2009 and previously served as Assistant Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Balamand in Lebanon. She has published a number of articles on the history of women and gender in the Protestant community in Ottoman Syria.

The Revd Dr Nerses (Vrej) Nersessian was born in Tehran in 1948. He was educated at the Armenian College in Calcutta, the Gevorgian Theological Academy in Holy Etchmiadzin (Armenia), and King's College, University of London. He has a degree in theology and a doctorate in Modern Greek and Byzantine Studies. After graduation in 1975 he joined the British Library as curator responsible for the manuscripts and printed books of the Christian Middle East section, a post which he held until his retirement in August 2011. Among his British Library publications are: *Catalogue of Early Armenian Printed Books. A history of Armenian Printing (1512-1850)* (1980), *Armenian Illuminated Gospel Books* (1987), *Treasures from the Ark, 1700 years of Armenian Christian Art*, a catalogue of the British Library exhibition marking the 1,700th anniversary of the conversion of Armenia to Christianity, *The Bible in the Armenian Tradition* (2001) and most recently *A Catalogue of the Armenian Manuscripts in the British Library acquired since the year 1913 and of collections in other libraries in the United Kingdom* (2012), described as 'a fitting culmination to the long and distinguished career'. He is the author of the articles on the Armenian Church tradition in *Jesus in History, Thought, and Culture. An Encyclopedia, In the Beginning. Bibles before the year 1000*, *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity*, *Sacred Books of the Three Faiths: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Byzantium 330-1453*, *The Orthodox Christian World*. He was ordained a priest in 1983, elevated to archpriest in 1991 by Vazgen I Catholicos of All Armenians of Blessed Memory, and in October of this year he was awarded the distinguished medal of Saint Nerses Shnorhali by His Holiness Garegin I, Catholicos of All Armenians, for his distinguished career in the British Library and devoted services to the Armenian Church.

Anthony O'Mahony is Reader in Theology and the History of Christianity, Director, Centre for Eastern Christianity, Heythrop College, University of London. He has published widely on the modern history of Christianity in the Middle East and its contemporary context including (co-ed), *Christian Responses to Islam: A Global Account of Muslim-Christian Relations* (2008); (co-ed) *Eastern Christianity in the modern Middle East* (2010); *Christianity and Jerusalem: Studies in Theology and Politics in the Modern Holy Land* (2010); (co-ed) with John Flannery, *The Catholic Church in the contemporary Middle East: Studies for The Synod of the Middle East* (2010).

Ariana Patey studied for an MA in Middle Eastern History at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and her doctorate in ‘The Life and Thought of Charles de Foucauld: A Christian Eremitical Vocation to Islam and His Contribution to the Understanding of Muslim-Christian Relations within the Catholic Tradition’, Ph.D thesis (2012), at Heythrop College, University of London.

Suha Rassam was born in Mosul (Iraq); after medical training she became Assistant Professor of Medicine at the University of Baghdad. She came to England to undertake further medical research and practised as a doctor of medicine for many years in the United Kingdom. She is a founding member of the charity ‘Iraqi Christians in Need’ for which she won the ‘Catholic Woman of the Year’ award in 2008. She is a member of the Chaldean Catholic Church. Dr Rassam undertook studies in Eastern Christianity at the University of London. She authored *Christianity in Iraq* (2004); articles include ‘The Plight of Iraqi Christians’, in *One in Christ: a Catholic Ecumenical Review*, Vol. 42, no. 2, 2008, and ‘Iraqi Christians: the Present Situation’, in A O’Mahony and John Flannery (eds), *The Catholic Church in the Contemporary Middle East* (2010).

Deanna Ferree Womack is a minister in the Presbyterian Church (USA) and a doctoral candidate in History & Ecumenics at Princeton Theological Seminary. Her research examines the encounter between American Protestant missionaries and Arab Christians and Muslims in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ottoman Syria.

TOLEDO GUIDELINES AND THE MYTH OF THE ANDALUSIAN CALIPHATE

James C Conroy

[The subject of this paper may seem tangential to the issues confronting Muslims and Christians living in the West Bank. However, for Palestinians seeking a template for religious freedom and education in the civil society of a future Palestinian state it is extremely relevant. The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority guarantees religious freedom but gives special status to Sunni Islam which is the religion of 98 percent of Palestinians living in the territories. Following the pattern of Jordanian law, there is no civil marriage; inheritance and matrimonial matters are administered by Muslim or Christian Religious courts and, until recently, identity cards included reference to the bearer's religious affiliation. This last change is indicative of an official policy in favour of religious freedom on the part of the administration. At street level, however, there have been increasing examples of discrimination and even violence against the Christian minority and conversion of Muslims to Christianity leads, at best, to social exclusion. Education is obviously the key to greater religious toleration and community cohesion.

The authors of the 2007 Toledo Guidelines offer a model for educators, basing their approach on relations between Jews, Christians and Muslims in the Umayyad caliphate of Andalusia which flourished, within changing boundaries, in Spain in the tenth and eleventh centuries. However, Conroy argues that the guidelines offer a romantic and simplistic view of the past and that they advocate a superficial model of 'learning about the

other' which obscures the importance of discovering often awkward truths about one's own religious and cultural traditions. He argues that good relations between Palestinian Muslims and Palestinian Christians, and by extension, between Jews and Palestinians, lie in action for political change which is rooted in telling such truths to oneself.

Duncan Macpherson]

Educated by Vincentian priests at both school and college I have long considered the opportunities afforded me as exceptional. Michael Prior was one of a large number of Vincentians whom I had the privilege of studying under and working alongside. Michael was completely fearless and, when committed to a cause, utterly devoted to realising its moral goods. And Michael always had a cause! Indeed, during my time as one of his students Michael was waging a campaign against local government treatment of a group of travelling people camped in West London. As part of his drive to sew together the fabric of the gospel and the raiment of the world Michael would insist that one or two of us would accompany him to have tea with the travellers so that we could hear their story and warm to their hospitality. For Michael the Scriptures were not texts to be studied so much as a map by which one navigated the tumult of the world. And, to be here to honour his memory is, for me, an enormous privilege and I am grateful indeed to Bethlehem University, to Fr Jamal and to my old friend and colleague, Deacon Duncan, for the opportunity to deliver this lecture. Let me then take my starting point from Michael Prior's own scepticism about the verisimilitude of one's account of their own place and space. In his 2000 essay, 'Confronting the Bible's Ethnic cleansing in Palestine' he opined;

For me, as a boy and young man, politics began and ended in Ireland, an Ireland obsessed with England. It was much later that I recognized that the history I absorbed so readily in school was one fabricated by the nationalist historiographers of a newly independent Ireland, who

refracted the totality of its history through the lens of 19th-century European nationalisms.

Like Michael Prior I grew up in Ireland, like him I was nurtured on a series of heroic nationalist myths and, like him, I came to distrust them (indeed partly, at least, because I had been one of Michael's students). This distrust extends to the ways in which religions are discussed in the public spaces of the EU, most especially in its educational spaces. Too often, in pursuit of easy accommodations academics, educationalists and politicians fall prey to the temptation to peddle half-truths in inter-cultural and inter-religious understanding and relations. These easy accommodations are not a consequence of wickedness but the understandable desire in post-Enlightenment liberal democracies to elide cultural and religious difference in the service of common civility. This desire, in its turn, has found practical expression in the deliberations of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) within the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),¹ which considers that the treatment of religions as an equality and human rights issue is of considerable import in the maintenance of mutual security. As observed in the introduction to the Toledo guidelines, 'misunderstandings, negative stereotypes, and provocative images used to depict others are leading to heightened antagonism and sometimes even violence' (OSCE). This human rights approach reflects a view that where it is present in publicly funded education, religious education has been subject to or too closely aligned to the interests and normative claims of particular religious communities, largely Christian—after all much European school education has its roots in religious institutions. One way of redressing what has been considered an imbalance has been to seek for an alternative heuristic lens through which to view notions of religious tolerance to the dominant (not quite) post-Christian. The Toledo guidelines have come to both reflect and define approaches to the teaching of world religions as based on tolerance of the other, a recognition of religious commonality and the confluence of belief. Toledo was chosen as emblematic on the assumption that the early

¹ The OSCE enjoys a close collaborative relationship with the European Union. For details see http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/eu_osce/index_en.htm.

Middle Ages Andalusian caliphate and *taifas* represent the high point of religious tolerance; a view reproduced in scholarship about religious tolerance, most notably Maria Rosa Menocal's study of the caliphate and *taifas* of early medieval al-Andalus, entitled *Ornament of the World*. But such an approach, I will argue, fails both theoretically and practically to support the growth of authentic pluralism on two grounds. First, it fails to recognize the salience of Mark Twain's view that toleration is everything for the self and nothing for the other and secondly, that the concern with the other occludes the necessity of looking at the self and subjecting oneself to critical scrutiny. I will elaborate this second point with reference to moves in the philosophy and anthropology of religion in the mid- to late twentieth century.

In the second part of this paper I will suggest that the starting point for meaningful religious pluralism is a psychological and pedagogical scrutiny of the self and that, in an evocation of the notion of the wandering Aramean (Deut 26:5), a recognition of one's own ineluctable strangeness. In doing so, I propose drawing upon a range of religious and literary texts to illustrate how what binds human beings together is our being *enstranged* (made strange to ourselves from within) (Conroy 2009) and not our being made strange by being different from the other. Finally, acknowledging that one can be no more than a friendly observer, I wish to make some remarks about how a re-understanding of otherness might open up new spaces for dialogue in the conflicted context of Palestine.

The North American historian Maria Rosa Menocal's study discusses the possibility that the Andalus caliphate may be considered as a political culture that was uniquely tolerant in the midst of altogether more intolerant cultures such as that of European Franks. Could such an approach to the analysis of historical cultures act as a model for multiculturalism and religious pluralism in a Europe that is increasingly witnessing fractures along religio-cultural lines. These fractures are becoming increasingly visible as political parties, under pressure from electorates that are sensing (as much as experiencing) the erosion of their living standards and the loss of their place at the summit of modern political ecology. As the media herald (often erroneously) the economic plight of the poorest as a consequence of migration, political parties on the far right are increasingly portraying the otherness of the migrant as a problem for 'indigenous' peoples. Over the years, the European

Community has considered itself to be a bulwark of integration and as an institution that supports the free movements of people and capital. Consequently it has been keen to promulgate and support the view that there are models of intercultural tolerance in history that might 'show us the way'. It is in this context that I considered Menocal's work deserving of further attention. Her argument is not unfamiliar in popular conversation (and indeed in some academic circles) about medieval Islamic Spain and entails the suggestion that as a consequence of the doctrine of the *dhimmi* Christians and Jews were indeed offered extended civic protection. But more than this Menocal argues that al-Andalus, under the Umayyad caliphate, restored political and social order in a chaotic world. Her claim is that the protection of the *dhimmi* went far beyond the normal rights and courtesies of protection.

... beyond the fundamental prescribed posture, Al Andalus was, from these beginnings, the site of memorable and distinctive interfaith relations. Here the Jewish community rose from the ashes of an abysmal existence under the Visigoths to the point that the emir who proclaimed himself caliph in the tenth century had a Jew as a foreign minister. (Menocal 2002)

For her, al-Andalus represented and continues to represent one of the most important sites of intercultural understanding in the oriental/occidental political imaginary. The capacity for Muslims, Jews and Christians to interpenetrate each other's cultures over centuries is much underestimated in contemporary political and social thought. Such tolerant interfaith relations, she argues, are nurtured by the layering of cultures, by intermarriage, by exchange of ideas, by the redeployment and reshaping of prior intellectual resources. All this matters because Menocal goes on to claim that this culture of tolerance was replaced by one of religious suppression and brutality; indeed a brutality that would appear from the rhetoric to have little parallel, and which is rooted in the Christian desire for religious purity precipitated by, amongst other things, Urban II's summons at Clermont, in 1065, to a crusade to regain the Holy Lands for Christendom. It also matters because she draws parallels in sharp relief with the burning of books in Sarajevo in 1992, an event she sees as an echo of this earlier religious

intolerance. For Menocal the project of the book is an ethical one—to expose, to restore and ultimately to valorise a vision of actual religious tolerance that might provide some kind of lodestar for our own times. Moreover, it matters because this reading of history is an important echo of a stronger political agenda concerning the teaching of religion in European schools as articulated in the Toledo Guidelines, which suggests that Toledo is an example of a culture that brought together competing civilisations with their attendant competing values and somehow represents the confluence of these values through the active borrowing, copying and transmitting of elements of different cultures.

However, to suggest this is to suggest little more than that notions of racial or ethnic purity and their concomitant social and cultural practices have little traction in the understanding of otherness. Any basic history of the creation of Europe will lead to such a conclusion. Moreover, the Toledo principles are designed to function as a pan-European approach to religion that is grounded in a belief that religious education embodies certain universalisable principles around tolerance and otherness that would suggest that the particularities of any individual political or educational culture are actually underpinned by beliefs about our underlying sameness. Hence the religious educational activities that might take place in a Lutheran or Catholic school, as religious education, are recognizable as such by colleagues working in a non-religious setting. It is one with the belief, held by Menocal, that there are overarching claims to continuity and coherence which belie seeming difference. In order to reinforce the Toledo claim that religious education should be taught in the space of a liberal imaginary, the authors try to establish continuity with this earlier idyll. Hence, we are invited to recognize that:

in those violent times, well known ‘golden ages’ emerged in medieval Spain, when religious tolerance was accepted by rulers, and some of the great accomplishments and precursors of models of peoples learning from each other with respect were achieved.

But this liberal imaginary must find an explanation for the failure of these halcyon days to endure; and the explanation appears to lie in the Christian reconquest of Spain; a reconquest that is, in the popular

(and in this case official) imagination, the cause of much late Middle Ages pain and suffering, and with consequences that run into early modernity and beyond. Religious intolerance is often seen to have its roots in the emergence of a particular Roman Catholic supremacy and ignoring the very high levels of intolerance that were evident across most of Spain for many centuries, the Toledo guidelines spend some time discussing the ways in which Castilian Spain, under Ferdinand and Isabella, brought in a new age of intolerance and uniform religiosity.

This *modern* version of history is echoed in Menocal's own reflections where she observes that Cervantes' *Don Quixote* is penned in the full knowledge of the tragedy that had befallen Toledo as a great centre of learning and translation. In *Don Quixote* 'the glory of Toledo's—and Spain's—past as the great centre of interfaith confluence and as the nonpareil centre of translation for all of Europe is alluded to through its ruin, which was the all-too-visible reality by the turn of the seventeenth century'. (Menocal 2002, p. 258)

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE ANDALUSIAN IDYLL

It would be remiss of any scholar who looked to the past to provide a normative metaphor for the present not to ask how far such claims are justified. Does Menocal's thesis stand up to a more refined analysis of the historical and cultural traditions of the age? To answer such a question we need to look at al-Andalus in the context of the wider political impulses and imperatives of Europe and the Levant. Other readings of the same period offer a rather more conditional account of the golden age of the Andalus caliphate, a more nuanced account of the Visigothic period that preceded it and a more complex analysis of the circumstances which precipitated the demise of this age of putative tolerance.

Alternative readings of the rise of and ultimate displacement of the Visigoths offers a somewhat more subtle account of their successes and failures. Their intellectual achievements are not, as Menocal would have it, reduced to the singular personality of St Isidore but have a somewhat longer duration with an architectural and cultural style that extends that of the later Roman republics (Collins 2004). Of particular concern in this story is the treatment of Jews. While Isidore

disapproves of the forced conversion of Jews he is not the only one. In the Fourth Council of Toledo (633) forced conversion is also criticized and in 638 Braulio, who had inherited Isidore's intellectual leadership in Toledo, was asked by the 6th Council of Toledo to reply to criticism from the pope, Honorius I, that the Visigothic Church was failing to take sufficiently repressive measures against the Jews. (Collins, *ibid.*)

The argument of Menocal's book rests on the assumption that bringing religious outsiders into the administrative circle of the court represented a form of religious toleration. Historically this assumption rests on the apparent success of a number of Christians and, most especially, Jews as senior administrators including Hasdai ibn Shaprut and Samuel the Nagid. Samuel, born into a wealthy Malagan mercantile family, and who becomes the vizier of Granada, is to be considered a great manager of the affairs of state, including the rebuilding of the Alhambra. While oblique and fairly non-specific, references are made to prosperous Jewish traders, the singling out of individuals as examples of a state of politics is, as Arendt (1951) is apt to point out, likely to mislead ignoring, as it does, the often quite marked distinctions between parvenu and pariah, where the former are encouraged to see themselves as disassociated from the latter. The foregrounding of such individuals runs the risk of ignoring the rather banal if distasteful fact that non-Muslims were not equals, that they had to pay punitive taxes and that they could not always openly practise their religion. Indeed in a range of parallel moves in other jurisdictions such as Christian Byzantium and Ottoman Istanbul extra taxes were levied on those not of the dominant religion as a way of encouraging conversion. After all, if one could avoid paying taxes by changing religious affiliation then, for many, it appeared as a modest enough compromise.

Equally, when one looks at the end of the Andalusian caliphate and the long dwindling decline of the *Ornament of the World* and the Muslim *taifas*, matters are no less likely to get complicated. The decline of this world into, what is often characterised, as a more barbarous period of intolerance against Islam and Judaism does not, as Menocal appears to think, arise exclusively as a consequence of the re-Christianisation of Iberia with its more authoritarian Roman ways. Rather, the Middle Ages witness quite stark rises in sectarianism and nationalism across Europe, north and south, fuelled by dwindling resources, plague and shifts in economic security. (Barlett 1993)

Rather than seeing the fall of an Islamic ornament as a consequence of the rise of Rome it may be better to consider the disappearance of this order, such as it was, as a consequence of changing economic pressures which expose, in the end the fragility of our endeavours to create cultures of tolerance. Changes in inter-cultural relations are not self-evidently a function of the rise of a kind of Christian barbarism *per se* but, more likely, as Marx would have understood it, of a decline in material conditions.

ON CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION

1

This historical excursion is no idle pursuit. Rather it raises two important ethical educational issues and a further prudential question about the nature and implications of participation in democratic society. First, is a question as to whether or not we may use historical resources as part of an imaginary, even where the imaginary may be, in some regards, over-romanticised and disconnected from the complex historical circumstances within which it is located. In other words, ‘is it ethical to create a metaphor or series of metaphors based on a very particular and partial reading of history even if this is in the pursuit of some putative good?’ This in turn leads us to ask some supplementary normative questions. Can we freight the past with the concerns of the present in our educational endeavours and how should we read history as an ethico-educational task? Just as historians such as Tom Devine accuse Michael Gove (the Secretary of State for Education in England and Wales) of whiggery and misplaced chauvinism in his desire to render a particular version of history as concerned to cultivate a certain nationally-loaded historical construction (Higgins Guardian 2011), Menocal and a number of European institutions are keen to create a more benign rendering of history than might be entirely legitimate. The real challenge for historians, theologians and educators alike is the avoidance of a kind of romanticism about the past which is likely to lead to fanciful conclusions about the present. Adopting a more benign view than the evidence affords too often results in the development of ideologies, and social and educational practices that fail to deliver genuine progress or improvement, serving only as a

distraction from the real task—in this case the task of recognizing that one's own view of the world is inevitably partial and partisan. To see the Andalusian caliphate as a proto-liberal culture of tolerance would be to misunderstand what is meant by tolerance. Andalusian Muslims were little different from their neighbours, they advanced territorial claims with some brutality; they also partook in the early Middle Age energies of trading services and support with whoever might offer most positional advantage. They were not uniquely civilised in a sea of barbarity and intolerance. At the other end of the Mediterranean in Byzantium similar cultural and political complexities were equally evident. At the same time as much learning was going on in Andalusia so too, much scholarship existed in the East (in Byzantium). (Phillips 2009) As Collins observes,

The Umayyads did not follow the earlier Roman emperors in endowing the main cities of their state with new religious and recreational buildings, or try to enhance their amenities. Their existence was justified by the success of their claim to be good Islamic rulers, repressing dissent and evil-doing within the *Dar al-Islam* and conducting jihad effectively in the *Dar al-Harb*. Hence the emphasis in our sources, which derive from official records, on the number of heads of infidels sent back to display on the gates and walls of Córdoba, and on the salutary crucifixion of heretics and rebels. For such ends they took the taxes and tolls from Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants of the towns and districts of al-Andalus. It is therefore not surprising that in the course of these centuries their activities beyond their frontiers were frequently hampered by the need to restore and reimpose their authority within them. (Collins, 2012, 27)

The consequences of over burdening particular readings of human history may result in nullification rather than effective appropriation. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the treatment of the evolution of American founding and constitutional history where the Tea Party and its scions has isigetically appropriated the likes of Jefferson and Franklin, the doctrine of the separation of church and state as ever

less trustworthy tools in their war against what they consider to be the predations of liberalism. (Lepore 2010) These things matter. The stories we provide for ourselves about the founding conditions of our social (and in this case democratic) traditions shape our social practices and their concomitant attachments. It matters what we tell ourselves about our history and the way we appropriate it. This matters because a condition of the maintenance of an advanced liberal democracy is that we do not tell our children lies about our own story. Moreover, any authentic engagement with the religious must perforce rest on something like truth-telling. But, perhaps more importantly than any of these is the danger that we pursue inappropriate or misleading strategies in developing humane intercultural relations.

2

As I have already suggested, the High Middle Ages represent a period of scarcity, which raises interesting questions for our own time. If the fall of the *Ornament of the World* is not primarily a function of a growing dislike of the other in their otherness but of quite different, emotionally located notions of survival and threat, then educating students to look at the other in their otherness may produce no more than a kind of exoticism which cannot stand up to the scrutiny of the very substantial resource pressures that have, in recent years (and not simply since the banking crisis), pressed in on liberal democratic polities. In my own recent ethnographic work exploring what we might describe as the inscape or whorlèd interior of religious education in the UK, this is exemplified by a student who, on discussing the effectiveness of her religious education considered herself to be more multiculturally educated because, as she opined, 'If a Jew came around to tea I would know what to give them'. (Conroy *et al.* 2012)

3

Education documents in liberal democracies abound with the claims of global citizenship and multiculturalism, two distinct conceits that are frequently, if not invariably, wrapped around each other. For

example the Victorian (Australia) government's document, 'Education for Multicultural citizenship' (State Government of Victoria 2009), suggests that

Multicultural citizenship denotes active participation in our multicultural society and respect for our similarities and differences. Global citizenship denotes an awareness of our interconnectedness with people and environments around the globe, and contribution to a global society and economy. Global and multicultural citizenship are two sides of the coin: one internally focused, the other externally focused. Together, they promote social cohesion and economic advantage locally and globally.

The report goes on to extol the civic virtue of knowing about the other and accepting similarities and differences as if these were matters of little or no complexity. For instance, it is unclear what is meant by active participation in our multicultural society. Hence we might enquire if it is possible to be active in a multicultural society in a non-multicultural way. The problem here is not merely semantic. Here multiculturalism is founded on rather flimsy notions of acquaintance with the other's social, cultural and religious practices. The consequence of these flimsy accounts of religious otherness are to be found in the rising tide of religious illiteracy across Europe.

In the case of the religious these flimsy accounts of multiculturalism and religious plurality have yet deeper epistemic roots. In the third quarter of the twentieth century, under the influence of Ninian Smart and others, phenomenology emerges in religious studies as a counterpoint to the theological and as a way of responding to a number of moves in the philosophy of religion from scholars as diverse as Ayer, Wittgenstein and Braithwaite, who, while different in many respects, variously adopt sceptical poses with regard to the propositional claims of religion. No longer comfortable with the conceit that religious statements embody propositions about the world, they suggest that religion is merely a set of metaphors to encourage people to behave morally. They consider that religion has a kind of performative role—that is, it offers social and psychological support to actions considered to be in the common interest. And one such action is that we should

cultivate the virtue of tolerance. This was to be achieved by recognizing how similar the other's beliefs were to one's own.

In the mid-twentieth century two parallel forms of the phenomenology of religion emerge. The first, shaped by, amongst others, Edmund Husserl, promoted the idea that in order to understand the religious, stripped of all its cultural layers, it was necessary to go through an internal process of reflection—what Ignatius might have considered 'discernment'. This required that we look inwards with a critical eye. The second movement, led by scholars such as Mircea Eliade considered religion to be concerned with absolute worth and that the way to understand it was through the systematic analysis of historical realities—methodologically one could do this through the creation of morphological or classificatory comparisons. Hence we end up with scholars such as Ninian Smart suggesting that Maoist Communism is a religion (or at least a quasi-religion).

This second move comes to dominate much of the study of religion in Europe and religious education embraces it—largely because, at least superficially, it is easier to get students to make comparisons than to invite them to reflect inwards on their own belief systems. The result is that religious education becomes increasingly dominated by sociological comparisons at the expense of structural understanding. I wish to suggest that this turn, with its focus on the other has been unhelpful in developing an education where one authentically understands the other partly because something like a comprehensive understanding of the other requires clarity about the self and one's own beliefs. It is to this I now turn.

THE OTHER AND THE SELF

Assumptions about how we are to live with each other in the face of constrained resources and migratory pressures will require more robust educational practices than those currently on offer; practices that rely on a transitory acquaintance of the other's otherness! As I have suggested all this matters because declarations such as the Toledo Declaration are always in danger of offering a benign view of history where intercommunal relations can be harmonized by offering the other space. But, in the case of al-Andalus this is altogether more troublesome. It

is not only that the Islamic caliphate and *taifas* appear to have been remarkably similar to their Christian neighbours in acquisitiveness, in their sporadic incursions into their neighbours' territories and so forth. More than this, it must be remembered that whatever concessions were afforded *parvenu* Jews they still had to pay punitive taxes and were very much second-class citizens. In any treatment of multiculturalism both then and now, class trumps religious affiliation. Given that economic migrants tend to come from the poor, the dispossessed and the aspirant rather than the successful, their reception into dominant cultures is inevitably problematic. While the Toledo guidelines acknowledge that education on its own is unlikely to remediate the tensions that emerge when migratory patterns and economic *dishabille* visit, what appear on the surface to be, settled liberal democracies, they do nevertheless place a great emphasis on curriculum choice, adopting certain well trodden paths of liberalism; a path striated with contradiction and confusion. Hence, all must be valorised and if there is to be any demurral from such valorisation on the grounds that religious communities have sometimes done 'naughty' things then this is to be historicized. Hence,

[n]eutrality towards religion or belief means that the state may not be hostile toward religions or beliefs and must maintain an objective stance. However, objectivity sometimes requires raising issues about the negative role that members of religious or belief communities may have played at certain moments in history.

The Guidelines document promulgates an education based on the rights of the other and the education of the self about the other. While it is important not to minimize rights talk or teaching about the other what is surprising in a very extensive document is the scant attention paid to the phenomenological turn towards one's own beliefs and assumptions. This, as I have suggested, is because one form of the phenomenology of religion (the descriptive and comparative) has come to dominate religious education at the expense of the other (discernment and self-analysis). The data cited in the Toledo report, and elsewhere intended to extol the virtues of teaching religion for multicultural understanding, relies on nominal and ordinal scales on self-reporting. As I discuss in some recent ethnographic work on the

teaching of religion in British schools, self-reporting about durable habits of mind and consequent social practices may be somewhat less secure than is often imagined. (Conroy *et al.* 2013) Here I wish to suggest that the absence of the turn towards one's own practices leaves a large gap in educational provision. Nowhere in the Toledo document is there explicit or concrete discussion of the self's own otherness with regard to one's accepted social, cultural and religious practices.

The absence of self-critique in the historical analysis of both the Toledo documents and in *The Ornament of the World* means that we rely on romantic accounts of truth. Al-Andalus was prey to the same economic and cultural forces with which we are confronted today and just as they were vulnerable so too are we. While I do not wish to delve into concepts of tolerance at the moment, I do want to suggest that tolerance of the other requires a little more intolerance of the self. Instead of focusing on the other it might be important to focus on the self—not as a form of narcissism but as a way of disclosing the self in the other. A turn to the pedagogies of *enstrangement* (Conroy 2009) may be of assistance here. By this I mean that we should attempt to surface, for our students, the sheer oddness of their own beliefs as a precondition for addressing the other. Rather than trying to domesticate the other by suggesting that they should be like us we must ask ourselves a question that has surfaced again and again in philosophy as well as theology—‘Who am I?’ In the Gospel of St John (7:53– 8:11), when Jesus confronts those about to stone the woman and begins writing (probably the sins of the accusers) in the sand they all drift away as they are faced to confront themselves. Until we are forced to confront ourselves we too often remain strangers to ourselves. This *enstrangement* suggests that it is the conditions of human being that gives rise to our sense of being a stranger. Creating the other as the proximate cause of my being strange is to ignore the conditions of my being. If teaching history is concerned with inviting students to understand how events shape social attitudes then it is important to provide an account that matches both the personal and the political complexity of human relations and interchange.

**ON THE SELF AND THE OTHER IN THE MIDDLE EAST—
SOME TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS**

Of course the injunction on the reading of history has important ramifications for everyday political and cultural life. Suggesting to others how they might conduct their intercultural or politico-economic affairs is always to be approached with some caution. Despite the dangers of doing so I would like to tentatively offer some brief reflections on the implications of considering this manner of approaching the self and his or her relationship with the other. As someone who grew up in the religio-tribal and economic conflict of Northern Ireland I recognise only too well the ease with which the other becomes the focus of one's attention; indeed one's sense of alienation. This tends to lead to a culture of blame and accusation, anger and resentment whereby my travails and traumas are a consequence of the other's treatment of me. This culture of blame paralyses both the personal and the political. It leads to what Arendt considered to be a culture of behaviour rather than a politics of action (Conroy 2003) where the public spaces are populated by those who follow and replicate pre-ordained patterns of engagement; patterns established by stories and narratives that reinforce stereotypical responses to the other. In other words, whether in Northern Ireland or Palestine there is a temptation to write and narrate those versions of events that confirm our existing attitudes and behaviours; indeed our existing prejudices. While this may have the effect of producing a social psychology of self-justification it does little to change the politics or indeed the lives of citizens. As Arendt would have it, only political action can lead to change and that political action must be, itself, rooted in a self-unfolding; a truth-telling to oneself.

The recent death of Nelson Mandela with his support for the 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' is a potent reminder of the import of the principle of self-disclosure: of confronting oneself as one confronts the other. Much was made of the need for white South Africans to confront their own past while there was some resistance to black South Africans doing the same. Indeed Archbishop Desmond Tutu (the emeritus Anglican Archbishop of Capetown) had to remind South Africans that truth and reconciliation could not emanate from a focus only on the other but required that the process required a turning inwards in the attempt to deal truthfully with one's own story.

This truth-telling radically depends on an account of history that does not fall prey to a faux romanticism but confronts the actual complexity of the lived relationships, antagonisms, frustrations and shifting alliances that constitute political economy. The temptation to modify, re-tell and re-write one's own cultural (social and personal) and political narrative in order to position oneself as either victor or victim is apt to miss the actual subtlety of history and the nuance of our relationships with the other. What we learn in arenas of conflict such as Northern Ireland and Palestine is that a careful attention to a nuanced account of history and a considered critique of one's own presuppositions is more important and ultimately more helpful than the morally easy analysis we witness in Menocal's account of the Andalusian caliphate and *taifas* or equally the easy accommodations of the OCSE. It is in a nuanced and careful attention to our history, that we uncover the struggles that ground the rights and obligations evocative of and necessary to, a vibrant political culture where the self and the other live in something like harmony. It is in philosophically and pedagogically considering the conditions of our own *enstrangement* that we become more open to the other in their otherness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Collins, R (2004) *Visigothic Spain 409-711*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Collins, R (2012) *Caliphs and Kings: Spain 796-1031*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Conroy, J (2003) 'What rough beast ...? On reading Arendt after the twin towers', in M Peters, C Lankshear, and M Olssen (eds), *Critical Theory and the Human Condition: Founders and Praxis*, Peter Lang: New York.
- Conroy, J (2009) 'The Enstranged Self: Recovering Some Grounds for Pluralism in Education', *Journal of Moral Education*, 38:2, pp. 145-164.
- Conroy, J Lundie, D and Baumfield, V (2012) 'Failures of Meaning in Religious Education', *Journal of Beliefs and Values*, 33(3), pp. 307-321.
- Conroy, J. *et al.* (2013) *Does Religious Education Work*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Higgins, C. (2011) 'Historians say Michael Gove risks turning history

lessons into propaganda classes: Academics warn against education secretary's plan to celebrate Britain's "distinguished" role in world affairs', *The Guardian Online* at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/aug/17/academics-reject-gove-history-lessons>, downloaded 3 December 2012.

Lepore, J (2011) *The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Menocal M-R (2003) *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain*, Backbay Books.

Phillips, J (2009) *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades*, London: The Bodley Head.

State Government of Victoria (2009) *Education for Global and Multicultural Citizenship: a Strategy for Victorian Government Schools, 2009-2013*, Melbourne: State Government of Victoria.

CHRISTOLOGY OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH

Vrej Nerses Nersessian

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The main line of advance of Christianity into Armenia was from the important base of Caesarea in Cappadocia. According to the sixth-century canon of the Council of Nicaea the exarch of Caesarea had supervisory jurisdiction for the missionary districts to the east of the exarchate. Consequently for about sixty years after the consecration of Saint Gregory the Illuminator as Catholicos of Armenia, his successors were ordained by the exarchs of Caesarea. In 373 open canonical ties with Caesarea were severed—the Church had become sufficiently strong and mature, its clergy had increased in numbers and its authority had been firmly established. However, because of this historical association, the orientation of the Armenian Church in the matter of doctrine was always determined by the Alexandrian school of thought.¹

In this the Council of Ephesus (431), the council at which the Alexandrian position became victorious, was the dominant factor. The first patristic works translated into Armenian were the writings of St Basil, Gregory the Thaumaturge, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, Ephraem the Syrian, Athanasius of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria and others. Thus the Alexandrian atmosphere that existed in the first half of the fifth century was decisive in deciding the orientation of the Armenian Church.

1 Nina G Garsoian, 'Politique ou Orthodoxie? L'Arménie au quatrième siècle', in *Armenia between Byzantium and the Sasanians*, London, 1985, IV, pp. 297–320; Peter L'Huillier Abp., *The Church of the ancient councils. The disciplinary work of the first four ecumenical councils*, New York, 1996, pp. 234–35.

CHURCH COUNCILS

The Armenian Church, together with the other Oriental Orthodox churches, recognizes the doctrinal and canonical validity of the first three councils of the Christian church—namely the Council of Nicaea (325), the Council of Constantinople (381) and the Council of Ephesus (431). She reveres them as holy, and has special days in the liturgical year dedicated to each one of them, celebrated with special hymns and ceremonies. The Armenian Church regards the doctrinal decisions of these councils as ‘The basis of life and guide to the path leading to God’. This attitude is best expressed by a doctrinal statement recited in the Divine Liturgy of the Armenian Church following the Nicæan Creed:

As for those who say there was a time when the Son was not or there was a time when the Holy Spirit was not or that they came into being out of nothing or who say that the Son of God or the Holy Spirit are of different substance and that they are changeable or alterable, such the catholic and apostolic holy church doth anathematize.²

This statement added to the Creed refutes Arianism, Macedonianism, Apollinarianism and Nestorianism and proclaims:

As for us, we shall glorify him who was before the ages, worshipping the Holy Trinity and the one Godhead, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, now and always and unto the ages of ages.³

The Church as a whole has always believed that it is important to maintain the doctrine that Christ is both God and man. If we say that Christ is God and not man, then all that was human in the historical Jesus disappears, including his ability to suffer and to feel as we feel. In fact, Jesus ceases to be our Example, because what was possible for him as God is not necessarily possible for us as man. There are also difficulties

2 *Divine Liturgy of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church with variables, complete rubrics and commentary*. Transl. by Tiran Abp. Nersoyan. Revised fifth edition by Revd V Nersessian, London, 1984, p. 56.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 56.

if we say that Christ is man and not God. If Jesus were only a man, just as other men are, our doctrine of God and redemption would be impoverished to such a degree that it would be unattainable. Christians maintain the central teaching, that God was so good, so interested in the affairs of men, that he himself devised a means of our salvation, and 'sent' Jesus for our redemption. It is the only religion that actually depends entirely upon history. It is faith in the Incarnate God, it is divine redemption given from within history, not by the promulgation of doctrines but by the wrenching of one Man's flesh and the spilling of his blood upon one particular square yard of ground, outside one particular city gate during three particular unrepeatable hours, which could have been measured on a clock.

ALEXANDRIA AND ANTIOCH

There have generally been two schools of thought within her fold, one of which lays stress on the divinity, and the other which places emphasis upon the manhood of Christ. In the ancient Church these two rival tendencies were expressed respectively by the theological schools of Alexandria and Antioch.⁴

The Antiochene school was, on the whole, more concerned with the life and human experience of Christ and sought to make a clear distinction between the human and the divine natures. Diodorus of Tarsus, one of the leading theologians of this school, distinguished Christ, the Son of God, from the Son of David, in whom the Word dwelt 'as in a temple'. He considered that the man born of Mary was the Son of God not by nature but by the grace, only the Word being the Son of God by nature. The stress on the distinction between the two natures rather than on their union, was more marked in the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who looked upon the union as a conjunction of distinct elements, and stated that 'not God, but the temple in which God dwelt is born of the Virgin Mary.'⁵ This separation

4 R V Sellers, *Two ancient Christologies: a study in the Christological thought of the schools of Alexandria and Antioch in the early history of Christian doctrine*, London, 1954; R P C Hanson, *The search for the Christian doctrine of God. The Arian controversy*, Edinburgh, 1988, pp. 318-81.

5 Dimitri Z Zaharopoulos, *Theodore of Mopsuestia on the Bible. A Study of his Old Testament Exegesis*, New York, 1989.

was even carried further by Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople. The latter claimed that the two natures had remained complete and distinct after the union, each one retaining its specific properties and acting according to them.

The union in Christ was, according to Nestorius, a personal union. This conception led to the recognition of two Sons in Jesus Christ, for the person of Jesus Christ resulting from the Incarnation was not absolutely identical with that of the Word, before the Incarnation.⁶ This doctrine, in the final analysis, threatened the doctrine of Redemption since salvation could not have been achieved by a man; humanity could not have been saved if God himself had not suffered and died on the cross.

Alexandrian theology started from the concept of the divinity of Christ. Its exponents insisted more on the divinity of the Word Incarnate and the intimate and complete union of the two natures in the person of Christ. St Cyril of Alexandria taught that the person of Christ is identical with that of the Word; the Word incarnate is Jesus Christ and is complete in his divinity. But the humanity that the Word has assumed, and in which He lives, is also complete, being composed of a body animated by a rational soul. 'The two distinct natures', he wrote, 'had united into a true union, and from both one Christ and one Son had come, not as though the difference of the natures had been done away by the union, but, on the contrary, that they constituted the one Lord Jesus Christ and Son by the unutterable union of the Godhead and the manhood.' St Cyril defined this intimate union by the formula 'One incarnate nature of God the Word'. There is one Son in Jesus Christ and He, being identical with the Word, is the Son of God; this same Word incarnate is the Son of Mary by nature, and thus Mary is 'Godbearer' (*Theotokos*) and not just the 'bearer of Christ' (*Christotokos*), a term preferred by the Antiochene school.⁷

The Christology of St Cyril triumphed at the Council of Ephesus in 431, and Nestorius and his supporters were condemned as heretics. But this teaching was gradually deformed by some of his followers, especially by Eutyches, the archimandrite of a monastery in

6 Friedrich Loofs, *Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian doctrine*, Cambridge, 1914.

7 Henry Chadwick and J E L Oulton, *Alexandrian Christianity: selected translations of Clement and Origen*, London, 1964.

Constantinople. Eutyches so emphasised the union that the two natures in Christ were confused and the manhood seemed to be absorbed by the Godhead. He denied that the *body* of the Saviour was of the same substance as ours, and this naturally raised the question whether the manhood of Christ was true manhood or merely docetic.

COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON

The Tome of Leo represents the opposite view to the concept just outlined. Leo I and the Council of Chalcedon suspected Eutyches of teaching a form of Docetism, that is, the denial of Christ's truly human nature, and, thus, of incarnation as such. Therefore Leo emphasised the difference of divinity and humanity in Christ in the Roman tradition. The most important expressions in the Chalcedonian formulation were to be the following:

Each nature performs what is proper to itself in common with the other; the Word, that is, performing what is proper to the Word, and the flesh carrying out what is proper to the flesh, the one shines out in miracles, the other succumbs to injuries.

Although there is in the Person of the Lord Jesus one Person of God and man, yet that wherein the suffering is common to both is one thing, and that wherein the glory is common is another, for from us He has the humanity inferior to the Father, and from the Father He has divinity equal to the Father.

In order to pay the debt of our condition, the invisible Nature was united to a passible, so that, as was necessary for our healing, one and the same Mediator between God and man the Man Jesus Christ, should be able from one to die and from the other should not be able to die.⁸

Contrary to the Cyrilline-Alexandrian concept, Leo made the flesh, that is, Christ's human nature, into a centre of autonomous activity. All

⁸ T H Bradley and F W Green, *The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith*, London, 1950, pp. 157-74.

these ideas had, in fact, been conserved by both the Alexandrine and Antiochene traditions in the East. The clash between them was the result of fear on the part of the former that the latter was not affirming the unity of Christ's Person in any real sense. The Tome appeared to be expounding the doctrine of the two natures to the entire satisfaction of the Antiochene side.

CHALCEDON AND THE ARMENIAN CHURCH

The Armenian Church teaching influenced by Alexandrian thought on theological grounds, from the middle of the fourth century, repudiated the formulations of the Council of Chalcedon. The Chalcedonian Definition was judged to be deviating from the theology of St Cyril of Alexandria and sanctioned by the Council of Ephesus. The Armenian Church did not react against the Council of Chalcedon upon the instigation and influence of the Syrian Church nor were they misled because of the deficiency of their language in its capacity to render correctly the subtleties of the Greek expressions. Neither did they exploit the doctrinal issues for purely political and nationalistic purposes. The theological discussions were based on the Greek terms and conceptions. In spite of the political unrest in Armenia at the time of the council (the momentous Battle of Avarayr waged against the Persians in defence of the Christian faith in 451) the Armenian Church had soon the knowledge of the decisions of the council and was able to fully participate in the discussions that followed. After long debates they deeply resented the new formulations, which were regarded as alien to the traditional Christology of the time and revealed close association with the Christology already condemned in the teaching of Nestorius. The explicit rejection of the Council came at the Second Council of Dvin in 555, during the Catholicate of Nerses II Bagrevandatsi (548-57), where it confirmed its rejection of the teachings of Nestorius, Theodore (of Mopsuestia), the Council of Chalcedon, the Tome of Leo, Eutyches, and Severus (of Antioch)⁹

9 *Girk' T'ghtots [Book of Letters]*, 2nd edition, Jerusalem, 1994. For partial translations into English and French see Leif Frivold, *The Incarnation. A study of the Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Armenian Church in the 5th and 6th centuries according to the Book of Letters*, Oslo, 1981; M'Tallon, SJ, *Livre des Lettres (Girk' T'ghtots). Ier Groupe: Documents concernant les relations avec les Grecs*, Beyrouth, 1955.

and this stance has remained constant throughout the centuries up to the modern times.

‘MONOPHYSITISM’

In examining the reasons why the Armenian Church and the other non-Chalcedonian Churches adopted the stand against the Tome of Leo and the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon it is necessary to see whether they criticised the council from a monophysite point of view, an accusation sometimes attributed to them by the Chalcedonian Churches.¹⁰

The *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (3rd ed., 2003) describes Monophysitism as ‘The doctrine that in the Person of the Incarnate Christ there is only one nature, not two ... covers a variety of positions, some capable of orthodox interpretation, others not.’ Thus by this definition, ideas that were ascribed to Eutyches were also ascribed to the non-Chalcedonian Churches.

One of the bases on which the term Monophysitism is used with reference to the non-Chalcedonian Churches is its defence of the use of the phrase ‘One incarnate nature of God the Word’.

The ‘One’ in the phrase ‘One incarnate nature’ is not a simple one, so that the characterization ‘monophysite’ cannot be considered applicable to the position held by the Armenian Church. In the Incarnation, by a divine act of condescension, God the Son willed to be so united with manhood that the two of them came together, without either of them being lost or diminished. At the same time, their union was so real and perfect that Christ was ‘one incarnate nature’.

DOCTRINE OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH

In face of the misunderstanding expressed by the Chalcedonian tradition described above, we shall put together the ideas emphasized by some of the Armenian theologians on those specific points of doctrine.

¹⁰ John Meyendorff, *Imperial unity and Christian divisions, The Church 450-680 A.D.*, New York, 1989, p. 283. The author is wrong in his assertion that ‘After this council the Armenian catholicosate of Dvin firmly adopted the Monophysite position.’

According to the Armenian Apostolic Church the Orthodox faith is that Our Lord is perfect in His Godhead and perfect in His Manhood. They dare not say, however, that He is God and Man together, for this expression implies separation. He is rather God Incarnate. In the *Teaching of Saint Gregory* the doctrine of the Incarnation is expounded in the following terms:

God the Holy Son was sent from God (The Father); he took flesh from the Virgin (and became) perfect man with perfect Godhead; he showed forth the power of the divinity and exposed the weakness of the flesh; those who believed in the flesh (he) manifested to them his Godhead; and those who erred (in their belief concerning) the flesh they denied his nature (i.e. his human nature). He united (himself) to the flesh in (his) nature and mixed the flesh with his Godhead; ... the true faith is this: He descended and mixed (his) Godhead with (our) manhood and the immortal with the mortal so that he could make us participants in the immortality of his Godhead; thus, when the Son of God equal to the Father, came with his flesh to the right of his Father, he united us to God.¹¹

Hence the union in which the Armenian Church believes in differs essentially and substantially from the kind of union professed by Eutyches. Eutyches maintained that our Lord is one nature, but that the manhood of Christ is absorbed in His divinity and completely vanishes like a drop of vinegar in the sea. In fact he is denying the real existence of the manhood of Christ. Several doctrinal documents belonging to various periods, make clear how the Armenian Church understood the union of the two natures.

The first of these documents is a treatise ascribed to the famous Armenian historian of the fifth century, Moses Khorenatsi.¹² Speaking against those who separate Christ in two, he asserts very strongly the idea of unity right from the very beginning by saying that it is possible for many elements to join together and to be united in one nature. Man

11 *The Teaching of Saint Gregory*. Revised edition. Translation, commentary and introduction by Robert W Thomson, New York, 2001, pp. 103–04.

12 Girk'T'ght'ots, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–71; Leif Frivold, *The Incarnation*, pp. 66–73

is composed of earthly and spiritual elements, but he has one nature. The two are not confused in him, that is to say, the flesh is not soul and the soul is not flesh. Each maintains its own properties. Their union does not destroy the distinctness of the two. Likewise the Incarnation also must be understood in the same manner. We must confess Christ One in His nature because it is said 'the Word became flesh' and that 'He took the form of a servant'. The meaning of the Scriptures is clear: that which was taken by the Word was that which he did not have. Therefore, the two, the Word and the flesh, which were separate before the Incarnation, became One after the Incarnation.

Half a century later, when the controversy over the use of the term 'natures' was more acute, the Armenian theologian Yovhannes Mandakuni (420-490) composed his *Demonstration* in which he analyzed the meaning of this term and the legitimacy of its application to Christ. Yovhannes acknowledges that the term 'nature' has different connotations. One can speak of the natures of the body, of the soul, and of the mind, and these are all different; yet man is not many, but one. Similarly, the many names of Christ do not involve several persons or natures, but only one Lord. Christian tradition, summed up at Nicaea, speaks of the single nature of the Son who is of the essence of his Father, so John can say that the Son is of the same nature as the Father. Hence the name of the Son is his divinity. But this term is not scriptural, so Yovhannes suggests that 'life' would be more appropriate to indicate the single personality of Christ. Yovhannes thus realises that 'nature' does not necessarily mean 'person', but the traditional identification of these two terms is still influential enough to lead him to stress that the acts of Christ can be ascribed to only one nature, for the Lord is one.

The Incarnation is thus to be conceived as the indivisible union of the Logos and the flesh, but the subject of discourse is always the divine Word. The Logos was incarnate, became a man, and was united to the flesh, and this flesh is said to be the flesh of the Word by a true union. But the Word did not become flesh by nature, for then the flesh would be the Word. So Christ was by will and not by nature in the flesh; He is God with the flesh, and with this same body (for Armenian does not distinguish 'flesh' and 'body'). For him the union is a genuinely real one and not a sheer principle of union or indwelling of the Word in the flesh. 'Some consider that the descending (the Incarnation) was

in appearance and not in truth. They believe that Christ became man in the sense that He inhabited the flesh by complaisance and will.' Here, in fact, he is criticising the ideas propounded in the name of Theodore of Mopsuestia who was influential in the bordering countries of Armenia. Secondly, he criticises the Chalcedonian position for its dualistic interpretation of Christ's life and death. The distinctness of the two natures has led the dyophysite thinkers so far as to give each nature the meaning of a person. It is this hypostasized understanding of Christ's natures, as the Tome of Leo formulates so sharply, that was fiercely opposed by the Armenian Church. The core of the position of the Armenian Church can be summed by this passage in the *Demonstration*:

God the Word took flesh and became man; thus, He united to Himself in God-fitting manner, the body of our lowliness, the whole soul and flesh; and the flesh truly became the flesh of the Word of God. In virtue of this it is said of the Invisible that He is seen, of the Intangible that He is felt, crucified, buried and risen on the third day. For He Himself was both the passible, and the impassible, the immortal who received death.¹³

It is clear from these documents, that the Armenian doctrine of the nature of Christ firmly asserts the oneness of the two natures of Christ, and not a unification of the two natures. One nature out of two natures unconfused and indivisible without change or diminution.

The attempt of the Chalcedonians to conceive the one apart from the other would be as perverse as for anyone to represent the human body as a man in and by itself. It is improper to designate Christ as a man who became God, but only as God who became man; not a *conversion* into flesh and bones, but *assumption* of flesh and bones. When the evangelist says 'the Word became flesh', he refers to the divine as sharing in all that Christ experienced as man. The dogmatic statements contained in the writings of Armenian theologians are directed towards the retention of a principle of unity, while at the same time they

¹³ Karekin Sarkissian, Abp., *The Council of Chalcedon and the Armenian Church*, Canada, 2006, pp. 177-83; M Tallon, *Livre des Lettres*, Chapter III, *La Demonstration* de Jean Mandakouni, pp. 78-138.

concede the diversity of the predicates, and aim to define all the deeds and sufferings of Christ as at once divine and human.

NERSES SHNORHALI'S DEFINITION OF FAITH

St Nerses IV Klayetsi, Catholicos of All Armenians (1102–73), better known by the epithet *Shnorhali* (full of grace), was the greatest literary figure of the Silver Age of the twelfth century.¹⁴ In 1141 he with his brother, Catholicos Gregory III Pahlavuni (1113–66), attended the Church Council held in Antioch, the first official contact between the Latin and Armenian Churches. In April 1166 Catholicos Grigor Pahlavuni appointed Nerses co-adjutor catholicos and he conducted the administrative duties of the see until his death. Shnorhali's literary career extended over half a century.

One of the most remarkable aspects of Nerses Shnorhali's career was his unrelenting endeavour to recover the unity of the Armenian and Byzantine Churches. He issued four encyclicals on Church unity: three of them (1166, 1170, and 1173) were addressed to Emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1143–80), and the fourth to Patriarch Michael III (1170–8). Nerses IV Klayetsi was the ecumenical figure *par excellence* of the Christian Church. His continuous negotiations with the Byzantine emperor, for the reunion of the Armenian and Greek Churches, constitutes one of the brightest chapters in the history of ecumenical dialogue. He produced doctrinal treatises to prove the Orthodoxy of the Armenian Church: *The Confession of Faith of the Armenian Church* and *Definition of Faith of the Armenian Church*. What is notable about his approach is that, in contrast to the maximalist attitude of the Greeks, who tended to demand that the Armenian Church conform in all ritual and ceremonial usage as well as in all dogmatic formulae to their traditions, Nerses insists that complete uniformity is necessary only in the most basic doctrinal essentials; to demand more, he says, is to risk falling into the Pharisaic legalism

14 Vrej Nersessian, 'Das Beispiel Heiligen: Leben und Werk des Hl. Nerses Clajensis mit dem Beinamen Schnorhali' in *Die Kirche Armeniens. Eine Völkskirche zwischen Ost und West*, Friedrich Heyer, Stuttgart, 1978 [*Die Kirchen der Welt*, Vol. XVIII], pp. 3 9–69; 'Nerses IV Klayetsi, called *Shnorhali*' in *The Everyman Companion to East European Literature*, ed. R B Pynsent, with the assistance of S I Kanikova, London, 1993, pp. 282–84.

condemned by Jesus as elevating human traditions above the Word of God.

**DEFINITION OF FAITH
OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH**

Written by Nerses, Catholicos of All Armenians, at the Request of Emperor Manuel, the God-Loving King of The Greeks.

Catholicos Nerses begins his definition of faith with a staunch defence of the Trinitarian Doctrine reached at the first three Ecumenical councils, before he directs his attention to the inter relationship of the Son with the other Persons of the Trinity.

[...] We also confess these three persons having come together being united in one Godhead and not separated from one another by different natures, introducing any time period or creature between them (as per Arius), but we believe and recognize one nature of the Most Holy Trinity, one dominion, one power, one glory. And again, we do not join Sabellius of Libya, who follows the Jewish teaching that the three persons are gathered in one, but we separate them inseparably and we unify them distinctly according to the doctrine of the orthodox Fathers.

But the Father is always Father by having in Him immutably the Word, the power and the wisdom and the life; and the Son is eternally Son born of the Father and being always with the Father, and the Holy Spirit is everlastingly the Spirit of God and with God. The Father is Himself cause and the Son and the Spirit are from the cause without time and without cause. The Father has His origin from no one and the Son and the Spirit have their origin from the Father. But the Son and the Spirit being before time and nature are co-creators with the Father. And as we confess Him to have been one out of two natures and not having lost one of the two in the union,

in the same way we do not say of the will as being one and other, as if the divine will were opposed to the human will, or the human to the divine; but we say that out of one essence, the wills being dual according to the difference of time, sometimes divine when He willed to manifest the power of His Godhead, and sometimes human when He willed to reveal the humility of His manhood. And these are the manifestations not of opposition, but of free will, because it was not the human will that forced itself upon the divine, as it is in us, when the will of the flesh desires in opposition to the soul, but the human followed the divine will, for when He willed and permitted, then the body would be given to its own desires, as at the temptation, when after the completion of the forty-day fast, when He willed to permit the nature of the body to hunger. For though He said that the Father's will was different from His, according to what is said 'not as I will, but as thou wilt', this is a manifestation of the accord of the Son with the will of the Father and not of opposition. This is explained elsewhere as being something proper to the divinity and not to the incarnate body: 'I descended from heaven not to do my own will, but my Father's will', and it is evident that what descended from heaven was the incorporeal Godhead and not body, which He took after descending on the earth.

And concerning the Godhead how would one dare to separate the Son's will from that of the Father, and what the Father's will is the Son shows by saying, 'This is the will of my Father, that I will give eternal life to all those who believe in me'? Now, it is the Father's will to give life to those who believe in the Son and does not the Son have His will? Especially by these words the Son shows His accord with the will of the Father and not His opposition, after Gregory the Theologian.

For, states Gregory, when the Son says to the Father, 'Not my will, but thine be done which is also mine', He shows that His will and the Father's will are one. Because if all that is of the Father is also of the Son, and whatever is of

the Son is of the Father, it is clear then that the Father's will is also the will of the Son and the Son's will is the Father's will [...].

For although He was conceived as man, yet as God He was conceived by the Holy Spirit. He was born of a woman as man, yet of a virgin, and He kept the virginity of the bearer immaculate after His birth as God. When eight days old He was circumcised as man, and He removed the circumcision of the body, being the giver of the law of circumcision, He taught the circumcision of the heart. He was presented in the Temple as man when forty days old, yet He was testified by Simeon as being God who releases the captives. He escaped Herod yet as man and as God He put idols to flight from Egypt. He was baptized by John as man, but washed off Adam's sin by His baptism, and He was testified by the Father and the Spirit as God. The new Adam was tempted like the old one, and as the Creator of Adam He defeated the tempter and as God He gave authority to the children of Adam to trample down the power of the enemy. He hungered as man, and as God He fed unopposed thousands with a few loaves. He thirsted as man, and as God He called to Him those who were thirsty in order to enable them to drink the water of life. He was tired on the road as man, but as God to the workers and to the heavily laden by sins He gave rest with His easy yoke and with His light burden. He slept in the boat as man, and as God He walked over the depths and He rebuked the wind and the sea. He paid tribute as man, but as God He created new coins from the mouth of the fish.

He prayed with us and for us as man, and as God together with His Father He accepted the prayers of all. He wept over His beloved as man, and as God He stopped the tears of the sisters by raising their brother. As man He asked 'Where have you laid Lazarus?' and as God He raised by His voice him who had been dead for four days.

As man He was sold for a small price, and as God He purchased the world for a great price with His Blood. He

became mute like a lamb before its slaughterer, according to His human nature, but by virtue of His divine nature He is the Word of God from the beginning, by which the heavens were established. He was nailed onto the wood with the robbers, as man, but as God He turned the daylight into darkness and He enabled the robber to enter paradise. He drank vinegar and He was fed with hyssop as man, but as God He changed the water into wine and became the sweetener of bitter foods. He died as man in His human nature and as God He raised the dead by divine power.

He tasted death in body inasmuch as He willed as man, and as God He destroyed death by death. Not one dead and one destroyer of death, but He himself dead and the same alive and giver of life to the dead, for He is one and the same Christ, as man being mortal by nature, but as God being immortal by nature.¹⁵

THEOTOKOS

The Armenian doctrine of the Virgin birth and redemption is also consistent with the above exposition of the doctrine of the nature of Christ. The Armenian Hymnal, which contains a rich collection of hymns dating from the fifth to the thirteenth centuries, renders the doctrine of the Incarnation from the realm of the mere speculation and lends to it the character of the pragmatic. Mary is the Bearer-of-God (*Astuads-a-dsin*), a formula constantly reiterated to show that the Holy One who was born of her was God Himself made flesh. In one of the hymns sung during the feast of Christmas the birth of Christ is described as:

Mystery Great and profound that has been revealed this
day.
Shepherds sing with angels, giving good tidings to the
earth

15 Apcar Amy, *Melodies of the Offices for the Eves of Christmas and Easter and for the Blessing of the Water on Christmas Day*, Breitkopf and Haertel, Leipzig, 1908, p. 6.

A new king is born in Bethlehem town.
Give blessings sons of men since for us he is incarnate.

The uncontainable in Earth and Heaven is
wrapped within swaddling clothes
From the Father inseparable, He seats Himself
in the Holy altar.

It follows from all this that the suffering of Christ is a Divine Sacrifice.
Christ's death was a voluntary death, endured solely for our Salvation:

Thou Who in ineffable being
Art co-sharer of the Father's glory,
Didst voluntarily consent
To suffer in the flesh for us.¹⁶

This last aspect of the doctrine of the nature of Christ involved the Armenian Church in the controversy concerning the corruptibility and incorruptibility of our Lord's body, a problem closely linked with the controversy of the nature of Christ. It would be only natural for the Armenian Church to affirm that our Lord's body was incorruptible. But this affirmation did not mean that Christ had a heavenly body in any sense or it was unreal because the Armenian Church has always confessed that Christ's body was passible.

The idea of the incorruptibility is that Christ being sinless, his body could not be affected by the consequences of sin. One of the arguments set forth in considering the Armenian doctrine Monophysite in the Eutychian sense is the form of the Trisagion as it is recited in the Armenian Liturgy: 'Holy God, Holy and powerful, Holy and immortal, who wast crucified for us.' The controversial clause is 'Who wast crucified for us.' This phrase is replaced by other appropriate phrases corresponding to the Dominical feast that is celebrated. For instance on Easter the wording is: 'Who didst rise from the dead'; on Annunciation, Nativity, and Epiphany: 'Who wast born and manifested for us,' and so forth. From this it is clear that the

¹⁶ *Divine Liturgy of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church*, p. 49; M Krikorian, 'Christology in the liturgical tradition of the Armenian Church', *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, XIII, 2 (1968), pp. 212-25.

Trisagion is sung in honour of Christ, not of the Trinity, and inasmuch as the Godhead was present in Christ incarnate it was legitimate to say that God has been crucified for us, has risen from the dead and was born and manifested for us.¹⁷

When we examine the non-Chalcedonian position carefully, we become convinced that the sole object of the reputed dissenters was to safeguard the divinely wrought redemption. They feel that it is a suffering God, not man, that makes the Cross of Calvary significant. The letter of Pope Leo I to Flavian itself affirms as such:

‘The impassible God,’ writes Leo, ‘became a suffering man; the Immortal One submitted himself to the dominion of death.’

To sum up the Armenian position, what they wished to say was that in the total being and action of Jesus Christ, both God and man are simultaneously and continually present and at work. The relationship between them is integral and persisting. To use here an excellent word, it is *unlooseable*. Once it has taken place, in accordance with the divine purpose, it is there; it cannot be undone. The objection to Chalcedon is not derived from a monophysite point of view; it came from a genuine fear that the council did not affirm the unity of Christ adequately, and that therefore it violated the faith of the Church. It is also clear that while opposing the council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo, the Armenian Church was fully aware of the Eutychian heresy, and that she excluded it with as much force and determination as the Chalcedonian side. Therefore, the reason for its opposition to Chalcedon was not an implicit or explicit sympathy for the position referred to as Eutychianism by the council of Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo.

DIALOGUE TOWARDS CONVERGENCE

The subsequent history of Chalcedon with all its efforts aiming at a reconciliation between the Chalcedonians and the non-Chalcedonians has shown that rapprochement and a common understanding are

¹⁷ *Divine Liturgy of the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church*, pp. 147–49.

possible if the problem is approached in the following spirit expressed by the twelfth-century Armenian theologian and catholicos Nerses IV:

Therefore, if One nature is said for the indissoluble and indivisible union and not for the confusion, and Two natures is said as being unconfused, immutable and indivisible, both are within the bounds of orthodoxy.¹⁸

This statement was uttered by the Armenian Church leader in his continuous negotiations with the Byzantine emperor, Manuel I Comnenus (1143-1180), for the reunion of the Armenian and Byzantine Churches. With this statement the Armenian Church is aware that there are different ways of expressing the same faith. Unity can be recovered and intercommunion restored beyond the words and formulae, if charity, good will and prayer become the driving force in the course of the negotiations. In the present negotiations the Armenian position has not changed. The Chalcedonian formula has of course come to stay. But the sense in which that formula was taken has fortunately gone. The council of Chalcedon had taken the words nature, person, and substance in their Nicaean sense and applied them to Christ, thus undoing by implication what Nicaea had done. This was the real reason why the council incurred the stricture of the non-Chalcedonians. Throughout the centuries the Chalcedonians have done exactly the reverse by taking the word nature in a sense opposite to the one given in Nicaea. Therefore there is no reason to perpetuate the division created by the council of Chalcedon.

TWENTIETH CENTURY

For several years there have been regular meetings between the theologians belonging to the Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian Churches. Meetings have been held in Aarhus (1964), Bristol (1967), Geneva (1970) and Addis Ababa (1971). The *Pro Oriente* ecumenical foundation has conducted theological consultations between the theologians of the Oriental Orthodox Churches and the Roman

18 Aram Keshishian I, Catholicos, 'The correspondence of Nerses *Shnorhali* with Manuel Comnenus (1165-73)', *Hask Hayagitakan Taregirk'*, n.s. I (1980), pp. 91-106.

Catholic Church in Vienna in 1971, 1973, 1976, 1978 and 1988,¹⁹ which began to heal the rift that had existed for more than fifteen centuries. The subject debated in these consultations was Christology. Does the Incarnate Christ have two natures or one, two wills or one? These conferences have made abundantly clear that, beneath variations of terminology, the Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian traditions share one and the same underlying faith. The content of the faith is the same for both, although the language in which that content is expressed may be different. The summary and conclusions issued by the Geneva consultation outlines the 'Reaffirmation of Christological agreement', which reaffirms the results achieved at the two preceding meetings in Aarhus and Bristol:

We both teach that Christ who is consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead became consubstantial also with us according to humanity in the Incarnation, that He who was before all ages begotten from the Father, was in these last days for us and for our salvation born of the Virgin Mary, and that in Him the two natures are united in the one hypostasis of the Divine Logos, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.²⁰

However, one cannot ignore the fact that the long period of separation has brought about certain differences in the formal expression of that tradition.

The Chalcedonians accept seven ecumenical councils, the non-Chalcedonians three, while the Roman Catholic Church has summoned twenty-one councils. In the event of union, what status will the two sides assign to the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh councils and the twenty-one Roman catholic councils? Certain men are venerated as saints by one side, yet denounced as heretics by the other (Leo of Rome, Dioscorus of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, etc.). How are

19 *Towards Unity. The Theological Dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches*, eds Christine Chaillot and Alexander Belopopsky, Geneva, 1996, pp. 79-80.

20 *Five Vienna Consultations between Theologians of the Oriental Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church*. Selected papers in one volume published and edited by the ecumenical Foundation *Pro-Oriente*, Vienna/Austria, 1993.

these anathemas to be lifted and the saints mutually venerated? How are the two sides to be integrated on the jurisdictional level? There are, for example, both Greek and Coptic patriarchs in Alexandria, both a Chalcedonian and a Jacobite patriarch of Antioch. The Armenian Church has patriarchs in Jerusalem and Constantinople. How could they be related in the event of organic unity? The first two points concern the 'localisation' of holy tradition. The Byzantine Orthodox are committed to Chalcedon, the non-Chalcedonians are committed to the first three ecumenical councils. The Geneva meeting suggested a possible escape from the impasse when they made the distinction between the 'true intention of the dogmatic definition of the council' and the 'particular terminology in which it is expressed, which the latter has less authority than the intention.' The position of the Armenian Church was best expressed by Archbishop Tiran Nersoyan:

A Christian's loyalty is not to a council as such, but to the church as a whole, which itself is the highest Council, and which is the keeper of the deposit of the faith. The Council is judged by the faith of the Tradition and not vice versa. That is why some councils have been rejected by the Church ... others have been accepted universally or partially. ... Consequently, there is a hierarchy of Councils, both with respect to the importance ascribed to them and with respect to the extension of their reception. It is an historical fact that councils have been accepted after their statements have been the subject of further dialogue within the church.²¹

Thus it might be possible for the non-Chalcedonians to accept the intentions of the fourth council as Orthodox, and to admit that what they rejected was primarily its formulation and terminology. The question of lifting of anathemas and the mutual recognition of saints was the main topic of the meeting held in Addis Ababa (1971). In its official report the Addis Ababa consultation stated: 'The lifting of

21 Tiran Nersoyan Abp, 'Problems of consensus in Christology. The function of councils', *Armenian Church Historical Studies. Matters of Doctrine and Administration*, ed. with an introduction by Nerses Vrej Nersessian, New York, 1996, p. 155; Vrej Nersessian, 'The source of the authority and infallibility of the Ecumenical councils' (in Armenian) *Ejmiadsin Monthly*, 9-10 (1991), pp. 55-68.

anathemas ... seems to be an essential stage on the road to unity of the two traditions.' The report continued, 'Once the anathemas pronounced against certain persons have been lifted it will not be necessary to require their recognition as saints by those who had so pronounced against them. Various national Churches have their calendars and lists of saints that differ. It is not necessary to impose uniformity in this matter.' What would be necessary in case of lifting the anathemas would be for both parties to make an official declaration to the effect that there exists essential unity in faith between the two traditions, based on the doctrinal statement issued as a result of the consultations at Aarhus, Bristol and Geneva.

The question of traditions and jurisdiction in the national Churches, particularly the Armenian Church is not merely an administrative matter. In a Church like the Armenian Church, religious and national identity are closely intertwined and its existence depends heavily on this factor. Having a substantial number of its members outside the geographical boundaries of the motherland, as a minority in the midst of other Christians the need of maintaining national jurisdictions and strengthening national traditions is fundamental. There is, however, room for variety, both in theological expressions and in canonical and liturgical practice.

The participants at the Addis Ababa consultation took the view that the time had come to move from the 'unofficial level' to the 'official level'. In their report they conclude: 'We hope that the work done at the unofficial level might be taken up officially by the churches.' Towards the implementation of this hope the first steps have now been taken in order to turn this hope into reality. On the Chalcedonian side, the Inter-Orthodox Theological Commission for the dialogue with the non-Chalcedonian churches held its first meeting at Addis Ababa in 1971. Taking into account the work already done in previous meetings, the commission affirmed that the two sides were now sufficiently prepared to embark on an official dialogue. The commission went on to request the non-Chalcedonian Churches to set up a corresponding commission, so that joint discussions could be arranged.

In the unofficial consultations between the non-Chalcedonians and the Roman Catholics, similar in character to the dialogues between the Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian churches, in their joint declaration, the participants have focused on the 'Common

foundation in the same apostolic tradition' as expressed by the first three ecumenical councils. 'With one accord we reject alike the Nestorian and the Eutychian positions concerning Christ.' They declared 'We believe that our Lord Jesus Christ is God and Son Incarnate, perfect in his divinity and perfect in his humanity. His humanity is one with his divinity without confusion, without division, without change, without separation.' Then they reaffirmed in general terms their differences in theological interpretation of the mystery of Christ which calls for further discussions. It is clear that enough progress has been made to make a union between the Chalcedonian, non-Chalcedonian and the Roman Catholic Churches possible and thus bring a valuable contribution in general to the ecumenical movement. It is hoped that all the leaders of the Churches would work hard for the realisation of the Church unity now that the groundwork has been done and basic differences resolved.

Further Reading

- Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare, *The Armenian Church: Heritage and Identity*. Compiled, with introduction, by the Revd Nerses Vrej Nersessian, New York, 2001.
- Nersessian, Vrej, 'Armenian Christianity' in ed. Leslie Houlden, *Jesus in History, Thought and Culture. An Encyclopedia*, ABC-CLIO, 2003, pp. 63-66.
- Nersessian, Vrej, 'Armenian Christianity', in ed. Ken Parry, *The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity*, Blackwell, 2007, pp. 23-46 and 458-61.
- Nersessian, Vrej, 'The Armenian Tradition' in ed. Augustine Casiday, *The Orthodox Christian World*, London, 2012, pp. 41-57.

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN TURKEY: AN OVERVIEW

Anthony O'Mahony

The presence of Christianity and Christian-Muslim relations in modern Turkey starts with the creation of the republic in 1923. The creation of the Turkish Republic marks a watershed in the history of Christianity in the ex-Ottoman territories.¹ This historic change has been observed with an often tragic mood set in the context of nostalgia. Wilhelm Baum writes 'Turkey was born through the destruction of the Byzantine and Armenian cultural worlds, which have always belonged to Europe and to the cultural sphere historically shaped by Christianity.'² The Jesuit scholar of Eastern Christianity, John Krajcar SJ, posits another observation 'Is there a future for Christianity in Turkey?' Ironically, Asia Minor had more Christians than any other territory in the Roman empire. St Paul was the first to preach the Gospel there; St John settled at Ephesus as 'overbishop'. Although Christianity was stamped out in the course of centuries, vestiges of its past survived. Two Ecumenical Councils were held at Nicaea (Iznik); in 451 Chalcedon (Kadiköy) harboured 600 bishops; and the Council at Ephesus upheld doctrines of Our Lady. Today, missionaries, faced with a graveyard of Christianity and multiplicity of rites, are struggling and seeking new approaches to bring this once Catholic stronghold to its ancient fervour.³ John Eibner takes further the question of civilization, culture and religion with his reflection on the situation of Christians in Turkey today: 'Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's "Alliance

1 Vincenzo Poggi, 'Le decline de l'Empire ottoman et les Églises orientales', in *L'Œuvre d'Orient: Solidarités anciennes et nouveaux défis*, (eds) Hervé Legrand and Giuseppe Maria Croce, Cerf, Paris, 2010, pp. 173-188.

2 Wilhelm Baum, *The Christian Minorities in Turkey*, Kitab Verlag, Vienna-Klagenfurt, 2006, p. 5.

3 John Krajcar SJ, 'Turkey: A Graveyard of Christianity', *Worldmission*, Vol. 15, 1964, pp. 64-72, p. 64.

of Civilizations” rhetoric, ... Turkey is very much entrenched in the clash of civilizations paradigm. Unless Ankara is prepared to combat the widespread “Christophobia” that fuels violence and other forms of repression, the country’s Christians are doomed to remain an oppressed and discriminated against minority, and Turkey’s aspirations of democratic transformation and full integration with Europe will remain stillborn.⁴ The territories which are now the modern Turkish state are long associated with Christianity which until the early decades of the twentieth century had a strong and living Christian presence; however, as that century progressed, Turkey’s Christian population dropped to a very small number. Despite its long history Christianity has little public presence in present-day Turkey. That said the civilization paradigm remains a point of orientation, as today there is a growing interest in the Byzantine empire and Christian culture among some members of Turkish society—this interest is often posited in opposition to Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. The question of religious freedom is a key pivot of aspiration for the Christians of Turkey.⁵ The Christian community in Turkey continues to feel the realities of violence often against the background of continuing assertion of religion as a marker in the discourse of identity politics. The murder of the Armenian intellectual Hrant Dink in 2007 deeply troubled Armenians and the wider Christian community in Turkey.⁶ The head of Turkey’s Catholic Church, Bishop Luigi Padovese, was brutally murdered on 3 June 2010, stabbed repeatedly and decapitated at his home in Iskenderun by his driver.⁷ Padovese had conducted the

4 John Eibner, ‘Turkey’s Christians under Siege’, *Middle East Quarterly*, 2011, pp. 41–52, p. 41.

5 Behnan Konutgan, ‘Christians Still Second-class Citizens under Turkish Secularism’, *International Journal for Religious Freedom*, No. 1, 2009, pp. 99–110.

6 Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, ‘The Armenian Community and the AK Party: Finding Trust under the Crescent’, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, no. 4, 2010, pp. 93–111.

7 Luigi Padovese, OFM Cap (31 March 1947, Milan–3 June 2010, Iskenderun) was the titular bishop of Monteverde and the Vicar Apostolic of Anatolia in Turkey. He was murdered by his driver on 3 June 2010. Padovese was a member of the Order of Friars Minor Capuchin in 1965 and was ordained in 1973, which has an historic presence in Turkey, later studying at the Pontifical University Antonianum and Pontifical Gregorian University; he would in due course be appointed as a professor in Patristics. He was consecrated a bishop and appointed Apostolic Vicar of Anatolia in 2004. He had also been the president of Caritas Turkey. See *In caritate veritas. Luigi Padovese. Vescovo cappuccino, Vicario Apostolico dell’Anatolia. Scritti in memoria*, EDB, Bologna, 2011.

funeral in February 2006 of one of his priests, Fr Andrea Santoro, who was shot twice in the back whilst praying in the little Catholic church in Trabzon.⁸ Eibner gives the following portrait of Padovese, ‘Consecrated bishop in November 2004, half a year following Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger’s elevation to the papacy, Padovese belonged to the body of intellectually sharp, proactive clerics who share Benedict XVI’s ecumenical understanding of the Church and its global mission of evangelization, especially in the Islamic Middle East where a century of intensive de-Christianization now threatens the faith’s regional existence.’ Padovese’s mission in Turkey was to help save the country’s Christian community from extinction and to create conditions for its religious and cultural renaissance. Rejecting the Church’s historic *dhimmi* status as a protected religious minority under Islam—which reduced it to little more than a submissive worshipping agency with no other legitimate activity—he viewed Turkey’s European Union candidacy as a golden opportunity for winning significant concessions from Ankara and pinned high hopes on the Special Assembly for the Middle East of the Synod of Bishops, which took place in Rome in October 2010.⁹ Discourse on civilization continues to inform religious and political reflection on Turkey and Christian-Muslim relations.¹⁰ The Italian Dominican scholar, Claudio Monge, however, observes the paradoxes of Christian presence in modern Turkey in his reflection on the dialectic of dialogue and conversion: ‘Not a day passes without hearing talk about “converts”, “repentant people” and “reconversions”’. The context is not always religious, still a phenomenon of religious nomadism does exist and it is impossible to ignore it. The observation of religious practices in the daily life, in the Turkish-Istanbulite context, allows us to note that dialogue and conversion are, quite often, situated not as two opposite poles but rather as two intertwined realities. This is the context of a religious “bricolage” which does not mean a true “crossing of the borders”, but a simple occupation of the other’s sacred space with a personal “votive practice” and no conscious adhesion

8 Valentino Salvoldi, *Andrea Santoro: una porta sempre aperta*, EMI, Bologna 2006; Augusto D’Angelo, *Don Andrea Santoro, un prete tra Roma e l’Oriente*, Cinisello Balsamo, San Paolo, 2006.

9 John Eibner, ‘Turkey’s Christians under Siege’, p. 42.

10 Hervé Legrand, ‘Quel dialogue islamo-chrétien dans le contexte de l’élargissement de l’Europe à la Turquie?’, *Esprit*, No. 11, 2006, pp. 27–42.

whatsoever to a new structured religion.’¹¹ The concept of displacement in religion and culture has been a strong feature in understanding the presence and situation of Christianity in Turkey.¹² Proposed Turkish entry into the European Union is still questioned and debated by significant elements of European opinion from across the religious and political spectrum. There is also a growing awareness of the significant role of non-Muslim communities as a distinct aspect of Turkey’s relations with Europe.¹³ It might be a timely moment to consider the presence of Christianity and Christian-Muslim relations in modern Turkey. The image of Christianity in Turkey is the subject of great historical transformation, especially with the creation of the modern Turkish Republic,¹⁴ and the ongoing struggle for identity formed in conflict and tied to contemporary political concerns and anxieties. Turkish relations with Europe highlight all these concerns with great intensity.¹⁵ To the surprise of many Turkey does not just have a secular face, often highlighted by Western observers, but is very religious. In this paper I will seek in a general and introductory manner to present some recent research on Christianity in modern Turkey in its wider historical, religious and political context.

CHRISTIAN PRESENCE IN TURKEY

The Turkish population is over seventy million of which approximately ninety-nine percent of the population is officially Muslim, the majority of whom are Sunni. David Shankland in his study, *Islam and Society in Turkey*, London, 1999, opines that Islam, in the form of Sunni Islam, possesses privileges and public status in Turkey in the early

11 Claudio Monge, ‘La dialectique “dialogue et conversion” au cœur de la complexe histoire turco-ottomane: le regard d’un théologien catholique en terre d’islamisme’, *Histoire et Missions Chrétiennes*, No. 23/2012, pp. 59–85, p. 59.

12 Giovanni Sale, ‘I cristiani nell’impero Ottomano e nella Turchia moderno’, *Civiltà Cattolica*, No. 3738, 2006, pp. 534–547.

13 Şule Toktaş, ‘EU Enlargement conditions and minority protection: A Reflection on Turkey’s Non-Muslim Minorities’, *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2006, pp. 489–518.

14 Necati Alkan, ‘Süleyman Nazi’s “Open Letter to Jesus”: An Anti-Christian Polemic in the Early Turkish Republic’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 44, 2008, pp. 851–865.

15 Otmär Oehring, *Human Rights—Turkey on the Road to Europe—Religious Freedom?*, Missio Report No. 20, 2004.

twenty-first century not enjoyed by established religions in Western European societies. The actual percentage of Muslims is slightly lower; the government officially recognizes only three minority religious communities, Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews,¹⁶ and counts the rest of the population as Muslim, although other non-Muslim communities exist. Before the creation of the Turkish Republic, some twenty percent of the population in these Ottoman territories had been non-Muslims, predominantly Jews and Christians. The level of religious observance, especially practice and style, varies throughout the country, in part due to the historically strong secularist tendency of the government and the military.¹⁷

In addition to the country's Sunni Muslim majority, there are an estimated 10 to 15 million Alevis, followers of a belief system that incorporates aspects of both Shi'a and Sunni Islam and draws on the traditions of other religions found historically in Anatolia.¹⁸ Alevi

16 The State of Israel and Republican Turkey have maintained a close relationship since 1948. There are some 120,000 Turkish Jews living in Israel, see Michael B Bishku, 'How Has Turkey Viewed Israel?' *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 12, No.1, 2006, pp. 177-194. As both are ex-Ottoman states with a deep history of relations with imperial and colonial powers who find themselves with significant Christian Churches and their institutions within their respective territories, they have encouraged an exchange of views between Israeli and Turkish officials on Christian issues. There remains an important Jewish community in Turkey, see Sule Toktas, 'Citizenship and Minorities: A Historical Overview of Turkey's Jewish Minority', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2005, pp. 394-429; S Toktas, 'The Conduct of Citizenship in the Case of Turkey's Jewish Minority: Legal Status, Identity and Civic Virtue Aspects', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 5, Nos 1 and 2, 2006, pp. 20-50.

17 See for the background history to Turkish laicity, James W Warhola and Egemen B Bezci, 'Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in Laiklik', *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 52, 3, 2010, pp. 427-453 and which they describe in the following way: 'Turkey was established as a secular republic in 1923, and was the first predominantly Moslem country to formally do so; significantly, the Turkish population is overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem regarding formal religious identification. The meaning of "secular republic" has varied over time, however, and has certainly varied in interpretation by the relevant actors in Turkish political life, including popular perceptions of what secularism *should* mean. The word itself is ambiguous and may carry a wide array of meanings; the Turkish word, *laiklik* is as intrinsically ambiguous as its French-derived origin, *laïcité*. In the Turkish context, however, it was initially instituted to convey a certain disposition of civil authority to religion in which the state itself actively embraced and fostered a nonreligious worldview in the public realms.' P. 427.

18 Relations between Alevism and Christianity are discussed in Yuri Stoyanov, 'Early and Recent Formulations of Theories for a Formative Christian Heterodox Impact

rituals include men and women worshipping together through oratory, poetry, and dance. Alevism is considered a heterodox Muslim sect by many Sunni Muslims; even some Alevis and radical Sunnis maintain Alevis are not Muslims.¹⁹ The question of religious freedom, for example in education, in Alevi relations with Sunni Islam are ongoing dimensions of religious and political life in Turkey.²⁰ Divisions between the Sunni and Alevi have been heightening due to the conflict in neighbouring Syria. Sectarian fissures have been opening up across the wider Middle East region due in part to the interreligious and intra-Muslim aspects of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict—Turkish society has not escaped these tensions.

There are several other religious groups, mostly concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities. While exact membership figures are not available, these religious groups include approximately 80,000 Armenian Christians,²¹ 25,000 Jews, and less than 3,000 Greek Orthodox Christians. The government interprets the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as granting special legal minority status exclusively to these three groups.²² However, the religious leadership, the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates, continue to engage with the state over recognition of their legal status. There also are approximately

on Alevism', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, no. 3, 2010, pp. 261-272; H L Kieser, 'Muslim Heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia: The Interactions between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia', *Die Welt des Islams*, n.s., Vol. 41, No. 1, 2001, pp. 89-111.

19 H L Kieser, 'Muslim Heterodoxy and Protestant Utopia: The Interactions between Alevis and Missionaries in Ottoman Anatolia', *Die Welt des Islams*, n.s., Vol. 41, No. 1, 2001, pp. 89-111; David Shankland, 'Maps and the Alevis: On the Ethnography of Heterodox Islamic Groups', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2010, pp. 227-239.

20 Olgun Akbulut, 'The State of Political Participation of Minorities in Turkey—An Analysis under the ECHR and the ICCPR', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2005, pp. 375-395; Olgun Akbulut and Zeynep O Usal, 'Parental Religious Rights vs. Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 433-455; Olgun Akbulut, 'A Critical Analysis of Current Legal Developments on the Political Participation of Minorities in Turkey', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, pp. 551-560.

21 Hratch Tchilingirian, 'The Catholicos and the Hierarchical Sees of the Armenian Church', in *Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History, Religion and Politics*, (ed.) A O'Mahony, Melisende, London, 2004, pp. 140-159.

22 Y Bayar, 'In pursuit of homogeneity: the Lausanne Conference, minorities and the Turkish nation', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2014, pp. 108-125.

10,000 Baha'is (there are over a million Iranians living in Turkey), an estimated 25,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians, 5,000 Yezidis, 3,000 Protestants, and small, undetermined numbers of Bulgarian, Chaldean, the Church of the East, Georgian, Roman Catholic, and Maronite Christians. There have also been significant numbers (tens of thousands) of Iraqi Christian refugees who are in Turkey; although many leave for Europe and the West when they have the opportunity.²³ Since 2011 small numbers of Christians from Syria are crossing over the Turkish border.

The number of Syriac Christians in the south-east Turkey was once high; however, under pressure from government authorities and later under the impact of the war against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish military, many Syriac Christians migrated to Istanbul, Western Europe, or North America. In the 1960s there were approximately 60,000 Syrian Orthodox living in the region. Over the last several years, small numbers of Syriac Christians have returned from overseas to the south-east, mostly from Western Europe.²⁴ In most return cases, older family members have returned while younger ones have remained abroad, although there are signs that this might be changing.²⁵ The Syrian Orthodox Church is not a recognized minority under the Treaty of Lausanne, and hence has no rights to establish its own schools or institutes.²⁶

23 Didem Daniş, “‘Attendre au Purgatoire’: Les réseaux religieux de migrants chrétiens d’Irak en transit à Istanbul’, *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, vol. 22, No. 3 2006, pp. 109–134.

24 Stephen Griffith describes the Syriac Christian presence in Turkey in a fine and lively account: *Nightingales in the Mountain of Slaves*, Christians Aware Publications, Leicester, 2013.

25 Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio, *TURKEY: Syriac Orthodox land—All people are equal, but some are less equal than others?* <<http://www.missio.de>> 9 November 2010 [http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1508]

26 Sebastian Brock, ‘The Syrian Orthodox Church in the twentieth century’, in *Christianity in the Middle East: Studies in Modern History, Theology and Politics*, (ed.) A O’Mahony, Melisende, London, 2008, pp. 17–38; S Brock, ‘The Syran Orthodox Church in the modern Middle East’, in *Eastern Christianity in the Modern Middle East*, (eds) A O’Mahony and E Loosley, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 13–24. For Syrian Catholic Church, see John Flannery, ‘The Syrian Catholic Church: Martyrdom, Mission, Identity and Ecumenism in modern history’, *Christianity in the Middle East Studies in Modern History, Theology and Politics*, Melisende, London, 2008, pp. 143–167; A O’Mahony, ‘Between Rome and Antioch: The Syrian Catholic Church in the modern Middle East’, in *Eastern Christianity in*

There are often press campaigns suggesting that there are 10–20,000 conversions to Christianity in Turkey due to Protestant missionary activity. The real figure is certainly lower; however, the press campaigns do serve to create fear among the majority Muslim population.²⁷ Christianity is often cast as foreign to ‘Turkishness’. That said there are numbers of clandestine Christians in Turkey; however, it is difficult to establish an accepted figure—some are converts from other national communities who are temporarily in Turkey, especially migrants, for example Iranians and Afghans, from other parts of the Muslim world.²⁸ In some political forums the minorities, especially Armenian, Greek and Syriac Christians, are seen as the reason for the collapse of the Ottoman empire because they are seen to have collaborated with foreign powers. This historical discourse is often emphasized to create a climate of suspicion. This historical understanding is often transferred to Christians in Turkey today.²⁹

One significant question which has arisen in recent years from discussion of the Armenian genocide is the religious identity of the survivors. It is thought that up to two million Turks or Kurds are of Armenian descent whose immediate family had survived the massacres in some way.³⁰ During the genocide organized by the Young Turk government in the Ottoman empire in 1915–16, most of the

the modern Middle East, pp. 120–137.

27 Across the wider Middle East region and North Africa there are small but growing and significant communities of Muslim converts to Protestant Christianity, see, for example, Katia Boissevain, ‘Des conversions au christianisme à Tunis. Vers quel protestantisme?’, *Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses*, 2013/4, No. 28, pp. 47–62.

28 Şebnem Koser Akcapar, ‘“What’s God got to do with it?” The role of religion in the internal dynamics of migrants’ networks in Turkey’, *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, Nos 119–120, 2007, pp. 81–100; Johan Leman, ‘A “Lucan effect” in the commitment of Iranian converts in transit: The case of the Pentecostal Iranian Enclave in Istanbul’, *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, Nos 119–120, 2007, pp. 101–114; Şebnem Koser Akcapar, ‘Conversion as a Migration Strategy in a Transit Country: Iranian Shiites Becoming Christians in Turkey’, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 40, 2006, No. 4, pp. 817–853.

29 Pascal Klue, ‘Turkish Views of Christians: Implications for Armenian–Turkish Relations’, *Iran and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, 2008, pp. 363–376.

30 Some accounts have emerged of remarkable Christian survivals in the early 1950s; in one of the deep valleys situated south-west of Lake Van more than a thousand Chaldean Catholics had succeeded in weathering the storms with one or two priests as recorded by the Belgian Jesuit E Hambye. On the Syriac Christian massacres, see Sébastien de Coutois, *The Forgotten Genocide: Eastern Christians, The Last Arameans*, trans. Vincent Aurora, Gorgias Press, New York, 2004.

Armenians in Lebanon, Syria and Palestine escaped mass deportation. This was not the fate of those arriving from Asia Minor—approximately 600,000 Armenian later perished in the deserts of northern Syria and Mesopotamia alone. Of the estimated 240,000 survivors, around 70,000 hid in and around Aleppo and another 5,000 near Mosul until the Ottoman retreat in late 1918. In the area of Dayr al-Zur in Syria over 190,000 deportees were massacred. In recent years, an Armenian church has been constructed in the city of Dayr al-Zur and also in the nearby village of Maradah, where further massacres took place, turning these sites into places of Christian pilgrimage for Armenians from all over the world.³¹ These areas today are located in areas of conflict between the Syrian government and Sunni militants.

Meanwhile, many survivors were farmed out for absorption into Muslim households; around 20–30,000 (mainly women and some children) of these ended up in a state of virtual slavery as young servants and concubines in their new houses.³² The desire to ‘adopt’ these so-called orphans of wealthy Armenian families was strong as they enabled the acquisition of inheritance rights. The transfer of large amounts of material property from Christians, who had either been killed or left Turkey created new wealthy elites of across all classes and regions. According to one recent report published in *La Croix* one family in four in the eastern departments of Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Bitlis and Van had a great-grandmother who was Armenian.³³ Over 120,000 (some scholars say 200,000) deportees accepted conversion to Islam to escape death. The trauma of the lives of these ‘lost souls’ can only be imagined. An echo of this tragedy was recorded by the travel writer William Dalrymple who in his *From the Holy Mountain*, an account of modern Christianity in the Middle East, mentions Muslims of Armenian descent from the mountains of Antioch requesting secret baptism of an Italian priest. One can only think that this request for baptism must have

31 Raymond H Kévorkian, ‘L’extermination des déportés arméniens ottomans dans les camps de concentration de Syrie-Mésopotamie (1915-1916): la deuxième phase de génocide’, *Revue d’histoire arménienne contemporaine*, Vol. 2, 1998, pp. 10–14, 45–46, 60–61.

32 The reintegration of Armenian women and often children born of rape was a significant and difficult issue for the community and victims. See Vahé Tachjian, ‘Gender, nationalism, exclusion: the reintegration process of female survivors of the Armenian genocide’, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 15, 2009, pp. 60–80.

33 ‘Les Kurdes n’ont pas oublié leurs anciens voisins’, *La Croix*, 23 August 2005.

been made many times before in secret. Some return to the ancestral faith, but need several witnesses to confirm that they are of Armenian origin. According to the Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II approximately eighty to one hundred and twenty do this each year—the number is growing as the issue is debated more in public.³⁴

The French journalist Jean-Christophe Ploquin, in a series of articles in the French Catholic daily journal *La Croix*, recorded the itinerary of one of these returnees to Armenian Christianity. Garabed—he abandoned his original Muslim name Farouk—asked for baptism. He explained his context: his grandparents had been brought up as Muslims in Silvan, near Diyarbakir in south-east Turkey. In 1915 somehow they avoided deportation and returned to their village of origin. In terms of culture and religion they lived in an ‘in between’ world doing what they had to do in public to make sure they were left in peace. The children did not practise but knew whence they came as did their neighbours. In time Garabed left the village; he recalls the saying ‘for them if they killed a Christian they went to paradise.’ Troubled by his personal identity he reflected, ‘I had forgotten my roots and was not a man of honour. Without honour a man cannot live. It is something you feel, so I felt it and did it.’ He lived in Istanbul for a year to undertake his catechumenate. On return to Diyarbakir he found it dangerous and lonely without a Christian community to support him. He knew others like him who wanted to return to the Christian faith—a civil servant who was afraid he would lose his job, a businessman who would lose all his customers.

There are other issues which disturb the Christian Churches. There is the continuing question of church building, repair and construction, which is still governed by Islamic notions of what is permitted for the religious other. The Armenian Church had wished to reconstruct several churches in Diyarbakir, Kayseri and Antakya (Antioch) region; however, the difficulty is that the Church is a not juridical person and thus cannot finance important restoration works. They have to work through foundations which require a certain number of people affiliated. This is difficult as, for example, there are only ten Armenians in Diyarbakir. Before the genocide it is estimated that some 120,000 Christian lived in the area. Having a Christian church in these areas where such events took place is a deep religious response to the lives

34 ‘Les Arméniens de Turquie’, *La Croix*, 29 August 2005.

sacrificed. In recent years an Armenian church has been re-opened in Diyarbakir which has become a centre for those in south-east Turkey who have returned to their Armenian Christian identity.³⁵ Difficult issues, however, remain in the relations between Church and state; most important is the question of religious freedom, and not just toleration of Christianity in Turkey.³⁶

THE COMING OF ISLAM

The Turks who came to the region embraced the Islamic faith around the year 1000,³⁷ with the exception of certain groups who remained Christian: the Gagaous in the Balkans³⁸ and the Karamanlis in Asia Minor, chiefly in Karamania to the south of Konya. Michel Balivet also identified a category of Muslims in the Ottoman empire who were greatly attracted by the personality and the message of Jesus, who accepted the Christian dogma, even when this was incompatible with Islam, and who did not hesitate to declare their beliefs in public, thus putting their life in danger. Balivet based his findings partly on cases reported by the German Cardinal Nicolas de Cusa in 1437 and by the French humanist William Postel in 1536, while some other cases are reported in Turkish sources. The case of the Sheyh Hamza of Bosnia, executed in 1561 because he exaggerated respect for Jesus, is perhaps the most striking.³⁹ Colin Imber also discovered the presence of preachers, in Edirne and in Istanbul, who simply said in public that Jesus is superior to Muhammad or went further by declaring that the

35 'Turkey and religious freedom: Wooing Christians. Some, but not all, want to improve the lot of Christians in Turkey [Diyarbakir and Mardin]', *The Economist*, 2 December 2010.

36 See the wider context given by Jean-Marc Balhan SJ, 'La Turquie et ses minorités', *Etudes*, No. 4116, 2009, pp. 595-604.

37 V L Ménage, 'The Islamization of Anatolia', *Conversion to Islam*, (ed.) Nehemia Levitzion, Holmes and Meier Publishers, New York/London, 1979, pp. 52-67.

38 Paul Wittek published several important articles on the history of Christianity among the Turks including, 'Yazijoghlu 'Ali on the Christian Turks of the Dobruja', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. 14, 1962, pp. 639-688; 'La descendance chrétienne de la dynastie Seldjouk en Macedonie', *Echos d'Orient*, Vol. 33, no. 176, 1934, pp. 409-412; 'Les gagaouzes—les gens de Kaykaus', *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, Vol. 17, 1951-1952.

39 M Balivet, 'Chrêtiens secrets et martyrs christiques en Islam turc. Quelques cas à travers les textes, XIIIe-XVIIe siècle', *Islamochristiana*, Vol. 16, 1990, pp. 91-114.

true faith is that of Christ, while the law of Muhammad is a bestial law. These preachers appeared in public at times of crisis. The cases actually pointed out by Imber are for 1444, when the movements of the French king, Charles VIII, in Italy combined with the intentions of Prince Cem caused alarm in Istanbul; and of 1527, when it was again a time of popular panic resulting from a series of religiously inspired revolts in Anatolia. The conclusion of Imber is that there was a sect in Ottoman popular religion which was not strictly Christian but which believed in the supremacy of Christ over Muhammad. This sect manifested itself in public at times of crisis, when the collapse of the established order or the religious order, seemed imminent.⁴⁰

There was also in many parts of the Ottoman territories an open and symbiotic relationship between Christianity and Islam (and Judaism). Hasluck mentions an interesting example in his study *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* from the *tekke* of Mamasun, near Aksaray, still in use in 1916, in which ‘... At the east end is the Holy Table, at which itinerant Christian priests are allowed to officiate, and a picture of St Mamas, while in the south wall is a niche (*mihrab*) giving the orientation of Mecca to Turkish pilgrims. There is no partition between Christian and Moslem worshippers, but the latter, while at their prayers, are allowed to turn the pictures from them. The sanctuary is administered by dervishes.’⁴¹ These faiths, which had lived alongside each other over the centuries, had developed a cultural flexibility which allowed space for the other.⁴²

Elizabeth A Zachariadou has suggested it is fairly certain up to the first part of the fourteenth century that Christianization was still going on among the Turks despite the fact that Islam was the religion of the conquerors and conversion had began among the subjugated Christian population.⁴³ For Bruce Masters Islam’s emotional and spiritual appeal to the sultan’s Christian subjects was increased by the syncretistic interpretations which were being preached by the wandering Sufi mendicants who visited the villages of Anatolia and later the Balkans.

40 C Imber, ‘A note on “Christian” preachers in the Ottoman Empire’, *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, Vol. 10, 1990, pp. 59–67.

41 F W Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Oxford, 1929, p. 576.

42 M Balivet, ‘The long-lived relations between Christians and Moslems in Cappadocia’, *Byzantinische Forschungen*, Vol. 16, 1990, pp. 313–322.

43 Elizabeth A Zachariadou, ‘Co-Existence and Religion’, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, Vol. 15, 1997, pp. 119–130.

Prominent among these were the adherents of the Bektaşî order who blended elements of Christianity with Islam, retaining a special place for Jesus and Mary and a fondness for wine while adding reverence for 'Ali. The retention of Christian customs by the order must have seemed comforting and familiar to the region's Christian peasants, often physically remote from their own clergy. Confirming this assumption, the strongholds of Bektaşî belief in the Ottoman lands were found among the Albanians, Pomaks and Bosnians, the only Balkan peoples to apostatise in any great numbers,⁴⁴ and in the ranks of the Janissary corps, which was conscripted from the Christian subjects of the sultans.⁴⁵

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

The advent of the new Turkey was an event unparalleled in the history of post-war settlements. Although decimated by eight years of war, practically disarmed and with no recognized government, the country acquired independence by force of arms. The nationalists were now secured of power. In Ankara, on 1 November 1922, the National Assembly, stripped the last Ottoman sultan of his power, and proclaimed itself the sovereign authority. It permitted the existence of a caliphate divorced from the sultanate, in the person of a scion of Ottoman stock. Some feeling for the past led to a desire that a little authority be left to the caliphate but Mustafa Kemal was taking no risks and, by a decree of 3 March 1924, the Ottoman caliphate definitely receded into history.⁴⁶

Such far-reaching changes gave a new look to the religious situation in Turkey. The *millet* system was doomed to disappear. The Armenians had been almost entirely wiped out. At the close of the Greek war, by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne of July 1923, one and a half million Greeks living in Anatolia and Thrace were to be exchanged

44 G Veinstein, 'Sur les conversions a l'Islam dans la Balkans ottomane', *Dimensioni e Problemi della ricerca storica*, Vol. 2, 1996, pp. 153-168; S Kirmizialtin: 'Conversion in the Ottoman Balkans: A Historiographical Survey', *History Compass*, Vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 646-657; A Lopasic, 'Islamization of the Balkans', *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 163-186.

45 Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 27.

46 Tolga Köker, 'The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism in Turkey', *Middle East Law and Governance*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, pp. 17-42.

for the 500,000 Turks leaving Greek territory.⁴⁷ Both states gained in homogeneity as a result of this drastic measure. The communities of Constantinople were privileged to forego this exchange. Christians would not form a separate group but disappear into wider society. Xavier Jacob would describe Christians as lonely within the crowd.⁴⁸ But, while the remaining *millets* scattered over the country were declining in importance, relations with Islam presented a grave problem to the new Turkish Republic, proclaimed on 29 October 1923, and to its first president, Mustafa Kemal.⁴⁹

A Ministry of Religious Affairs had superseded the old organization governed by the *sheikh ül-Islam*; on the proclamation of the Republic its function passed to two departments: the Presidency of Religious Affairs dependent on the presidency of the government, and the Directorate-general of *Evkaf*, concerned with the administration of the property and religious buildings which had passed into state ownership. At the same time a committee undertook to produce a report on the modernization of Islam.⁵⁰

Close upon the exchange of peoples and with desires to weaken the authority of the ecumenical Orthodox patriarch, the Turkish government favoured the attempt to found an orthodox Turkish Church. The prime mover was the *papa* Eftim who in October 1923 tried to impose himself upon the synod of the Greek Orthodox Church. Undaunted by his excommunication in February 1924, with a few followers he founded the independent Turkish Orthodox

47 John A Petropoulos, 'The Compulsory Exchange of Populations. Greek and Turkish Peacemaking, 1922-1930', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 2, 1976, pp. 135-160.

48 X Jacobs, 'Christen in der Türkei', *Wie im Himmel so auf Erden. 90. Deutscher Katholikentag vom. 23 bis 27 Mai 1990 in Berlin: Dokumentation: Teil II*, Bonifatius Druck Buch-Verlag, Paderborn, 1990, pp. 1272-1289.

49 My account given of the Turkish Republic follows closely F M Pareja SJ's very helpful study: 'Society and Politics', *Religion in the Middle East*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 465-469.

50 Xavier Jacobs has written over the years very knowledgeable and thoughtful accounts of Islam in Turkish institutional and public political life, see *L'enseignement religieux dans la Turquie moderne*, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1982; 'Islam turc et politique en Turquie', *Se comprendre*, No. 99, 1999, pp.1-19; 'Situation de l'Islam en Turquie', *Religion et Politique: Un thème pour le dialogue islamo-chrétien. Dossiers de la commission pour les rapports religieux avec les musulmans (CRRM) (1995-1999)*, Vatican City, 1999, pp. 145-159; 'Islam et politique en Turquie', *Religion et Politique: Un thème pour le dialogue islamo-chrétien. Dossiers de la commission pour les rapports religieux avec les musulmans (CRRM) (1995-1999)*, Vatican City, 1999, pp. 119-144.

Church, officiating in Turkish in the church of the Panagia in Galata. In March 1926 he assumed the title of archbishop and exarch of Turkish Orthodoxy, and despite his almost complete lack of followers did not cease to create difficulties for the Orthodox patriarch.⁵¹ The Turkish Orthodox Church continues in political form. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church continues to experience much difficulty in Turkey.⁵²

When on 24 July 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, which gave international recognition to the new Turkey, the situation of Christians in Anatolia was already totally turned upside down. Of the 1.5–2 million Armenians who were there before 1914, hardly 70,000 still remained. The Assyrians of the Church of the East of Hakkari had sought refuge in Iraq, and the Syriac, Orthodox and Catholics only held a few villages in the region of Midyat and the Mardin. In 1920–1, the Armenians fled Cilicia on the heels of French troops. The Greeks on the Asiatic coast had thrown themselves in large numbers into the warships sent to evacuate the routed Greek army. Even before the Treaty of Lausanne, a Greek–Turkish agreement of 1923 had foreseen a population exchange of unprecedented numbers: while half a million European Turks would come to their new homeland, 1.5 million Greeks would abandon their thousand year-old homes on the Asian side of the Adriatic (only the Greek communities of Istanbul and the Turkish islands could remain). In addition, the political troubles seriously disorganized the Church. Patriarch German V had to resign in 1918 because of his extreme docility towards the ‘Young Turk’ government, so the Phanar See remained unoccupied for three years before being filled by a former Metropolitan of Athens whose sacking was demanded by the Kemalist government from 1923.

No Christians in the East, including in the Arab world, paid such a cruel price for their identity. For those who remained, the future

51 Xavier Jacobs, ‘Een autokefale Turks-orthodoxe kerk’, *Het Christelijk Oosten/The Christian East*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1969, p. 165–178; Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974*, Center for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1983.

52 Samim Akgönül, *Les Grecs de Turquie: processus d’extinction d’une minorité de l’âge de l’État-nation à l’âge de la mondialisation, 1923–2001*, L’Harmattan, Paris/Bruylant Academia, Louvain la Neuve, 2004; Joëlle Dalègre, *Grecs et Ottomans: 1453–1923 de la chute de Constantinople à la disparition de l’Empire ottoman*, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2002.

within a state constituted along narrow ethnic lines promised to be more than uncertain. The few international guarantees provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne appeared to be a survival from the times when the Ottoman empire was 'the sick man of Europe': who, in the Western world, was going to make the new Turkey respect them?

While the extreme prejudice with which the Christians had greeted it was unjustified, the Kemalist regime did not bring to an end the discriminations against them, which its modernist and laic philosophy should have implied. Excluded from public life, they were hit more heavily than other communities by the tax regime (for example in 1943, where a rise in tax on wealth could vary up to ten-fold, depending on ethnicity and religion). Harassed by the administration, the Christians rediscovered as members of ethnic minorities the segregation they had suffered under the Ottomans as a religious minority. Conversely, they had lost the protection of the community status, which had been sacrificed in the construction of a modern state which in theory only wished to see all citizens as equal. The stabilizing of the interior situation and the end of European interference certainly led them to escape open and on-going persecution, but not the violent uprisings like that of September 1955, which led a large part of the Istanbul Greek community to leave the country. Political interference in the running of the Churches was so great that from 1921 to 1948 there were no fewer than eight Greek Orthodox Patriarchs of Constantinople. During the 1920s the government even favoured the constitution of a dissident, purely Turkish, Church, and the schism was not resolved for some decades. Only the election of Patriarch Athenagoras in 1948, former Archbishop in the US and close to American government circles, would lead to a loosening of the stranglehold.⁵³

Furthermore, the Christian population of Turkey, with a strength of 340,000 in 1927, continued to decline. In 1939, at the time of the cession of the Sandjak of Alexandretta to Turkey (it had been under the French Mandate), the great majority of Armenians did not think they could risk returning to Turkish rule and went to Syria or Lebanon. Following the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938

53 For an overview see Heinz Ohme, 'Das Ökumenische Patriarchat vom Konstantinopel und die türkische Religionspolitik', *Erfurter Vorträge zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums* 6/2007, pp. 1-25; X Jacobs, 'De Juridische Positie van Het oecumenisch Patriarchat', *Het Christelijk Oosten/The Christian East*, Vol. 43 (1991), pp. 225-245.

the progressive democratisation of the country allowed a certain improvement in conditions for Christians, but it was clear that in a state which remained fundamentally Turkish and Muslim, their situation would always be precarious.⁵⁴

Of all the countries of the Middle East, Turkey is the one whose lay character is reaffirmed most insistently. From 1924, having given the new state the constitution of a republic and suppressed the caliphate, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk carried out what has been described as a 'cultural caesarean': he undertook a huge programme of secularization of the law largely based on Western codes, suppressed the Qur'anic courts—the institutions which managed religious affairs and property (and largely deprived them of their areas of competence)—brought education under state control, and forcibly Europeanised life-style (even regulating habits of dress, such as the wearing of the fez which was outlawed under pain of death in 1925). In 1928 and 1937, constitutional revisions deprived Islam of its status as official religion and confirmed the lay nature of the state. Without really being regarded with hostility, the Muslim faith thus found itself placed in the private sphere and strictly subordinated, as much to the demands of modernization as to the confirmation of Turkish identity; in practice, it became an instrument in the hands of the state without, in balance, having its social role reinforced.⁵⁵

These principles have never been questioned, even if in practice they have since changed. The secular nature of the state, confirmed by Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution, cannot be revised. The modernist laws of Atatürk (for example in personal status) have gained constitutional weight. Attacks against laicity of the state are forbidden by the penal code and no political party can found its programme on principles other than political and social organisation (for example by claiming to reintroduce discriminations between citizens based on ethnicity or religion). All are equal before the law without distinction: 'the organs of the State and the administrative authorities are held to act in conformity with the principle of equality before the law in all their actions' (Article 10, 1982 Constitution). In the context of these

54 I am indebted here to the work of Jean-Pierre Valognes, 'Les chrétiens de Turquie', in *Vie et Mort des chrétiens d'Orient*, Fayard, Paris, pp. 795–832. See also Y. Courbage and P. Fargues, 'From Multinational Empire to Secular Republic: The Lost Christianity in Turkey', in their *Christians and Jews under Islam*, I B Tauris, London, 1997.

55 Valognes, 'Les chrétiens de Turquie', p. 812.

principles 'everyone has freedom of conscience, belief and religious conviction' (Article 24), freedom of worship (Article 25) and freedom of expression (Article 26), on condition that they do not abuse these fundamental rights. No Arab country of the Middle East goes so far in the pronouncement of the principles of secularization and the legal consequences which follow from it.⁵⁶

There are still, however, anomalies in the law (as well as social practice) which manifestly contravene these measures. For a long time after the adoption of secular law, religion continued to be marked on identity cards.⁵⁷ Islam, whose religious personnel work for the state and whose property is managed by the administration, is still closely interlinked with the government. In 1949, Qur'anic education was reintroduced into primary schools and an Islamic theology faculty opened at Ankara. The following year, the use of Arabic for the call to prayer was once more authorized.⁵⁸

The constitutional text of 1982 re-established the obligation of religious education in primary and secondary schools, which were otherwise under state control (which was a double attack on laicity. Muslim preachers have air-time on public radio and TV). In 1986 the Prime Minister Turgut Özal (who had Islamic sensitivities) brought in a law to protect religions against blasphemy and desecration, like the ones found in overtly Muslim states.⁵⁹ These paradoxes illustrate an undisclosed development: without openly going back on the principles of laicity (the army sees itself as its protector), since the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the governing body has had to take account of public opinion, which remains deeply Muslim and which only accepted the principles of the founder of modern Turkey by force.⁶⁰ From the perspective of modern history the criteria of ethnic and religious

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Selin Esen and Levent Gonenç, 'Religious Information on Identity Cards: A Turkish Debate', *Journal of Religion and Law*, Vol. 22, 2008, pp. 579-603.

⁵⁸ X. Jacobs, *L'enseignement religieux dans la Turquie moderne*, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 1982.

⁵⁹ See the various important studies by Xavier Jacob, 'Courants et essais novateurs dans l'Islam turc', *Die Welt des Islams*, n.s. Vol. 44, No. 1 (2004), pp. 27-84; 'L'Islam turc: l'Islam officiel', *Se comprendre*, No. 95/11, 1995, pp. 1-14 and Part II, 'L'Islam turc: l'Islam parallèle' *Se comprendre*, No. 95/12, 1996, pp. 114; 'L'Islam turc en synode', *Se comprendre*, No. 94, 1994, pp. 1-13; 'Islam turc et politique en Turquie' *Se comprendre*, No. 99, 1999, pp. 1-19.

⁶⁰ Valognes, 'Les chrétiens de Turquie', p. 813.

difference, furthermore, tend to come together. Since the death of Mustafa Kemal, the state has allowed itself to be progressively influenced by the Islam which is the faith of almost all Turks, to the point that 'Turk' and 'Muslim' now mean almost the same.⁶¹ The Islamist prime minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, due to his party's electoral success in Turkey, has encouraged a growing presence of Muslim faith and practice across political society and culture.

THE IMAGE OF CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN TURKEY

The blurred image of Christianity which prevails in present-day Turkey is down to a number of factors. After the First World War Turkish identity was presented as a Muslim identity. The annihilation of the Armenians in 1915 and the departure of the Greeks from Anatolia in exchange for Turks from Greece in 1922 strengthened this identification. The Christian 'otherness' was perceived in terms of confrontation and as a source of conflict which should be removed. This tendency has become stronger as Islam has occupied an increasing place in public life since the 1950s and especially since 1980. Events such as the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the rule of the Refah party in the late 1990s and the emergence to power of the AKP in the last decade has reinforced it. The second wave of emigration of Christians from Turkey from the 1950s onwards has reduced daily Muslim-Christian relations to a level that is more and more insignificant, since any possible representatives of Christianity are disappearing, although Istanbul is a little different.

In contrast, on a purely academic level, there have been some advances of a contrary nature. Nevertheless at these colloquia, symposiums or other Islamic-Christian encounters, the number of participants is very small, limited to some very restricted groups. Such meetings are ignored by the larger public. These conferences have a purely academic character and the participants are all mature and

61 See the studies which look at the Armenians, the Greeks and the Syriacs in Turkey from various modern perspectives: Ayla Göl, 'Imagining the Turkish nation through "othering" Armenians', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, 2005, pp. 121-139; Ali Tuna Kuyucu, 'Ethno-religious "unmixing of" Turkey: 6-7 September riots as a case in Turkish nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, 2005, pp. 361-380; Hakan Samur, 'Turkey's Europeanization Process and the Return of the Syriacs', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2009, pp. 327-340.

thoughtful. That said they have very little impact upon the public at large.⁶²

Many Turks still see Christianity as a dangerous alien presence in the present national religious discourse. According to the observations of Xavier Jacob when one discusses what ordinary people in Turkey know of Christianity, we can distinguish two types of knowledge which go back to two different sources. On the one hand Turkish Muslims draw on the information about Jesus and Christianity contained in the Qur'anic texts mentioning 'Isa. On the other hand they refer to critical Western scholarship on the Bible, in particular the Gospels, and to present-day critical voices in the West on the subject of Christianity. Neither of these are the Christianity of present-day Christians or of the Churches.⁶³

In the interesting collection edited by Jacobus Waardenburg a recent study was made of the ways in which Christianity is described in Turkish sourcebooks. Secondary schoolbooks on religion praise Christian moral values as of universal importance but they practically leave out the story of Jesus' Passion and do not mention belief in his resurrection. The message of the Gospels and their character of truth are scarcely taken into consideration. Secondary schoolbooks on history give little positive information about the birth of Christianity and its expansion in the Mediterranean world; the Roman and Byzantine empires are hardly treated. The history of Christianity in Anatolia—Asiatic Turkey—with its Byzantine and Armenian culture of more than a thousand years is hardly referred to. The Crusades obviously are depicted largely in black-and-white terms and later military European ventures against the Ottoman empire are mostly stamped as ever repeated Christian Crusader efforts. From these history schoolbooks children must conclude that Christians have been enemies either from outside, such as the Crusaders and Europe or the West in general, or from inside, such as the Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman

62 Xavier Jacob, 'Les relations islamo-chrétiennes en turquie', *Islamochristiana*, Vol. 21, 1995, pp. 95-119; 'Nouvelles voix pour le dialogue interreligieux en turquie', *Islamochristiana*, Vol. 25, 1999, pp. 139-158.

63 I am greatly indebted to the account given by J Waardenburg, 'Introduction', *Turkish Islam and Europe/ Türkischer Islam und Europa: Europe and Christianity as reflected in Turkish Muslim Discourse and Turkish Muslim Life in the Diaspora*, (eds) Günter Seufert and Jacques Waardenburg, Istanbul in Kommission bei Franz-Steiner-Verlag, Stuttgart, 1999, p. 17.

empire. The sole exception in this sombre picture of Christianity is the Reformation, which is treated and praised as an important event in the history of Europe over the obscurantism and tradition-based authoritarianism of the 'Roman' Catholic Church.⁶⁴

The author of this study also looks at the role of Christianity in presenting national-religious discourse. This role is not negligible. The theme of the Crusades is recurrent and the Turkish-Greek dispute is depicted as an equally religious confrontation. Some journalists 'unmask' orientalists, teachers and people affiliated to Western institutes in Turkey as covert missionaries. Some authors see forms of Christian propaganda to undermine Islam behind Western social and cultural features that have entered Turkey over time. They also express criticism of the way in which Christians celebrate Christmas, not only as a purely religious matter but also because of the cultural and social influence which these celebrations have on fashions, sales and business at large in Istanbul which is now a world city.

Whereas Christianity is labelled as fundamentally intolerant, Islam and specifically Turkish Islam, is depicted as having been and being the religion of true tolerance. Turks tend to perceive Christianity as the antagonist of Islam, as a fundamental alien being or otherness. As has been pointed out by Elizabeth Özdalga, this perception can have wider ramifications for the idea of a 'Turkish Islam' as opposed to other cultural and national forms of Islam.⁶⁵ There are two distinguishing aspects: the Turkish Muslim view of the 'minor otherness' of Christianity has its source in the Qur'an and here discussion and tolerance are admitted. The Turkish Muslim view of the 'major otherness' of Christianity, on the other hand, has very different sources. It goes back to certain historical events which had a traumatic impact such as the rebellions against the Ottoman empire, humiliations by the European powers or acts of violence that were directed at what was sacred for Muslim Turks. This 'major' religious otherness often then stands as a symbol for the national otherness of European nations confronting the Ottoman empire or the Turkish state. When nation and religion become mixed, nationhood tends to become sacralised, and religious and national

⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 17-18.

⁶⁵ For Elizabeth Özdalga this instinct can have wider application, see 'The Hidden Arab: A Critical Reading of the Notion of Turkish Islam', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2006, pp. 551-570.

sensitivities then reinforce each other.⁶⁶ Elizabeth Özdalga has raised the important question of Islam and Muslim identity in nationalist discourse.⁶⁷ Elizabeth H Prodromou, in her study ‘Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalisms? The “Muslimhood Model” and the Greek Orthodox Minority’, suggests a possible danger in this confluence for Christians in Turkey: ‘This tension would either produce civil and political unrest, wrought from the twin radicalization of Islamists and Kemalists, or generate a new form of exclusivist nationalism, based on an (inherently fragile) alliance of convenience between Islamists and Kemalists.’⁶⁸ Prodromou states further: ‘The history of Turkey is one wherein religious freedom has been a casualty of militant secularism. Both civilian politicians and the Turkish military have long argued that “Kemalism”—the secularist nationalist ideology developed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—is the only model for modernity in Turkey that avoids the perils of Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘The Turkish experience is one of wide comparative relevance, extending well beyond the narrow limits of debates about the (in)compatibility of Islam and democracy that drive most discussions about the nation-building projects ... In the first instance, the Turkish case provides real-world evidence that militant secularism is as much a threat to religious majorities and minorities as is militant religious fundamentalism. Furthermore, the evolving content and effects of the Muslimhood model on Turkey’s democratic consolidation also give purchase into the more general question of the relationship between religious pluralism and alternative types of nationalism and democracy.’⁶⁹ For Prodromou Christians in Turkey open up the possibility of ‘a case study of the Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey in order to enhance understanding of the most efficacious mechanisms for promoting religious freedom as a *sine qua non* for sustainable democratization.’⁷⁰

66 *Turkish Islam and Europe/Türkischer Islam und Europa* ..., p. 18-19.

67 E. Özdalga, ‘Islamism and nationalism as sister ideologies: reflections on the politicization of Islam in a *longue Durée* perspective’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2009, pp. 407-423.

68 Elizabeth H Prodromou, ‘Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The “Muslimhood Model” and the Greek Orthodox Minority’, *The Brandywine Review of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 3, no. 1, 2005, pp. 11-22, p. 18.

69 *Op. cit.*, p. 11

70 *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

In what scholarship might call political history, many Turkish perceptions are cast in terms of an eternal antagonism between Islam and Christianity.⁷¹ However that said, Turkey is a changing society and culture which is increasingly engaging with the Islamic, especially of the Middle East and Asia, as well as Europe. Other political contexts will shape the understanding of Christian-Muslim encounters in contemporary Turkey and these forces will also give renewed focus to the identity of Islam in Turkey, be it Sunni, Alevi or to a lesser extent Shi'ite.⁷² The dialogue and encounter between Turkey and Christianity, past, present and future, will remain a difficult but dynamic conversation set between history, religion and politics in contemporary context.⁷³

In conclusion, the Turkish vision of Christianity seems to be informed and often distorted less by ignorance than by painful memories from history, Ottoman-Balkan wars, Turkish-Greek confrontation, the Cyprus question and in recent times the question of Turkish entry into the European Union.⁷⁴

71 I am indebted to the work of Étienne Copeaux in particular his very informative contribution, 'L'image brouillée du christianisme', *Turkish Islam and Europe/ Türkischer Islam und Europa: Europe and Christianity as reflected in Turkish Muslim Discourse and Turkish Muslim Life in the Diaspora*, pp. 159-178. See also Recep Kaymakcan, 'Christianity in Turkish Religious Education', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 10, no.1, 1999, pp. 279-293.

72 Karin Vorhoff, ' "Let's Reclaim Our History and Culture": Imagining Alevi community in contemporary Turkey', *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 38, 1998, pp. 220-252.

73 *Op. cit.*, pp. 159-178.

74 Edel Hughes, 'The European Union Accession Process: Ensuring the Protection of Turkey's Minorities', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010 , pp. 561-577; Nora Fisher Onar and Meriç Özgüneş, 'How Deep a Transformation? Europeanization of Greek and Turkish Minority Policies', *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2010 , pp. 111-136.

THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE GREEK MINORITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MUSLIM- CHRISTIAN RELATIONS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

Rev'd Archimandrite Nikodemos Anagnostopoulos

INTRODUCTION

Muslims and Christians live alongside each other in many parts of south-eastern Europe and the Middle East. The relations of Christian and Muslim communities of each nation of that particular area are unique and each nation can influence one another. The sunrise of the twentieth century until the present day numbers significant events and changes that dramatically affected the relations between Christians and Muslims having an impact on their religious traditions and their cultural identities. The phenomenon of the establishment of nation-states, the Cold War and the dependence of the western countries on Arab rich energy sources led to the increase of the ethnic and religious divisions even in particular population groups that lived within the borders of the same country.¹ In addition, the end of the Second World War marked the establishment of the United States of America and USSR as the powers, which would control the whole world; a situation that lasted approximately until the end of the twentieth century and the collapse of the Communist regime. This worldwide composition of powers brought significant changes in the Balkans and the Middle East. Christian Orthodox populations of the Balkans had the sense that they were under the domination of the newly established Communist regimes. Balkan Christians were facing difficulties in relation of practising their faiths within an environment that was opposed ideologically to organized religions. Most of the Balkan states adopted the same policies toward Christians and their churches, similar to those that the Soviet regime had had toward the Russian

1 Steven Runciman, *The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1971, pp. 41, 68-76.

Orthodox Church at the beginning of 1917.² In addition, Muslims likewise Christians were facing violation of their religious rights under the Communists, particularly in Albania and former Yugoslavia. The atheist regimes forbade Muslims from wearing traditional clothes, they closed and destroyed religious places of worship and killed and imprisoned religious leaders and Qur'an teachers.³

The consequences of the Second World War had a different impact on the Middle East countries. Even though Muslims and Christians in the Arab World have been able to find common ground before the war, they were struggling to maintain this unity after the war. The establishment of the Israeli state, the later defeat of the united Arab forces during the Arab-Israeli war and the demand for Middle Eastern petroleum products affected negatively Arab unity.⁴ The significant politico-economical changes in the Balkans and the Arab world could not leave unaffected the relations between Muslims and Christians in the newly established Republic of Turkey especially after the second half of the twentieth century. The increase of secularism found the Turkish government struggling to identify whether Turkey would be either a part of Europe or a part of the Middle East. The initial steps of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first leader of the Turkish Republic, to displace religions from the public sphere have been decreased over the years; however, Kamalist reformation has been a continuous force that still finds comfortable ground in Turkey until the present day. Orthodox Christians in Turkey as well as other religious minority groups of the country have also faced violation of religious freedom because of the political ambitions of the Turkish government.⁵

One of the religious minority groups of Turkey is the Greek Orthodox minority, which has its religious and administrative centre in Istanbul and it is known as the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. It is of a great significance therefore, to mention at this point some generic information about the origins and the establishment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Christian faith, initially originated in Palestine during the first century, was rapidly spread throughout the

2 Yaacov Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union: from the Second World War to Gorbachev*, C Hurst, London, 2000.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, pp. 93-113.

5 Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Church*, Penguin Books, London, 1993, pp. 127-128.

Mediterranean countries by the Apostles. Christianity was officially recognised as the religion of the Byzantine empire by the end of the fourth century, having its five major administrative centres located in Rome, Constantinople (present-day Istanbul), Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. In addition, the principles and the rituals of the Christian faith were the significant elements, which influenced the Byzantine empire in terms of organising and developing its culture, legislation, architecture, art and intellectual life.⁶ The Eastern Orthodox Church is the second largest Christian Church worldwide with an estimated number of three hundred million adherents primarily in eastern and south-eastern Europe.⁷ The Orthodox Church consists of several independent ecclesiastical bodies, the Autocephalous Patriarchates and Churches, which all share the same rituals and beliefs regarding the Orthodox Christian faith and are in communion with one another. All the Orthodox Autocephalous Churches acknowledge the primacy of honour (*primus inter pares*, 'first among equals') of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.⁸

The present article focuses on the present status and the challenges that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is facing as a religious institution from the perspective of Christian-Muslim relations in the contemporary context of the modern Turkish Republic. Turkey, where the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is based, is a secular country with a strong Muslim element, which accommodates within its borders an official, recognised Greek Orthodox minority, located at Istanbul. Regarding precisely the secular identity of Turkey it is of a great significance to mention that the Turkish Republic was officially established in 1923 as a 'secular republic'; however, the formal religious identity of the majority of the Turkish population is *Sunni* Muslim. Based on the vital geographical and geo-strategic region of the country within the Islamic world the change of political secularism in relation to religion and politics is an issue of a great significance. The term 'secular republic' had various interpretations within the political context of Turkey. Hence, combining arguments have arisen

6 Ware, pp. 12-17.

7 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 'Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian Population', *Pew Research Centre*, 2001, p. 31.

8 Cross, F L and E A Livingstone, *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 1205.

about the accurate meaning of secularism. The Turkish word *laiklik* was derived from the French *laïcité*, which literally means secularism and was introduced as a principal element of the republic. The idea of *laiklik* was introduced specifically to transfer particular regulations (public education, media etc.) from the civil authority to religion; an approach, which has been called *active secularism* and stands in opposition to *passive* secularism, which exists in the United States. Turkish *laiklik* is comprised by the ideas of the Turkish new generation of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the ideas of the reformer Mustafa Kamal Atatürk as well as the role of the Western societies, which had a significant influence on the Turkish military; the most trusted institution of the Turkish state. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923, the Turkish military played a significant role within the political arena of the country in terms of safeguarding the secular character of the newly established state despite the fact that political secularism was constitutionally codified in 1928. The threats of Islamic fundamentalism and the attempts at separation of the Kurds became the initial causes that led the military to have the obligation to protect the secular character of the country. Primarily, all these reasons shaped the relations between religion and state of the Turkish Republic establishing an austere distinction between state authority and public religion. However, this distinction did not mean that the state was not able to be involved into religious affairs. On the contrary, the historical Turkish understanding of secularism signified that religion is under the control and the authority of the state. Therefore, the actual characteristic of the secular identity of Turkey is of the *active secular* type, which imposes an absolute control on religious leadership, religious education and official recognition of religious communities.⁹

The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the religious institution of the Greek minority of Turkey, is officially recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). However, the Greek minority is not a unique phenomenon in terms of the minority issues of the country. It is therefore important to have an understanding of the notion of the term minority as well as the circumstances of other important minority

9 Warhola, J. and E. Bezci, (2010), 'Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent Developments in Laiklik', *Journal of Church and State*, 52 (3), pp. 427-434, 452-453.

groups in the contemporary context of modern Turkey. History reveals that minorities have been linked to those groups of people who have been living within a multi-ethnic environment and who have been excluded and discriminated against with regard to their political and governmental rights. The establishment of modern national states in Europe especially by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries caused the creation of minorities because the official national states were working upon the homogeneity of their ethnic citizens. The notion of the term minority, which usually refers to a small numerical group, can only be illustrated after comparison to minority and majority groups within a particular territory. One of the most significant characteristics of minority groups is the powerlessness of the minority group when compared to the majority group. Majority groups are the ethnic majorities, which dominate in a system of ethnic stratification. Other significant elements, which characterize minority groups, are the differentiation of language, religion and ethnicity.¹⁰ Despite the fact that minority rights are protected worldwide by international agreements and conventions such as the European Convention of Human Rights of 1950 or the United Nation Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, minority groups are still facing violation in relation to their rights.

The minority issue of modern Turkey is the result of the collapse of the Ottoman empire, which stretched over the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa accommodating and mingling people with different cultures, religions and customs. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey created a mosaic of populations, who have diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. These diverse population groups have co-existed for nearly a century in Turkey and despite the fact that they were facing, and in many cases still face, violation in relation to their rights; they are trying to maintain their own linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics.¹¹

The Ecumenical Patriarchate is based in Constantinople, the late capital of the Byzantine empire; the Christian community at Byzantium had had an active role in the society of that particular area since the

10 Schuerkens, U (2004), 'Ethnic, Racial and Religious Minorities', *Social and Economic Development*, (5).

11 Karimova, N, and Edward Deverell, *Minorities in Turkey*, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 2001, p. 8.

second AD century, which indeed resulted to the establishment of Constantinople as a Christian city. The Christian Orthodox community of the city of Byzantium has been known by different terms—as the Church of Byzantium, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Great Church of Christ, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Bishopric, the Patriarchate of New Rome and the Church of Phanar. However, after the fall of the city in 1453, the Ottomans felt the need to give a new name to the Christian community of Constantinople based on their culture and tradition and as such the Christian community of Constantinople has known as Istanbul or Fener Rum Patrikhanesi.¹² The history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople sustains the destructive influences of time and lasts for eighteen centuries. The Church of Constantinople since her foundation in the fourth century, throughout its growth and flourish during the period of the Byzantine empire as well as after the fall of Byzantium to the Ottomans and currently under the challenges, which is facing within the borders of a Muslim country, maintains the Tradition of the Orthodox faith based on the Holy Scriptures and decisions of the Ecumenical Councils. In order to comprehend better the fundamental elements of the ecclesiology and the development of the political theology of this significant religious institution of the Christian world in response to Muslim-Christian relations in the contemporary context of modern Turkey, it is an immense necessity to divide its history into three major periods: i) the Byzantine period (324–1453), ii) the period of the Ottoman empire (1453–1923) and iii) the period after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923) until the present day. However, this paper focuses only on the period after the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the present day, highlighting the challenges that this religious institution is still facing in terms of religious practices and freedom based within the borders of a Muslim country.

12 Vasil Stavrides, *Συνοπτική Ιστορία του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου* [*A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*], Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, Thessaloniki, 1991, pp. 15–16.

**THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AFTER
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC**

The Peace Treaty of Lausanne between Greece and Turkey, which was signed on 24 July 1923, the foundation and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, as well as the exchange of Turkish and Greek populations were the most significant events until the first quarter of the twentieth century, which affected and dramatically alternated the role and the life of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Precisely, the collapse of the Asia Minor campaign and the destruction of the Greek forces, 'the desire to bring to a final close the state of war which has existed in the East since 1914'¹³ led to a series of long negotiations (20 November 1922–24 July 1923) at Lausanne between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. An additional factor, which contributed to the series of negotiations before the final agreement of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, was the rejection of the Treaty of Sevres. The Ottoman empire had previously signed the Treaty of Sevres however, the Ankara based government of the Turkish national revolutionary group acting under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,¹⁴ refused it. The Treaty of Lausanne (2nd Article) recognized the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic as the successor state of the collapsed Ottoman empire. In addition, the Treaty contributed to the final mapping of the Greco-Turkish borders, which were finally defined; no changes have been made to that borderline until the present day.¹⁵

A component part of the Treaty of Lausanne had already been signed on 30 January 1923. This document ascertains the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, which was for the first time in history, a compulsory transfer of a large number of people and was officially adopted in order to determine a minority problem based only on the religious identity of the population.¹⁶ According to the Treaty, all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on Turkish territory other than Constantinople on the one hand and

13 Pentzopoulos, p. 51.

14 Nikolaou Charalambos, *Διεθνείς πολιτικές και στρατιωτικές συνθήκες-συμφωνίες και συμβάσεις: Από το 1453 μέχρι σήμερα* [International political and military treaties-agreements and conventions: Since 1453 until today], Floros, Athens, 1996, p. 306.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 306–307.

16 Zurcher, p. 4.

all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory other than the newly-acquired region of Western Thrace on the other were to be forcibly exchanged. Thus, the distinguishing criterion, which has been chosen for compulsory resettlement was exclusively that of religion. The result calculated that a minimum of 1.3 million Greeks were expelled from Turkey and some 500,000 Muslims were sent to Turkey from Greece. All were dispossessed of their properties, which in many cases of the Greek refugees were substantial and this loss of property was subsequently confirmed by the Ankara Treaty of 1930. The Lausanne's negotiations had allowed approximately 150-200,000 Greek Orthodox people to remain in Constantinople and a similar number of Muslims in Western Thrace, who accordingly recognized officially as the Greek minority of Constantinople and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace.¹⁷ However, the agreement for the exchange of populations created tensions between the Greek and the Turkish representatives in terms of the interpretation of the French term *Etabli* (English: established, Turkish: *kurulmuş*, Greek: *εγκατεστημένος*). The Greeks argued that the term referred to those citizens, who lived in the late Ottoman empire (Constantinople) before the 30 October 1918. In contradiction, Turks claimed that the term *Etabli* referred to those who have been registered at the general register office of Constantinople. The dispute was referred for settlement to the International Court of Justice.¹⁸

The Peace Treaty of Lausanne signified the end of the Greco-Turkish war and constituted the foundations of a peaceful cooperation between the two neighbouring nations. Undoubtedly, the Treaty and the population exchange have had negative and positive impact upon the general distribution of the population of both countries. A question still remains regarding the full compliance to the terms of the Treaty by both the covenanters, specifically to the aggregations related to minority rights.

¹⁷ Edwards, p. 2.

¹⁸ Nikolaou, p. 304.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

The Lausanne Treaty did not affect the Ecumenical Patriarchate in terms of its pastoral and spiritual work. However, all the external rights and privileges that the Ottoman rule had awarded and recognised for the Patriarchate discontinued existing, a fact that brought the functional situation of the Patriarchate at the status before the capture of Constantinople. Precisely, the articles 38-44 of the Treaty stipulated that the Turkish Government should undertake the obligation to provide full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the country without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or/and religion. Conjointly, all inhabitants of Turkey have the right to exercise freely in public or private, any creed or religion. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities will enjoy the similar political rights as Muslims without distinction of religion and shall be equal before the law.¹⁹

A significant Turkish claim however, which brought tensions between the newly established republic and the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, was the relocation of the Patriarchate of Constantinople outside the Turkish borders. In addition, with the 1092/1923 Decree, Turkey has challenged for the first time the ecumenical role and identity of the Patriarchate. The Treaty of Lausanne resolved this challenge stating that the Ecumenical Patriarchate should remain in Constantinople. In addition, it defined the procedure of the election of the Patriarch, who should have Turkish nationality.²⁰ Another development towards secularism of the Turkish Republic, which aimed to lessen the authority and the dignity of the Orthodox clergy within the Turkish society, was the 1935 Grand National Assembly legislation about clerical attire. Based on this law, all clergymen were forbidden to wear cassocks outside of the places of worship compelling them to wear civilian clothes. There was only one exemption of this legislation, which was related to the patriarch. However, this attempt for secularization affected the Muslim clergy as well as all the other religious representatives in Turkey.²¹

¹⁹ Stavrides, p. 83.

²⁰ Nikolaou, pp. 307-308.

²¹ Andreas Nanakis, 'History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in the Twentieth Century', in *The Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Christine Chaillot, Peter Lang, Oxford, 2011, p. 28.

THE TURKISH ORTHODOX CHURCH

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the population exchange between Turkey and Greece, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not been confronted only by the new issues in relation to the official Turkish State but also with another challenge. This new challenge was related to the movement of *Euthimios Karachissaridis*, known as Papa Eftim. However, the Turkish Orthodox Church (*Türk Ortodoks Kilisesi*), which was the Church that *Papa Eftim* found and established is an unrecognized Christian Orthodox denomination influenced by Turkish nationalist ideology. Between 10 May and 8 June 1923, Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV (Metaxakis) summoned a pan-Orthodox Synod where representatives of other Orthodox Churches (Russia, Serbia, Cyprus, Greece and Romania) had been invited and attended. The main points that this Synod was dealing with were linked with the significant corrections of the Julian calendar as well as to some canonical issues about the marriage of the clergy after their ordination and the second marriage of widower priests. The proceedings of the Synod were interrupted by demonstrations against Patriarch Meletios. These demonstrations were organized by Damianos Damianides, a member of the trust of the Church of Panagia Kafatiani at Galata district of Istanbul, who demanded the immediate resignation of the patriarch. Finally, these events led to the resignation of Patriarch Meletios and created the question of the establishment of a 'national' Turkish Orthodox Church within the borders of the newly established Republic of Turkey.²²

Damianides' actions against the patriarch were supported by Papa Eftim, who was an ethnic Greek Orthodox citizen of Turkey. Papa Eftim was bilingual, speaking both Turkish and Greek and was serving as a priest at Keskin, a city in Anatolia. On 15 September 1922, Papa Eftim, who had regular contacts and relations with Kemalists, organized a conference at the monastery of St John at the city of Zincidere where he proclaimed the establishment of the Turkish Orthodox Church. His attempts were warmly embraced by Kemalists, who were trying to establish as well a Turkish Orthodox Church for the Turkish speaking citizens of the country. Unfortunately, the exchange of populations under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 was based on the

22 Nanakis, pp. 23-24.

religious background of the populations. Therefore, Turkish speaking Orthodox individuals have been forced to move to Greece while Greek speaking Muslims relocated to Turkey. Therefore, the attempt to establish a national Turkish Orthodox Church that would not have been in a communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not been achieved. However, this outcome did not dishearten Papa Eftim; thereafter the resignation of Patriarch Meletios, he started promoting himself for the ecumenical throne despite the fact that he was a married priest.²³ Papa Eftim argued that the fact that he was fluent in Turkish was an advantage in relation to the Patriarchate on the one hand and to the new forthcoming era of the newly established Turkish State on the other. The patriarchal Holy Synod broke all relations with him, an event that did not deter him to force the Patriarchate on 2 October 1923, while Constantinople was evacuating by troops, claiming to remain within the premises of the Patriarchate until the election of the new patriarch. This act signified that he had the support of the Turkish authorities. In relation to the canonical process of the election of Metaxakis' successor, the assistant governor Fahrettin sent a letter to the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was placing restrictions regarding to the patriarchal election. The letter stated that all the voters as well as all the candidates for the patriarchal throne should be Turkish citizens and serve within the borders of Turkey.²⁴

THE PATRIARCH

Since 1923 onwards, the Patriarch is confined to his spiritual and pastoral duties depriving the ethnic role that he had during the period of the Ottoman empire. A positive development in relation to the Patriarch was the friendship agreement signed in 1930 between the

23 Based on Canon Law, within the Orthodox Church only unmarried priests are able to become bishops. All male individual, who are planning to enter the priesthood, have the freedom of choice as to whether or not they wish to serve as married priests or as celibates. After ordination, no marriage is permitted. The practice of the Orthodox Church to appoint only celibate priests as bishops originates in the fifth century. Nicolaides Angelo, 'The State of Celibacy and Monastic Calling: An Orthodox Perspective' in the *Australian e-Journal of Theology*, (2006) <http://aejt.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/395187/AEJT_6.5_Nicolaides_Celibacy.pdf> [accessed 17 August 2013].

24 Nanakis, pp. 23-24.

Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and his Turkish homologous İsmet İnönü during the process of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement. The negotiations led in September 1931 to the recognition of the ecumenical nature of the patriarchate providing Patriarch Photios (1929–1935) an identity card (*nüfus cüzdanı*).²⁵

Nevertheless, Turkish authorities in a prefectural level played a significant role in relation to the patriarchal election. According to the Turkish law, the Orthodox Patriarch should have Turkish nationality and be a Turkish citizen. The *endemousa* synod of the Patriarchate has the absolute authority to elect a new Patriarch therefore; the members of the *endemousa* synod drafted the list of the candidates, which was submitted to the Istanbul Prefecture. The list was returned back either as the original list or with crossed names. After the receipt of the list, a secret ballot took place between the members of the *endemousa synod* in order to draw up a shorter list of three candidates. Finally, the Hierarchs of the *endemousa* synod elected with their canonical vote as the new patriarch one among the three short listed candidates. These proceedings for the election of the Patriarch exist up the present day.²⁶ The limited number however, of the Orthodox metropolitans and bishops, who have Turkish nationality created obstacles regarding the election of a new Patriarch.²⁷ Therefore, a recent decision was made by the Turkish authorities in 2010, which was the offer of the Turkish nationality to metropolitans and bishops, who are under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate but live and serve outside the Turkish borders. This significant decision reassures the election of the new Ecumenical Patriarch despite the ongoing interference of the Istanbul Prefecture.²⁸

25 Nanakis, p. 28.

26 Constantinides, Chrysostomos (2000), 'The Ecumenical Patriarch and the Ecumenical Patriarchs from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to the Present', *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 45 (1–4), pp. 4–22.

27 Bigne, A S (1998), 'The Fener Greek Patriarchate', *Journal of International Affairs*, 3 (1).

28 Theodore Kalmoukos, 'Hierarchs Under the Patriarchate Can Become Turkish Citizens' in *The National Herald*, (2011) < <http://cliftonorthodoxcathedral.org/images/TurkishCit.pdf> > [accessed 19 August 2013].

HIERARCHY AND SYNODICAL INSTITUTION

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate consisted of twelve Turkish national metropolitans, who additionally had Turkish citizenship and continued to operate around the Patriarch, who still had the right to summon and preside over the Synod. On the other hand, the *endemosa* synod meets only when serious issues concerning the Patriarchate arise. The Ethnic Assembly is no longer operating therefore; there was no direct intervention of the laity into ecclesiastical affairs of the Patriarchate.²⁹ Since 2010 onwards, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate consists of six Turkish national metropolitans, who live and serve in Turkey and six Turkish national metropolitans, who live and serve in Greece, Europe and the United States, territories which are under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Despite all the challenges that the Patriarchate faced as a Religious Institution based on the Turkish Republic Legislations in terms of religious freedom and practice, besides the spiritual growth and the pastoral care of the Orthodox flock the Patriarch had specific responsibilities for co-ordinating a common witness among the Autocephalous Churches. The Ecumenical Patriarch exercises this ministry first of all in relationship with the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Patriarch, as the president of this Synod does not act over or above the other bishops. According to the Orthodox perspective, primacy involves conciliarity. Likewise, in his relationship with other Orthodox, the Ecumenical Patriarch is honoured as the first bishop of the Orthodox Church. This position gives to the Ecumenical Patriarch the specific responsibility of identifying issues requiring the attention of the entire Church and for convening appropriate meetings to address these issues. When representatives of the Orthodox Churches meet in a *Synaxis*, the Ecumenical Patriarch is the presiding bishop of the meeting. The Patriarchate of Constantinople constitutes the centre of all the local Orthodox churches. It heads these not by administering them, but by virtue of the primacy of its ministry of Pan-Orthodox unity and the coordination of the activities of all Orthodoxy.³⁰

²⁹ Stavrides, pp. 88–89.

³⁰ Patsavos, L., (1990). Paper delivered at the 41st meeting of the Orthodox-Roman Catholic Bilateral Consultation. Brighton, Massachusetts.

ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION

The nationalist phenomenon and the need for the establishment of autocephalous Churches in the Balkans continued during the twentieth century, which resolved significant problems on one hand in terms of Church administration and linguistic homogeneity in worship but decreased the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate on the other. The newly established independent Balkan States have claimed and finally had been awarded from the Ecumenical Patriarchate their ecclesiastical autonomy. During the patriarchy of Benjamin I (1936–1946), the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognised the autocephaly of the Albanian Orthodox Church in 1937 and lifted the schism with the Bulgarian Church in 1945 recognising its autocephaly.³¹ Nowadays, approximately 3,000 Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens of Istanbul, the Princes Islands and the Islands of Imvros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada) are under the direct jurisdiction and the pastoral care of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.³² In addition, under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate are provinces across Europe, Asia, the United States, Australia, North Aegean Islands, Crete Island and the Holy Mountain Athos. Furthermore, the provinces of northern Greece, which are called new lands, are under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, despite the fact that the Greek Orthodox Church has been an Autocephalous Church since 1850. The current holder of the office of the Ecumenical Throne is Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Constantinople New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch as his official title is. In addition, there is no attributive adjective attached to the official title of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, defining a specific ethnic or national identity of the Patriarchate.³³

THE ISTANBUL POGROM OF 1955

The ongoing disputes between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus led the Turkish authorities to engage in a continuous motivation of public

31 Nanakis, p. 30.

32 Karimova, N, and E Deverell, p. 11.

33 Meyendorff, J, J Chapin, and N Lossky (1981), *The Orthodox Church: its past and its role in the world today*, St Vladimir's Seminary Press, New York, p.132.

opinion against the Greek minority. The Istanbul and Izmir pogrom of 6-7 September 1955 known as *Septemvriana events* followed by the events of 1964 led the vast majority of the Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey to abandon the country. These events had widely reported as anti-Christian riots, after which the Turkish authorities never compensate the Greek minority for any personal, economic and property loss. In addition, the Septemvriana events led to the closure of all the minority language schools of the Lausanne protected Islands of Imbros and Tenedos.³⁴ The aggressive policy of the Turkish Government against the Patriarchate and the Greek minority culminated in 1971 with the closure of the Halki Theological Academy, a fact which deprived the right to education of the Greek Orthodox clergy.

ECUMENICAL DIMENSION OF THE PATRIARCHATE

In General, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has a particular responsibility to strengthen the unity of the Orthodox Churches and to co-ordinate their common witness. At the same time, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has a specific responsibility to care for the Orthodox faithful in lands beyond the borders of the other Autocephalous Churches. This is a ministry of service to the entire Church, which the Ecumenical Patriarchate undertakes in accordance with the canons and often under difficult circumstances driven from socio-economical and political climate of each country.³⁵ The use of the term 'ecumenical', which refers to the Patriarch himself as well as to the Patriarchate as a religious institution, has been a subject of conflicts several times between the Turkish authorities and the Patriarchate. In relation to the use of the term Ecumenical, which is used by the Patriarchate, the Commission of Venice has clearly stated that it is an internal issue of the Patriarchate and for the Orthodox Autocephalous Churches to determine based in the way that this concept is understood among the Orthodox Churches despite the way that any government or court deals with this matter.

34 Prodromou, E (2005), 'Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The "Muslimhood Model" and the Greek Orthodox Minority', *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 3 (1), p. 15.

35 The Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (2009), 'The Leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Significance of Canon 28 of Chalcedon', *The Canadian Journal of Orthodox Christianity*, 4 (3), p. 172.

The Ecumenical role and nature of the Patriarchate is undoubtedly not legal but pastoral, spiritual and ecclesiastical. However, a Turkish court verdict in 2007 decided that there is no legal basis regarding the claims of the Patriarchate about the use of title Ecumenical, stating that the Patriarchate is a religious institution having limited religious power and authority over the Greek minority of Turkey only. This decision and the denial of the Ecumenical title of the Orthodox Patriarchate is a direct interference to the religious rights and the autonomy of the Greek Orthodox Community. The Commission of Venice clearly stressed that ‘no secular court has any competence or jurisdiction to rule on whether a religious leader is *Ecumenical or not*.’ In addition, Turkish authorities have the obligation under article 9 of ECHR not to forbid or to obstruct the Patriarchate to use this title. They are not however forced or obliged to use this term when they formally refer to the Patriarchate. It is therefore clear that if Turkish authorities have not the will to use the title Ecumenical; under the ECHR they are formally free not to do so, as long as they do not obstruct the use of this particular title by others. However, taking into account the fact that the term Ecumenical consists a part of the official title of the Patriarchate and has done so for the last fifteen centuries, while it is a title, which is widely recognised and used globally, the Venice Commission fails to see any reason, factual or legal, for the authorities not to address the Ecumenical Patriarchate by its historical and generally recognised title.³⁶ The Orthodox Church as the One, Holy and Apostolic Church fulfils her spiritual mission through the convocation of local and major Synods, as it is established by the canonical tradition in order to safeguard and affirm the communion of the local churches with each other and with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is the First Throne in the Orthodox Church; a prerogative of honour, which has been granted by the decisions of Ecumenical Councils³⁷ and by the eighteenth century of ecclesial praxis. In other words, the responsibilities and the obligations to care and protect the Orthodox faith as it have been delivered. Thus, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople is recognized as *Primus inter pares* (‘first among equals’) among all the bishops of the

36 Council of Europe. 2009. Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the adjective ‘Ecumenical’. Venice Commission (No 535), pp. 21-24.

37 Canon 3 of the II Ecumenical Council; Canons 9, 17 and 28 of the IV Ecumenical Council; Canon 36 of the Quinsext Ecumenical Council.

Orthodox Churches.³⁸ A passage from Luke the Apostle is a statement, which Patriarch Bartholomew himself has used often. ‘The Lord said, Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the Kingdom’ (Luke 12:32). This passage underlines the challenge regarding the ecumenical role and dimension of the Patriarchate of Constantinople; the fact that the Orthodox Church of Constantinople within the borders of Turkey numbers a small flock, which is under its direct jurisdiction and pastoral care. This argument is not really accurate; as it was previously mentioned, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople has under its direct jurisdiction provinces in all five continents worldwide. Another fact is that all the Autonomous and Autocephalous Churches—except the provinces, which were under the jurisdiction of the five sees of the Pentarchy (Churches of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch)³⁹—equally enjoy their independency, which was awarded by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Prior to the awarding of the Autocephaly, these ethnic eastern provinces were under the direct jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Finally, the decision of the Turkish Government to grant Turkish nationality to Orthodox metropolitans of Greece, Europe and the United States in 2010 obviously recognises the ecumenical jurisdiction and dimension of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Orthodox leaders, metropolitans and bishops, who are based outside Turkey and are responsible for the pastoral care of Orthodox populations, are under the authority and the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. Therefore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is not only responsible for the pastoral and spiritual care of the Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey but also is responsible for its flock at all its jurisdictions worldwide having indeed an ecumenical role and dimension. This diplomatic decision was made by the Turkish authorities based on the Patriarchal claims regarding the re-opening of the Theological Academy of Halki. These claims since the closure of the Academy in 1971 were expressed to the authorities because of the limited number of the Orthodox educated metropolitans and bishops who had Turkish nationality; a fact that would create

38 The Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology (2009), ‘The Leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the Significance of Canon 28 of Chalcedon’, *The Canadian Journal of Orthodox Christianity*, 4 (3), pp. 172–174.

39 Cross, F. L. and E. A. Livingston, p. 1240.

obstacles regarding the election of a new Patriarch. This significant decision reassures the election of the new Ecumenical Patriarch on the one hand but on the other paralyses the claims of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the re-opening of Halki Theological Seminary due to the fact that clergymen outside the Turkish borders have the Turkish nationality; they are therefore able to live and serve in Turkey as well as to be nominated and elected for the Patriarchal Throne.

LEGAL IDENTITY OF THE PATRIARCHATE

The Turkish Constitution recognises that all individuals, who have Turkish nationality and belong to non-Muslim communities, have the same legitimate rights as all the Turkish citizens. However, the legal status of the institutions of these communities varies. The legal identity of religious communities is not recognised by the authorities despite the lack of a specific law to prevent this issue. Therefore, the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a religious institution still has no legal identity in Turkey similarly to all non-Muslim religious institutions. No religious community has been registered and yet obtained so far recognition as a legal body because of the unclear clarification in the Turkish legitimate system. Therefore, they operate through foundations and associations, which to some extent support the legal functioning and representations of religious communities. Turkish authorities and courts, when a registration issue for obtaining legal personality by a religious community arises, they claim that this goes against to the principle of secularism and especially in contradiction of Articles 2, 13, 14 and 24 of the Turkish Constitution. However, this is a particular interpretation of the Constitution. Non-Turkish scholars and specialists argue that there is nothing in the Turkish constitutional provisions that clearly prohibits a revision or a form of the legislation; a fact that will lead to the recognition of the legal personality of all religious communities in Turkey. The answer to this trivial reality of non-Muslim communities in relation to their function and operation lies upon the practises and the policies that other European secular countries follow and apply. France which is a secular country, following the tradition of *laïcité*, provides religious communities with a legal framework for registration. The process for the establishment of a new religious community in

Turkey requires the members of that particular community to have established a foundation or an association in order to safeguard property ownership for the community buildings such as schools, mosques and churches on the one hand and to support the activities of the religious community on the other. The foundation system, also known as *vakfis* gives specific limitations related to the operation of the foundations and dates back to the Ottoman era. The majority of the foundations of the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish communities were established as *vakfis* before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.⁴⁰ The Turkish Government recognizes the Patriarch as the spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey and refers to him as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of the *Phanar*. A major impediment to the functioning of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an institution within the Turkish society stems from the fact that it is not recognized by the Turkish government as a legal entity, a fact which results in its deprivation of property rights.⁴¹

ECCLESIASTICAL EDUCATION

The Orthodox population of Turkey had specific rights in terms of education after 1923. Primary schools were operating in each Orthodox community; education was not related any more with the ecclesiastical authorities. There were six secondary schools, the famous Theological Academy of Halki⁴² and, during the patriarchate of Athenagoras I (1948–1972), three important higher educational institutions were established outside the Turkish borders: (i) the Orthodox Centre of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Chambésy (1966), (ii) the Patriarchal Institute of Patristic Studies in Thessaloniki (1968) and (iii) the Higher Orthodox Academy in Crete (1968).⁴³ However, a significant event, which encumbers the proper recruitment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with clergy men, was the illegal closure of Halki Theological Academy in 1971 by the

40 Council of Europe 2009. Opinion on the Legal Status of Religious Communities in Turkey and the Right of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul to use the adjective 'Ecumenical'. Venice Commission (No 535), pp. 10–11.

41 Dilek Kurban and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Μια Ιστορία Αμειβομένης: Τα Μειονοτικά Βακούφια στην Ελλάδα και την Τουρκία*, Istanbul, TESEV, 2010, p. 14.

42 Stavrides, p. 105.

43 Nanakis, pp. 32–33.

Turkish authorities; however, the operation of this Minority School was protected by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.⁴⁴ Since its closure, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has had to send abroad those young men, who desire to enter the priesthood and maintain and experience the patriarchal ecclesiology, order and tradition. They usually reach one of the theological schools in Greece, and in many instances they do not return to Turkey after their studies. Since the closure of the school, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has also had difficulties recruiting staff at the Ecumenical Patriarchate in order to carry out its many administrative responsibilities, and to fill positions to carry out its world-wide mission. Despite many promises made by the Turkish government over the past few years that the school would reopen, this issue remains unresolved even now. The Turkish Prime Minister has stated that he would like the school to re-open but under the condition that a Mosque should be built in Athens. The demand of the Turkish authorities to the Greek government regarding the establishment of a Mosque in Athens in order to allow the re-opening of the Halki Theological Academy appears to be under questions as the demand becomes disproportionate. The right in higher education for the Orthodox clergy of the Patriarchate is not in accordance to the policies that the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs implies.⁴⁵ The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs has said several times that the government is working on a solution of the re-opening of the Academy of Halki. The Minister of Education on the other hand pointed out that if there is political will, the school could re-open in 24 hours. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has never been officially contacted by the Turkish Authorities about the re-opening of the school. Its re-opening is absolutely necessary for the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

44 Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, 24 July 1923. (Section III, Articles 37-45).

45 Androussou, A, N Askouni, T Dragonas, A Frangoudaki and E Plexousaki (2011), 'Educational and Political Challenges in Reforming the Education of the Muslim Minority in Thrace, Greece', *The International Journal of Learning*, 17 (11), pp. 227-239.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

Towards the path of secularization, Turkish authorities decided to convert important places of worship including the Church of the Holy Wisdom (known as Hagia Sophia) to museums. These places of worship have been previously converted during the Ottoman empire from Christian Churches to Mosques. In order to classify property ownership of religious institutions, in June 1935 the Turkish government introduced a new law regarding religious properties. This new legislation stated that property affairs of all religious institutions were under the authority the Turkish state. Thereafter, the government established the Religious Property Service Committee (*Evkaf Genel Müdürlüğü*) in order to examine the property ownership of all religious institutions. There were two categories where religious properties were classified: the *mazbut*, concerning the properties belonged by Muslim institutions and administered by the state and the *mülhak*, properties owned by non-Muslim community religious institutions and were administered by elected committees. Thus, none of the churches or other places of worship under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey are owned by the Patriarchate. All the worship buildings and temples are owned by Minority Foundations, which are administered independently of the Patriarchate. The Ecumenical Patriarchate is prohibited from purchasing any type of property.

CONCLUSION

The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople since its foundation in the fourth century, throughout its growth and flourishing during the period of the Byzantine empire, as well as after the fall of Byzantium and under the current challenges, which it still faces being based within the borders of a Muslim country, maintains the rituals and the teachings of the Orthodox faith according to the tradition and the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils. In addition, the Church of Constantinople promotes and supports the idea of world peace participating at various forums and supports the Ecumenical Dialogue among different Christian denominations in the light of the reunion of the Christian world as well as the Inter-Religious dialogue, which is conducted

rather for the cessation of religious intolerance but for the triumph of mutual understanding, and for the establishment of certainty in the good intentions of both sides, respectful of each person's cultural background and freedom of religious choice.⁴⁶

Finally, human rights and free religious practices regardless of nationality, language or religion is a problematic aspect of today's societies, which the Patriarchate tries to instate. Undoubtedly, Muslims and Christians after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 live alongside in Turkey for nearly seven centuries in a peaceful co-existence facing however, periods of tension.

Christianity and Islam are part of a long family quarrel within the family of the children of Abraham. As with many family quarrels it can be bitter at times, but as with family quarrels there remains a great deal of territory in the house that you still occupy together.⁴⁷

Despite the recent positive steps of the Turkish authorities toward religious freedom in the sense of establishing, administrating and controlling religious institutions, there is still remaining an absolute necessity for further development related to legal revisions and change of mentality towards minority rights. In the light that Turkey, a secular country with a strong Muslim element, is under negotiations for full membership with the European Union in relation to the recent demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara, because of the attempts of re-islamization of Turkish society, the authorities still violate the legitimate rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; a policy which befalls other religious minorities in Turkey as well. This tactic is a calculated long-term state strategy of harassment, attrition and annihilation, which has multiple deleterious effects upon the proper function of the Patriarchate and, indeed, its very existence; the existence and the future of a religious

46 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, 'The Necessity of Inter-Religious Dialogue—The Relationships between Christianity and Islam', Lecture delivered at the Islamic College in Libya <<http://patriarchate.org/documents/christianity-and-islam#sthash.4OotVhL6.dpuf>> [accessed 20 August 2013].

47 Rowan Williams, *Islam, Christianity and Pluralism*, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 2.

institution that the combination of its history and its ecclesial praxis over seventeen centuries signifies its actual role and purpose not only among the Orthodox Church but within global Christianity.

THE *DHIMMI*: *DHIMMI* AND *DHIMMITUDE* IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Robin Gibbons

Whilst I am very aware that I am going to examine a fairly broad concept of *dhimmi* in the Ottoman empire, I also have a narrow and particular focus on the Byzantine Orthodox Christian community as *dhimmi* people. This is to help sharpen a focus but in doing so I shall also examine other areas and connections which remind us that this is simply part of a much wider problematic issue and one which does not simply belong to the past. One of the fruits of any examination of the complex history of religion in the territories of the Ottoman empire and surrounding lands is identification of the powerful place (particularly within the Islamic states) religion had (and has) in the lives of the people and in particular, as we will discover, the problem that *dhimmitude* represents.¹ This helps us to ask more fundamental questions, particularly when we consider the place and suffering of the Eastern Christian Churches throughout Ottoman history and, within the contemporary Middle Eastern Christian context, what the wider and ecumenical Christian churches can do to help this continuing and serious problem today? Given that we have to take on board religious patterns of belief and, in the presence of Islamic communities, recognize a system that gives ultimate authority to the Divine law as iterated in the Holy *Qur'an*, just how does the Orthodox or Eastern Christian face life as a *dhimmi*, given that they see their salvation coming through Jesus Christ as the 'Incarnate Word', and not through the holy *Qur'an*. It is certainly of fundamental necessity that we re-evaluate seriously the rights of others and need to have the freedom and ability to reflect critically on the rights of all *dhimmi* peoples within the structures of Islam. This needs to be done not only by politicians and negotiators,

1 An important paper covering early Islam is C E Bosworth, 'The Concept of *Dhimma* in Early Islam', *Living Stones Yearbook*, 2012, pp.143-164.

but also by many other people including theologians and religiously trained canon lawyers.

In order to dialogue, it is important for me as a theologian to keep in mind certain key issues within the various traditions of Christianity, particularly the Eastern Churches who have long lived with Islam. Whatever we may like to think, the primary issue is the place of Christ and our relationship to him, and how through Christ and the community of believing disciples, we relate to our world and its destiny. All through Christian history there has been the particular theological tension exemplified in the issue of eschatology, that the Kingdom proclaimed and inaugurated by Jesus is at once present and is not yet. This immanent sense of presence is complicated by the lack of any spatial reference, for in Jesus the location of God is not only in heaven (Our Father who art in heaven) (Mt: 6:9-13, Lk 11:2-4) but also within, the kingdom of God is within you (Lk 17.21) and located both individually, you are temples of the Holy Spirit (1Cor 3:16, 1Cor 6:19) and in community, where two or three gather I am in the midst of them (Mt 18:20). What does this do? It challenges the whole question of any one religious community to claim hegemony of territory on this earth. Augustine of Hippo writing about the two cities of humans and God, sees the Christian involved in a battle between the values of both in which the City of God will eventually triumph.² In other words the Christian will always have that sense of a final destination where what happens here on earth will be made right and that somehow the politics of this world need to be transformed through the Gospel values of the Beatitudes not in war or of imposition. This tension may also help us understand why there was what some historians might call 'acquiescence' in *dhimmi* status and the balancing act any group has to make within another societal structure. As David Kopel points out in a paper on Dhimmitude and Disarmament, 'sometimes the *dhimmi* were quite harshly persecuted. At other times (they) were allowed relatively tolerable living conditions.'³ Whilst this might be true and accommodation inevitably happened, it does not mean that

2 For an excellent translation copy, see David Knowles (ed.), *St Augustine: The City of God*, Penguin, London, 1984.

3 David B Kopel, 'Dhimmitude and Disarmament', Research Paper in the series: *Islamic law and Law of the Muslim World*, New York Law School Research Paper, Series 08/12, 2008, p. 2. Online version <http://www.nyls.edu> also published in *George Mason University Civil Rights Journal*, 2008.

this situation was acceptable to the eastern Christians, a careful look at contemporary sources might reveal a different set of insights.⁴

ORIGINS AND SOURCES

Paul Collins in his historical book, 'The Birth of the West', has some pertinent comments to make about a recent tendency of post-modern historians to see Christianity as a demonizing force within wider world politics and Islam as an enlightened force for good, especially within the context of Spain under Arab rule. Examining the birth of Europe in the tenth century, he looks at the Islamic conquest of Spain, and in doing so reminds us that we need to be very careful about modern interpretations of history:

Much has been made recently of the Arab contribution to European knowledge—namely, that the Arabs preserved the philosophy of the Greco-Roman world at a time when unflattering comparisons could be made of the 'primitiveness' and barbarism of Christian Europe. However it is often forgotten in postmodernism's enthusiasm for multiculturalism and post colonialism that almost all of this knowledge was nonetheless derived by the Arabs from Greek and Middle Eastern Christian sources in the first place or from India and China.⁵

This romantic and popular interpretation of Spanish history often contrasts Christianity unfavorably with Islam, as though there were two Europes, one barbaric and superstitious, the other refined, cultured and sophisticated. The reality is far more complex than these caricatures. Muslim Spain had a high culture but it was not tolerant in any sense that we might know. It was a highly stratified society with strict stratification and the imposition of *dhimmi* status on those who were the true inhabitants of the country.

4 See the article by K A Hain, 'Devishirme is a Contested Practice', in *Historia: The Alpha Rho Paper*, University of Utah Publication, 2012. epubs.utah.edu/index

5 Paul Collins, *The Birth of the West: Rome, Germany, France, and the Creation of Europe in the Tenth Century*. Public Affairs, New York, 2013, p. 107.

More than this Collins also reminds us of another concept that we need to keep in mind, namely the contextualization of a religion such as Islam in a 'conquered' society, particularly when we look at the Ottoman empire and the problem of the Greek Orthodox and other religious minorities. The sheer speed of conquest by Islam of Byzantine provinces, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine between 636-642 followed by North Africa in 648 and then the advance through the Iberian peninsula in the eighth century represented the concept of *jihad*, a holy war, in which the fundamental aim of the 'pious Muslim was the expansion of Islam and the conversion of non-believers.'⁶ The ideology of *jihad*, following on from Islamic expansionism, represents a marked theological division between Christianity and Islam. Whilst Christianity is a missionary and universal religion, it does not have the political determination to establish a world state in which Christianity prevails over all things. Whatever may or may not have happened in particular historical circumstances such as the crusades or where Christians accepted slavery as a norm, the theology of mission for Christ's Kingdom is opposed to compulsion and forced conversion. The difference between the two faiths is that 'Islam assumes that everyone is "by nature" Muslim and that it is the duty of Muslims and Muslim states to spread Islam. Essentially, *jihad* is a kind of unrelenting and fervent missionary thrust that can be carried out either by persuasion or by the sword.'⁷

Collins argues that the Arab rule of *al-Andalus* and also of other parts of the Muslim world was not a '*convivencia*', a tolerant living together, with the native communities many of whom were Christian, 'it was a highly stratified society with strict demarcation of roles, including for a period the wearing of identifying badges for Jews and Christians.'⁸ A case in point is the invidious comparison of Christian Europe with Muslim lands at certain periods in history; sometimes—careful comparisons reveal a different perception. For instance the inference that Christians in medieval Europe persecuted the Jews, whilst a measure of greater freedom and tolerance existed in *dar al-islam* at the same time, can be shown in a very different light when one compares it with the Carolingian period in Europe (747-987)

6 Collins, p. 105.

7 Collins, p. 107.

8 Collins, p. 201.

which overlapped with the first three centuries of Islam. This was a period where Jews experienced good levels of toleration, security and prosperity. However during this time (640–1240) in Palestinian territories there was wholesale destruction of Judaism and Christianity in the Hijaz and a rapid decline in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia. Not only that but the great Christian Latin Church of Saint Augustine in North Africa had been completely eliminated by 1240. Bat Ye'or goes further in maintaining that any comparison must not only be carefully calibrated in this way, but that the concept of *jihad* needs to be examined and acknowledged as being at the root of the whole issue of *dhimmitude*.

The particular question that this highlights is a perennial one, what is the relationship between religion and the state? Christianity has more often than not been accommodating, 'render to Caesar what is Caesars!'. In traditional Islam there was no clear separation, at first the caliphs saw themselves as successors of the prophet claiming to be *khalifāt Allah*, vice regents of God. This initial understanding was concerned with religious life and practice but soon evolved into leadership of the wider secular community. It is within this religious and theological context of *jihad* that the emergence of the *dhimmi* occurs, but these 'protected ones' or 'people of the book', who were granted a special residential status to live in Muslim dominated countries, had in return to pay a land and poll tax called *jizya*, but more than that there was also the implicit hope of conversion to Islam by these peoples. There is a text which illustrates this taken from a Tunisian jurist of the tenth century, al-Qayrani (d. 966):

Jihad is a precept of Divine institution. Its performance by certain individuals may dispense others from it. We *Malikis* (one of the four schools of Muslim jurisprudence) maintain that it is preferable not to begin hostilities with the enemy before having invited the latter to embrace the religion of Allah except where the enemy attacks first. They have the alternative of either converting to Islam or paying the poll tax (*jizya*), short of which, war will be declared against them.⁹

9 BatYe'Or, 'The Decline of Eastern Christian Communities in the Modern Middle East'. Lecture at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 11 November 1996. <http://>

Thus we see the development of three strands, legal status, holy war and theology! Kopel points out clearly that in part this can be traced back to the surrender of the Jews to the prophet at *Khaybar* in 628 CE, where his treatment of them allowed existence on the lands they had previously owned but in return for half the produce.¹⁰ He also reserved the right to expel them if he so chose and they had to pay *jizya*, a tribute. Whilst Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians were allowed to keep their religion, conquered pagans were forcibly converted to Islam, although there is evidence that Hindu and Buddhist groups also were given *dhimmi* status. It was a progressively discriminatory process: 'it is essential to define the specific characteristics of *dhimmi* when they became established under the second Caliph, 'Umar (634-644) ... what is the strategy reducing an entire nation to a *dhimmi* people? It is the *jihad*, an expansionist holy war aiming at Islamization of non-muslim territories.'¹¹ From its inception this came to represent a persistent type of humiliation, all kinds of other prohibitions followed, ranging from the non-bearing of arms to not wearing the colour green (thus further distinguishing them from the Muslim community). In one well-documented edict, the direct association of the devil with Jews and Christians was highlighted when a decree of the Caliph Mutawakkil (850) ordered that 'wooden images of devils be nailed to the doors of their houses to distinguish them from Muslims.'¹² Moreover Jewish and Christian cemeteries were considered to be part of hell to which all the *dhimmi* were assigned on death! Men who performed military service converted to Islam and it was from the custom of 'pervasive civil inferiority of non-muslims' that the status that the scholar Bat Ye'or has termed *dhimmitude* arose.¹³

The late Shirley W Madany who had written extensively on Christianity within the Middle East sums up the concept of Bat Ye'or's term in this way:

www.dhimmitude.org/archive/LectureE2.html

10 Kopel, *Dhimmitude and Disarmament*, p. 1ff,

11 Bat Ye'or, 'Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict' in *The Weiner Library Bulletin*, 1979, vol. XXXII, Series 49/50, p. 7,

12 Bat Ye'or, 'Islam and the Dhimmis' in *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 42, Spring 1987, p. 85.

13 David B Kopel, '*Dhimmitude and Disarmament*', p. 1f.

Dhimmitude is the ... Islamic system of governing populations conquered by jihad wars, encompassing all of the demographic, ethnic, and religious aspects of the political system. The word 'dhimmitude' as a historical concept, was coined by Bat Ye'or in 1983 to describe the legal and social conditions of Jews and Christians subjected to Islamic rule. The word 'dhimmitude' comes from *dhimmi*, an Arabic word meaning 'protected'. Dhimmi was the name applied by the Arab-Muslim conquerors to indigenous non-Muslim populations who surrendered by a treaty (dhimma) to Muslim domination. Islamic conquests expanded over vast territories in Africa, Europe and Asia, for over a millennium (638-1683). The Muslim empire incorporated numerous varied peoples, which had their own religion, culture, language and civilization. For centuries, these indigenous, pre-Islamic peoples constituted the great majority of the population of the Islamic lands. Although these populations differed, they were ruled by the same type of laws, based on the shari'a.¹⁴

The focus is therefore on the relationship of Muslim and non-Muslim at all kinds of levels including political, social, economic *and* theological. As *dhimmi* status is rooted within the structure of Islamic law and theology it is incumbent on Christian theologians to explore precisely what this means not only in historical terms but also in new situations today. We cannot go back to an Ur-moment and expect to work out a hermeneutic of exploration through early texts and records, that in itself would need a huge amount of interpretative evidence, nor can we simply apply contemporary historiography to the situation of *dhimmi* as once was, but we can examine in all seriousness the problems of religion both as a force for good and as a problem within the context of the varying forms of twenty-first century society.

Part of the problem of Middle Eastern Christian communities is their necessity of discovering and then allowing the hidden voices

14 Shirley W Madany, 'The Muslim World: Recognising the New *Dhimmitude*' in *St Francis Magazine, Missionary Monthly*, Grand Rapids MI, Dec. 2002. Middle East Resources at www.levant.info/INFO.HTM

of history to emerge. Sometimes what is not said openly can be discovered within the oral and textual evidence of these communities, but what we also need to realize, and this might provide a fertile area of dialogue and interpretation is that there is a real problem. Firstly *dhimmitude* only occurs within the Islamic context, there is no direct equivalent anywhere else. Secondly as Bat Ye'or has pointed out, the root of *dhimmi* status is actually economic not religious, for *jizya* is taxation. 'Numerous legal texts link the *dhimmi* existence to their economic utility,' but at the heart of this economic concern is something more pernicious, those who are taxed not only have a subordinate economic function in an economy of taxation and appropriation, but also the degradation attached to the *jizya* is in itself intended to debase the *dhimmi*.

THE OTTOMANS

The status of the Christian community within the Ottoman empire was built upon the contextual experience of *dhimmi* within Islamic countries.¹⁵ There were three groups that were established under the Ottoman interpretation of Islamic law, the people of the book (*ahl al-kitab*), protected minorities (*ahl al-dhimma*) and non-Muslims. Within early Islam these groups were not forced to follow Islamic law and had freedom of choice within their own religious organisations. The *dhimmi* contract was indefinitely renewed and property and certain rights were respected but they did not enjoy the rights of full citizens, in return for this these communities had to acknowledge Islam's domination and pay the poll tax (*jizya*). The prophet himself, as we have noted, showed tolerance and caution in treatment of religious minorities particularly Christians, Jews, Magians, Samaritans and Sabians. Under Ottoman sultans the structure of the three groups remained in principle but the laws were applied very differently¹⁶ Dr Bekir Aksoy maintains this was both its strength and weakness but also points out that as the Ottoman state was so complex it is difficult at times to work out what

15 For a good overview see Goodwin, Jason, *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire*, John Macrae Book, Henry Holt & Co., 1998, New York.

16 See Bekir Aksoy, 'The Status of *Dhimmis* in the Ottoman Empire', in *Fountain Magazine*, Issue 40, October-December 2002.

discrimination took place. For instance government personnel worked in three areas, Religion and the Law that was restricted to Muslim subjects, and Statecraft and Bureaucracy that were not. As a result many Christians and Jews could fit into state bureaucratic structures that were not religious. Bekoy makes an important point about this:

After reforms during the nineteenth century, many intellectuals and ecclesiastics argued that applying a unified law would deprive them of their privileges. The Ottoman system of government was holistic, considered all branches interwoven and interconnected, and was fairly well integrated, in socioeconomic matters but not in religious matters, at least in Turkish-majority areas.¹⁷

This is part of our hermeneutical problem, the ‘holistic unified governance’ operated in different ways and at different times, if there was any recorded trouble it would be for some obvious problem, on the other hand just because a minority community remained silent does not mean happy acquiescence with the status quo! In order to examine the issue of *dhimmitude* further we need to briefly examine the overarching *millet* system in which these religious legal structures worked.

THE MILLET SYSTEM

The Ottoman empire developed a powerful governmental institution that allowed tolerant interaction and partnership between different religious groups. The *millet* system refers to a confessional, religious or ritual group that is understood as a community organisation. As Islamic law is corporate it dealt with corporate bodies and in terms of *dhimmis* the individual was always accountable to the community. Through the *millet* system the government protected the communities from internal and external aggression allowing the leaders to manage their affairs through the foreign ministry. In theory the Sublime Porte ratified the appointed the leaders of the *millet*.

¹⁷ Aksoy, p. 2.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror allowed the Greek Orthodox population to practice their religion and live in peace enjoying their privileges as they had before, thus they became the *rum milletti*, the first and largest of these groups. To underline this benevolent dependency the sultan supervised the synodal election of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Genadius in 1454, and gave him certain ceremonial honorifics, such as the rank of vizier with protecting guards, but also allowing him to serve both as the Greek Orthodox communities' spiritual and temporal leader, collecting the poll tax, hearing court cases, imprisoning criminals and other legal activities. This gave the Greek Orthodox very strong ties with the central government. The jurisdiction of the patriarch extended throughout the empire as all other Orthodox jurisdictions were placed by the Porte under his control! Thus in the end the ancient Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch came under the same *millet* ensuring Greek dominance particularly over 'Arab' Christians.

There were other *millets*, Mehmed allowed the Jewish community to settle in Istanbul and appointed for them the *haham basi* (chief Rabbi) with similar powers to the patriarch. At times it would seem that the Jews were in greater favour than the Christians, particularly under the rules of Bayezid II and Mehmed. This was partly explained by Ottoman suspicion about Christian links with Europe, but also because the Jews were an immigrant group with many different customs and practices therefore offering no unified religious threat and easily controlled through the office of the *haham basi*.

The Armenian *millet* was the last community recognised in 1462, partly due to the fact that the head of the Armenian Church did not reside in the empire, as the hinterlands of the Armenians (little Armenia and the Armenian provinces of the east) were not ruled by the Ottomans. Mehmed II chose Bishop Horahim of Bursa as the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul and granted him the same powers as the other rulers of *millets*. All other unclassified groups came under the auspices of this *millet*; these included Christian groups such as the Latins (Western Catholics) who were regarded as heretical by the Orthodox.

DEVSHIRME AND GHULAM SYSTEMS

If we see the *millet* system as the overarching way of dealing with the minority communities in the Ottoman empire, we also need to look at the way in which their *dhimmi* status affected other areas of life. Two examples are the intertwined *devshirme* and *ghulam* systems.¹⁸ The first was based on traditional Islamic ways of dealing with prisoners of war but developed into a particular form by the Ottomans. Askoy points out that in the classical period of Islam the jurists advocated execution or enslavement but also interpreted the law to allow for the immediate release or ransom of some or all of the prisoners in exchange for Muslim prisoners. Whilst Islamic lawyers allowed slaves to be emancipated, the Ottomans did not, and about one fifth of all slaves entered the Sultan's slave family (*ghilman*). Whilst this was enforced captivity, it allowed these young men to rise through a particular system and from this the powerful *Janissaries* developed, men who converted to Islam and were turned into elite career soldiers. Such slaves were recruited from Christian families and were adolescent boys. 'The preferred ages were probably between 14 and 18, and is part of the wider issue of *dhimmitude* and at the heart of *devshirme* was a system aimed at taking children away from both their Christian family and ethnic communities. Kathryn Hain points out the problems any contemporary historian faces in analysing such a system:

Devshirme, the levy of Christian boys, is a contested practice. The majority of historians analyzing this Ottoman acquisition of Christians enslaved for the sultan's service, emphasize how much this institution improved the economic and political prospects of these boys drafted from rural, outlying Christian villages. For these scholars, it is a foregone conclusion that Christians acquiesced to the loss of their children to the Ottoman army and palace.¹⁹

In fact as Hain goes on to point out, though slavery was accepted in Islam, the *devshirme* was actually an 'obvious abrogation of the

18 See Justin McCarthy, *The Ottoman Turks*, Longman, London, 1997, pp. 54–58.

19 Hain, p. 166.

Islamic *shari'a* provisions, which protected Christian and Jewish *dhimmi* populations from enslavement. Shari'a law was flaunted again by the forbidden forced conversion to Islam and the boys' continued enslavement after they became Muslims.'

In this matter the '*ulama*' showed their deference to the Ottoman sultan and there is no evidence of any contrary argument on these matters for over a hundred years. It can be noted that during the sixteenth century it has been estimated that 3,000 children were recruited annually. The system itself perhaps reached as many as 80,000 though a more realistic evaluation of the total during the centuries was as high as 2,000,000. Under Suleyman the Magnificent the Janissary system was opened to other Muslims, until this time it had also been hereditary, Aksoy maintains this was 'a fatal move, for it became the only hereditary institution after the sultanate.'²⁰ Giving great prestige and upward mobility it was also a recipe for subversion. In the end many Muslim families saw the Janissary as a member of an highly prestigious military corps, which automatically conferred on the soldier a high status position.²¹

PROBLEMS OF *DHIMMI* UNDER THE OTTOMANS

The problems that the *dhimmi* structure and *devshirme* and *ghulam* gave to the Christian community cannot be discounted easily, nor can it be airbrushed out because there does not appear to be too much evidence of resistance. The impression, easily given, that the empire was a place of peaceful co-existence has long attracted certain historians. John Gray writing in a BBC article for Christmas 2013 could happily assert that the Ottoman empire was: 'a haven where religious minorities that were persecuted in Christian countries could live together in peace.'²² Here is the old canard, that the Christian communities in other places persecuted others (such as Jews) more harshly, in fact it can be argued

²⁰ Aksoy, p. 2.

²¹ The self-importance of the Janissary corps and their final end is graphically shown by the Ottoman scholar Jason Goodwin in his novel, 'The Janissary Tree'. This gives an atmospheric insight into the twilight years of the Ottoman rule. Jason Goodwin, *The Janissary Tree*, Faber and Faber, London, 2007.

²² John Gray, 'A Point of View, Two Cheers for Human Rights' in *BBC History News Magazine*, 27 December 2013.

from good evidence that Islam institutionalized the ghetto through these systems and that in fact many ghettos found in other parts of Europe are actually copies of dhimmi prescriptions.²³ Theoretically the *dhimmi* structure protected groups in equal measure. The impression is given that for the Jews at least this was a positive experience, but then they were the least numerous peoples of the empire and were also largely foreigners, the Greek speaking Orthodox were not, they belonged to an indigenous community. However there is a body of evidence which shows that the Jews also experienced their status as intolerable servitude, for instance Joseph Hacker in his work of Jews and Jewish attitudes in the fifteenth century Ottoman empire points out that there are numbers of letters which express ...

the fate of Jews who underwent one or another of the Ottoman conquests. In one of the letters, which was written before 1470, there is a description of the fate of such a Jew and his community, according to which description, written in Rhodes and sent to Crete, the fate of the Jews was not different from that of Christians. Many were killed; others were taken captive, and children were [enslaved, forcibly converted to Islam, and] brought to devshirme.²⁴

There are other letters describing how captive Jews were taken to Istanbul and which are filled with openly anti-Ottoman sentiments. There is also the fate of a Jewish doctor and homilist from Veroia who, when his community was driven into exile settled at Negroponte in 1455. 'He furnished us with a description of the exiles and their forced passage to Istanbul. Later on we find him at Istanbul itself, and in a homily delivered there in 1468 he expressed his anti-Ottoman feelings openly. We also have some evidence that

23 See David Littman and Bat Ye'or, 'Protected peoples under Islam', 30 October 1976, *Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Moyen-Orient*, Avenir, Geneva, p. 3. See also the list of documentation concerning prohibitions and prescriptions, p. 8f.

24 See Joseph Hacker, 'Ottoman Policy Toward the Jews and Jewish Attitudes toward the Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century', pp. 117-126, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 117.

the Jews of Constantinople suffered from the conquest of the city and that several were sold into slavery.'

Joseph Hacker writing for the 'American Thinker' urges caution; 'it does seem to me that this accepted view of consistently good relations between Ottomans and the Jews during the fifteenth century should be modified.'²⁵ They too suffered heavily from Ottoman Jihad conquests, policies of colonialisation and population transfer explains the disappearance of many Jewish communities and their re-founding in Istanbul. Hacker maintains that there was strong anti-Ottoman feeling prevalent in some Byzantine Jewish circles in the first decades after the fall of 'Constantinople', and as we have already noted some of this was openly expressed by Jews under Latin rule.²⁶ Mehmed II's policies towards non-Muslims enabled constructive and positive advancement of economic and social development, especially of Jewish groups, but this was not continued under the Sultans Bayezid II and Selim I. Another issue we need to face is that the good experience of Spanish Jewry under the Arab rule caused them to overlook both the destruction of Byzantine Jews in the Ottoman conquests and later persecution in sporadic outbursts under Bayezid II and Selim I.

There are too many sources, which can reveal the hidden toll on these communities, and they need to be heard. The Islamic structure had its own realities, the capture and selling of slaves especially for the harem was an especially harsh reality for the thousands of young women and men who were captured and sold and has no comparable equivalent in Europe. The invasions of bellicose Bedouin tribes particularly in the harsh and chaotic circumstances of Egypt where the Ottoman rule was seen as a brutal and exploitative military dictatorship had continual effects on the rural Christian and Jewish populations; Michael Winter in his book on Egyptian society under the Ottomans notes that the Bedouin were always ready to support uprisings and played a large part in the sixteenth-century revolt of Ahmet Pasha, despite his capture and execution on 6 March 1524 they continued to create long term problems for the empire.

The fact that the Arab tribes continued to challenge the Ottoman state after Ahmet's revolt has usually been

²⁵ Joseph Hacker, 'Ottoman *Dhimmitude*', in *American Thinker*, 7 October 2005, p. 120.

²⁶ Bat Ye'or, 'Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict', p. 49.

overlooked. Politically, their threat did not seem as serious as Ahmet Pasha's actions, but militarily the Bedouins nearly exhausted the Ottoman forces in Egypt.

The rules of *jihad* constantly gave rise to the fundamental problems of *dhimmi* status and their belonging to a place and society, for there are serious religious and theological repercussions for Jewish and Christian communities of the Muslim doctrine that all children born in Islamic lands are born Muslim.²⁷

There are many examples of Christian non-acceptance, for instance the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Isidore Glabas preached a series of sermons in which he shows clearly that the Christian community did not accept *devshirme* and were certainly not acquiescent with their *dhimmi* status. In a sermon of 28 February 1395 he rails against the carrying off of children by the decree of the emir, but he also lists reasons why the practice of *devshirme* is intolerable for the Christian: Hain notes that:

His sermon concerning the carrying off of the children by the decree of the emir, and concerning the coming Judgment, delivered on the first Sunday of the Fasts' vividly portrays that the Patriarch's 'eyes are filled with tears and can no longer bear to see my beloved' and that the fathers feel as if they are 'cut into two parts' by the loss of their sons.²⁸

The patriarch did not soften the horrors that awaited their sons, he warned of the consequences that awaited them, including barbaric cruelty, slavery, the issue of becoming murderers, eunuchs, homosexuals and in Christian eyes damnation for becoming Muslims.²⁹ Hain maintains that many other Christian communities speak with the same voice as Glabas and points out that people would try to protect their

²⁷ Bat Ye'or, 'Islam and the *Dhimmis*', p. 88.

²⁸ Hain, p. 170.

²⁹ See also George T Dennis, 'The Late Byzantine Metropolitans of Thessalonike' in Dumbarton Oaks Papers no. 57. *Symposium on Late Byzantine Thessalonike*, ed. Mary-Alice Talbot, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 2003, pp. 255–263.

children by any means even becoming ‘crypto-Muslims’. Parish Priests erased names from the baptismal registers; in Albania children were married between eight and ten to protect them from the draft. Flight was an option and in several cases open revolts against the Turkish recruiting agents, which often ended in the massacre of the Christian community. Though the revolt at Naousa in 1705 effectively ended the practice of *Devshirme* and the Janissaries were officially disbanded in 1826, many children continued to end up as slaves for the harem throughout the eighteenth century. In other areas of Ottoman rule similar evidence can be found.

Ivo Andric, a Bosnian historian, points out that within Bosnia Christians were under an enormous amount of pressure to apostasize, if they refuse the Ottoman *Kanun-i-Rayah* (*dhimmi*) was enforced. Andric shows that there is: ‘a wealth of irrefutable evidence that the main points of the Kanun, just those that cut deepest in the moral and economic life of Christians, remained in full force right up to the end of Turkish rule and as long as the Turks had power to apply them ... it was inevitable that the rayah decline to a status that was economically inferior and dependent.’³⁰ Andrew Bostom writing on *dhimmitude* under the Ottomans maintains that throughout the Ottoman empire it is more than evident that Christians suffered from excessive taxation and conscript labour, in places such as Bosnia this forced migration of communities from villages and towns abandoning houses and land to live in more inaccessible retreats such as the mountains. The exclusion of activities such as wine making, pig keeping, selling pork meat products, the prohibitions on categories of work such as saddlers, tanners or candle makers or trading in various products, thus restricted their economic productivity. The market day was established on a Sunday, which was a deliberate attempt to subvert the practice of Church attendance.

Christians were thus deliberately faced with the choice between ignoring the precepts of their religion, keeping their shops open and working on Sundays, or alternatively, forgoing participation in the market and suffering

30 Ivo Andric, ‘The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia Under the Influence of Turkish Rule’, (1924 doctoral dissertation), English translation, Durham, North Carolina, 1990, p. 24–25; see also Chaps 2 and 3, pp. 16–38.

material loss thereby. Even in 1850, in Jukic's 'Wishes and Entreaties' we find him beseeching 'his Imperial grace' to put an end to the regulation that Sunday be market day.³¹

On top of that the excessive taxation, usual prohibitions on dress and behaviour continued to oppress those in *dhimmi* status. An Ordinance of 1794 for the Bosnians listed a number of prohibitions including colour and type of clothes, the use of bathhouses, what laundry should be used (in distinction to the Muslims) behaviour towards Muslims in public, the use of Church bells, singing in public, all of these continued to be disapproved of until the end of the nineteenth century.³² There are other well-documented examples of these types of issues all over the empire, neo-martyrs and forms of crypto-Christianity were common in Asia Minor. We should also note that in the Orthodox martyrology from 1483 until 1828 in eleven patriarchs of Constantinople, nearly one hundred bishops and several thousand priest monks and nuns, let alone faithful were put to death! It soon becomes obvious that a roseate picture of Ottoman religious toleration is not wholly sustainable; in fact one of the main reasons for the Greek Revolution of 1821 was the *jihad*-imposed *dhimmitude*. One final question needs to be asked, why was there no Shari'a inspired anti-slavery movement in the nineteenth century? Sadly, at Constantinople, the sale of women slaves, both Negresses and Circassians, continued openly until 1908!³³

CONCLUSION

The obstacles to *dhimmi* emancipation envisaged in the Ottoman empire, namely legal status, *jihad* and theology proved insurmountable. By the end of the eighteenth century modernisation of the empire had become urgent in order to safeguard its territorial integrity against the ambitions of Austria and Russia. By the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji in 1774 Russia had obtained the right to intercede on behalf of all Orthodox subjects of the Sublime Porte and was therefore seen as the champion for the Slav communities and Orthodox in general. France

³¹ Hacker, p. 27.

³² See Andrew G Bostom, 'Ottoman *Dhimmitude*' in *American Thinker*, 7 October 2005.

³³ See Ruben Levy 1957, *The Social Structure of Islam*, CUP, Cambridge, p. 88.

defended the interests and privileges of Catholicism which placed the issue of territorial integrity at the heart of European politics. Within this context the emancipation of Christian *rayas* or *dhimmis* was envisaged, a wish and hope that equal rights for all Ottoman subjects would help stave off potential revolution in the Balkans and Greece.

However the Ottoman context is different from the ideology of human rights and equality bequeathed by the French and American revolutions to European politics. Christianity, unlike Islam, allows for and had to make a distinction between secular and religious power. There is no theology of any theocratic state or any ultimate religious legal authority that could override the state. Catholicism itself developed methodologies for dealing with secular rulers and states particularly as the Papal States diminished. In protestant countries the state church was often hedged about by law, and as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, many state churches lost their status to become just one religious group amongst many.

The theological issues of the Reformation and the sporadic persecution of one religious group by another was a religious matter, but importantly it was sanctioned by the State, this meant that once theological pressures were reduced or eliminated from the legal and political system a privileged position held by one group could be eliminated and the principle of equal rights could be introduced. The Islamic system was (and is) the reverse of this because religion and politics are completely intertwined; theological interpretations are deeply connected to a legal system. Under the Ottoman empire the experience of the *dhimmi* groups gives us a complex religious picture, based on centuries of Islamic jurisprudence and not at all straightforward. As we have noted some historians view this empire as one of tolerant benevolence. John Gray's BBC article on human rights maintains that our perceptions of them are built upon useful devices that quite often don't work. His view of the Ottoman empire is that the system worked fairly well.

[The ...] Ottoman empire was a haven where religious minorities that were persecuted in Christian countries could live together in peace. The Ottoman regime wasn't based on rights. In fact, since it involved separate systems of law for each community, it was incompatible with a

system in which everyone had the same rights. Where something like peace between religions has been achieved it's because the difficult art of toleration has been learnt.³⁴

As a theologian I find that a breathtaking remark, the mention of Christianity as religion of that empire, and in some places, a majority population constrained and degraded by a minority group, does not appear nor is it recognised. Nor is there any true understanding or discussion of Islamic law, *jihad* and *dhimmitude*. The great elephant in the room of the Ottoman story is, as I hope we are beginning to note, the problem of *dhimmi*. It is also something that any of us concerned about the Middle Eastern Christian communities today need to be aware of for this problem will not go away. Due to its own connection with *dhimmi*, Islam and the structures that have existed, Eastern Christianity is well placed to speak on this matter; we need to help provide a clear and unequivocal theology to deal with this concept. Bat Ye'or quite rightly makes the point that human behaviour is determined everywhere by the same constraint. The principle of cultural and religious differentiation does not need to be a problem, provided there is a basis in Human Rights Law that underpins the fundamental rights of all those groups:

The principle of cultural and religious differentiation should not be condemned outright, since it allows freedom of expression in a plural society. It becomes a manifestation of intolerance only when it is motivated by a desire to diminish politically, economically, socially and spiritually one group in favour of another. Discrimination exists then as an intention in the mind of the legislator, prior to its implementation.³⁵

Perhaps that insight might be the beginning of dialogue, in Christian moral theology intention is a key concept and Jesus himself

34 John Gray, 'A Point of View ...', website <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25505393>

35 Bat Ye'or, 'Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict', p. 49. See also Paul Halsall, 'A Legal answer to a question about dhimmi 1772', Jewish History Sourcebook: Islam and the Jews: The Status of Jews and Christians in Muslim Lands, 1772 CE, Fordham University July 1998, www.fordham.edu/halsall/jewish/1772-jewsiniislam.

reminds us it is what comes out of a person that matters. It is clear that any discriminatory process that purposefully and progressively degrades anybody, such as that which happens to the *dhimmi*, is inimical to the gospel. It is also of great moment for any improvement in the condition of our Christian brothers and sisters in the Middle East, 'if it is true that the destruction of racist myths is a necessary precondition for establishing a better world, by the same token it must follow that the elimination of the *dhimmi* archetype is a pre-condition for true peace in the Middle East.'³⁶ Herein lies the 'great matter'!

³⁶ Bat Ye'or, *ibid.*

THE CHALDEAN CHURCH IN MODERN TIMES

Suha Rassam

Iraq became a sovereign nation under British mandate in 1921 and an independent monarchy with Faysal I as king in 1932.¹

The Chaldean Church, however, has its origins in the middle of the sixteenth century with roots that go back to the first Christian century through its relationship with the Church of the East.² In this paper I will give a short history of the Church's formation and then proceed to discuss its growth and role in the formation of modern Iraq.

The Chaldean Church is an heir of the Church of the East that developed in Mesopotamia independently of the rest of the Christian *oikoumene* and became self-ruling in 424.³ Free from imperial Western influence, it developed its own theology and culture, had famous centres of learning, monasteries, saints and mystics. Due to vibrant missionary activity, it spread eastwards from Mesopotamia, where the patriarch resided, to Persia, Central Asia, India and China and southwards to the Arabian peninsula.

When the Muslim Arabs invaded the Byzantine and Sasanid empires in the seventh century, the Church of the East according to some historians had a greater number of adherents than the Western Church.⁴ The Church continued to flourish during the first two centuries of Muslim rule and in view of its learning it contributed to the development of the 'Abbasid civilization. One of their key

1 Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, third edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 41, 77.

2 Wilhelm Baum and Dietmar W Winkler, *The Church of the East: A Concise History*, trans. Miranda G Henry, Central Asian Studies Series 3, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2003, p. 8.

3 Christoph Baumer, *The Church of the East: An Illustrated History of Assyrian Christianity*, Tauris, London, 2006, p. 81.

4 Suha Rassam, *Christianity in Iraq: Its Origins and Development to the Present Day*, New Edition, Gracewing Publishing, Leominster, 2010, pp. 80–89.

contributions to burgeoning Muslim civilisation was the translation of Greek philosophical and medical writings to Arabic which was vital for the development of Islamic educational institutions.⁵ Members of the Church of the East also contributed as physicians and confidants to caliphs and other members of the ruling elite as well as in astrology and many other professions.

However, from the tenth century, one period of Muslim rule came to an end and Christians were subdued in a number of different ways. This happened, either through subjugation by strict application of the *dhimmi* rules or by direct persecution at different periods of its history.⁶ Wars and displacement caused the patriarchate to move from one place to another leading to a reduction in its size and educational standards.

When the Ottomans took control of Mesopotamia in 1534, this sometime great Church had been reduced to a limited presence in Iraq (mainly the north), Persia and southern Asia Minor. The patriarch had become the temporal as well as the religious leader of his community, which consisted of several tribes each ruled by its leader the *malik*. During the middle of the fifteenth century, Shimun IV Basidi introduced the process of hereditary succession to the patriarchate which led to deplorable consequences and final rebellion.⁷ In 1551 Shimun VII Bar Mama died and left the patriarchate to his eight year-old successor Shimun VIII Dinkha. Objection was voiced by the bishops of Arbil, Urmya and Salmas and supported by priests and monks from Bagdad and Kirkuk. This group met in Mosul together with members of the laity and decided to elect a new patriarch.⁸

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHALDEAN CHURCH

Yuhanna Sulaqa, the abbot of Rabban Hormiz was chosen as a patriarch in opposition. He travelled to Rome where he met with Pope Julius III and was consecrated by him on 28 February 1553 as Patriarch

5 Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbasid society (2nd-4th / 8th-10th Centuries)*, Routledge, London / New York, 1998, *passim*.

6 Rassam, *Christianity in Iraq*, pp. 78–79.

7 David Wilmshurst, *The Martyred Church: A History of the Church of the East*, East & West, London, 2011, pp. 292–293.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 298–299.

of the Chaldeans. He was given the pallium and sent back with two Dominicans to instruct the faithful in the Catholic faith. The term Chaldean was first used by Pope Eugene IV for Timothy of Tarsus in 1445; it had no political connotation and did not refer to a Chaldean nationality. The Church of the East was sometimes referred to as the Chaldean Church, since one of its main centres was the land of the ancient Chaldeans.

Although Yuhanna Sulaqa was murdered soon after his arrival in Amid, he had consecrated five bishops who continued his work. But the union faltered and was dissolved in 1672 by Shimun XIII Dinkha, who returned to the practices of the Church of the East with a patriarchal line based in Kotchannes in the Hakkari mountains.

Concurrent with these events, the Metropolitan of Amid, Joseph I, converted to Catholicism under the influence of Capuchin missionaries and in 1681 announced a union with Rome and another patriarchal line claiming the heritage of the Church of the East was founded. However, when Joseph V (Augustine Hindi) was to be affirmed as patriarch in 1804, there was another claim to the patriarchate by John Hormiz, bishop of Mosul from the line of the original patriarchate of the Church of the East.

John Hormiz was converted by the efforts of Dominican and Carmelite missionaries who had arrived in Iraq from the seventeenth century.⁹ By the beginning of the nineteenth century the majority of people in Mosul and its environs had turned to Catholicism. Both established communication with the clergy and the community and worked especially in the fields of education and medicine.

The friction between Joseph V Hindi and John Hormiz over the patriarchate continued and presented problems for Rome. It was only solved after the death of Augustine Hindi, after which John VIII Hormiz was consecrated on 5 July 1830 by Pius VIII as Patriarch of the Chaldeans with his see in Mosul.¹⁰

The period that followed the consecration of Patriarch Hormiz (1830–37) can be considered a period of consolidation and growth

9 The Carmelites opened the first primary school in Baghdad, while the Dominicans brought the first printing press to Iraq in order to provide books for prayers and general education. Many provided medical help and the Dominican nuns were the first nurses in Iraq to serve in the general hospital in Baghdad and establish the first modern nursing school.

10 Wilmshurst, *Martyred Church*, p. 333.

of the Chaldean Church as well as the development of its special character.

Before the First World War, three patriarchs were of special importance in this respect: Patriarch Joseph VI Audo (1848-79), a man of great learning, leadership and vitality, Elias XII Abolyonan (1879-94), a great pastor and reformer and Georgis Abdishu Khayyat (1895-99), a great scholar and the right hand of the first two patriarchs before he himself became patriarch.

Audo's firm loyalty to the Catholic faith brought many members of the Church of the East of Amadya and Aqra to the Catholic faith, while his deep awareness of the importance of the heritage of his Church, put him in conflict with the local nuncio and Latin missionaries as well as the Propaganda in Rome and Pope Pius IX. There were many issues regarding the traditions and rights of the Chaldean Church, but the most problematic issue of contention was the jurisdiction over the Christians of Saint Thomas in Malabar who were put under the Latin Church by the Portuguese. He argued that these Christians had been under the jurisdiction of the patriarch in Mesopotamia before the arrival of the Portuguese and the faithful in Malabar wanted to remain under his authority. This led to confrontation with Pope Pius IX and division in Iraq, some supporting Rome while others their patriarch. Despite his vehement attitude to preserve the independence of his Church, he eventually submitted to the leadership of Rome. He attended the First Vatican Council and sided with the party which opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility.

In the midst of these difficulties, Audo managed to introduce significant reforms in his Church starting with establishing a Patriarchal Seminary Institute in the city of Mosul, 'Shimun al-Safa', in 1866, and in strengthening the Chaldean monastic Antonian Order of St Hormiz. He also built a church and a school in Baghdad, a church in Telkef and in Mosul he transformed the small ancient church of Miskinta into a cathedral.¹¹

Patriarch Elias XII Abbo al-Younan (1878-1894) who succeeded Audo had to deal with the serious problem of the division within the Chaldean community regarding the Malabar issue. Elias XII patiently dealt with those who opposed the decision of the Holy See and with the support of Pope Leo XIII, who had a keen interest in the needs

11 Joseph Habbi, 'Patriarch Yousif Audo', *Bayn Al-Nahrayn*, 1978, pp. 198-203.

of the Eastern Catholic communities; he managed to overcome the potential schism within the community. Elias also consolidated the patriarchal seminary institute that was started by Audo and enlarged the patriarchal residence. Accommodation was provided for the laity who came from the villages to ask for help until their needs were fulfilled. Aware of the importance of education, he endeavoured to establish a school in every Chaldean village.¹²

He also built a large church in Baghdad (Umm al-Ahzan) and a school to serve the growing population of Chaldeans in Baghdad of nearly 3,500 persons. Two priests were sent to Basrah in 1825 but they used to worship with the Carmelites. He built a church where there were 63 families. Similarly he built a church for the Chaldeans in Cairo. During a famine of 1879–80 he worked hard to secure food for the poor. With the help of Georges Ebed-Jesus Khayyath, Archbishop of Amid, he unified the liturgical books and al-Huthra.¹³

Khayyath succeeded to the patriarchate in 1894 and was patriarch for only five years. His importance lies in his great scholarship—he mastered French and Italian—in addition to Arabic and Syriac. He was a great supporter of the work of his predecessors, Audo and Abbolyonan, assisting them in their efforts to establish the patriarchal clerical institute and liturgical reforms respectively. Khayyath's role in the changes to the liturgy are considered a landmark development in the history of the Chaldean Church.

He accepted the financial offer of al-Yazaji to establish a printing press for the publication of various books. His writings include original works in the fields of philosophy, liturgy, catechism, history, poetry and Biblical studies as well as translations.¹⁴ He co-operated with various Orientalists, such as Bedjan and Shabo, supplying them with information and helping them in studying manuscripts and communicating with various researchers. He produced a new edition

12 For an overview of the Chaldean situation in the aftermath of Elias' leadership, see Georges Ebed-Jesus V Khayyath, 'État religieux des diocèses formant le Patriarcat Chaldéen de Babylone au 1er janvier 1896', ed. Jean-Baptiste Chabot, *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien* I, no. 4 (1896), passim.

13 P Haddad, *Bayn al-Nahrayn*, no. 39–40 (1982), pp. 247–75.

14 See, for example, Georges Ebed-Jesus V Khayyath, *Syri orientales, seu Chaldaei, Nestoriani et Romanorum pontificum primatus: commentatio historico-philologico-theologica, adjectis textibus citationum genuina lingua propriisque litteris exaratis*, Typis S. Congregatinis de Propaganda Fide, Rome, 1870, <https://archive.org/details/syriorientalesse00khay>.

of the Old and New Testament in conjunction with another scholar, the head of the Syrian Catholic bishops, Iqlimis Dawood, in both Syriac and Arabic.¹⁵

THE CHALDEANS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MODERN STATE OF IRAQ

The transition between Ottoman rule and the creation of the modern state of Iraq was witnessed by Patriarch Joseph Emmanuel II Toma (1900–1947).

Thomas' astute leadership before, during and after the First World War ensured the safety of large numbers of Christians in Mosul and its environs who otherwise would have suffered the fate of massacre at the hands of Kurdish auxiliaries and Ottoman soldiers. Thomas visited Sultan Abdul Hamid soon after his enthronement as patriarch in 1902 and after the announcement of the new Turkish constitution in 1909. He also made several visits to the pontiffs in Rome and European heads of state before and after the war. During negotiations to determine the post-war political settlement in the Middle East he stood behind the cause of the Arabs and on several occasions expressed his support for an independent Iraqi rule. He was the first Christian leader to welcome King Faysal I (r. 1921–1933) and helped to ensure the transfer of Mosul and the surrounding area to Iraq in opposition to Turkish claims.¹⁶ Thomas wrote a report to the League of Nations' committee which was to determine which state should gain Mosul and in this he expressed the opinion that the Christians of Mosul stood with the Iraqi government. His assistant, Bishop Yusif Ghanima, argued on behalf of the people of Mosul that they would only have their city if it remained under the Iraqi government.

The patriarch served as a member of the senate in the new Iraqi parliament and was respected by all including King Faysal who visited Thomas in his summer residence in Deir Mar Oraha. His loyalty to Iraq and the king ensured the safety of the Chaldeans as opposed to what happened to the Assyrians who insisted on an Assyrian national

15 P Haddad, *Bayn al-Nahrayn*, no. 41–42 (1982), pp. 67–87.

16 Turkey's claim rested on the fact that Mosul remained unconquered by Entente forces prior to the Armistice.

identity. He was a highly respected leader both for his pastoral efforts and administrative skills and died aged ninety-six. It is no exaggeration to state that the Chaldean community flourished under the monarchy.

Patriarch Joseph IV Ghanima (1947-58) moved the seat of the patriarchate to Baghdad in view of its increasing importance as the capital and his political role in the senate. Work continued on establishing schools, constructing churches and organising the community.¹⁷ During his tenure, the Christians enjoyed full citizenship with equal duties and responsibilities to their Muslim compatriots. They were conscripted in the army and the Iraqi constitution ensured freedom of conscience and free exercise of all forms of worship. Officially, they had equal rights of admittance to universities and to all jobs, however administrative positions were generally the prerogative of Muslims. Consequently the Christians excelled as professionals, artisans and traders.¹⁸ By the middle of the twentieth century Christians constituted 4.5-7 percent of the population of Iraq and the Chaldeans made up 75 percent of the total Christian population. Over 50 percent resided in the city of Mosul and its surrounding villages as well as the cities of Arbil, Kirkuk and the mountainous areas in northern Iraq such as Zakho, Duhok and Amadya.

Unfortunately, the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 by a military backed republican coup was followed by a turbulent time for all Iraqis. Patriarch Poulis II Sheikho (1958-89) had to deal with the question of military service of the priests, the nationalization of the schools in 1972-74 and the displacement of the Christians from the north.

After the revolution, two events caused the displacement of the Christians from Mosul and the Christian villages of north Iraq. The first was the Kurdish uprising which started soon after the revolution and continued until it was controlled by Saddam Husain in the late 1970s. During the 1960s over two hundred villages were razed to the ground by the army in an attempt to crush the uprising. While Kurdish inhabitants moved to other Kurdish villages, the Christians moved to Baghdad and Mosul and other areas of Iraq, emptying many previously prosperous villages.

17 G al-Banna, *The Patriarchs of the Chaldeans*, n.d., pp. 269-293.

18 Rassam, *Christianity in Iraq*, p. 140.

The second event was the attempted coup in Mosul of 1959.¹⁹ Christians were accused of participation in Communist groups, which had some basis in truth, and many atrocities were committed against them. Many were killed and numerous families moved to Baghdad. By the end of 1960 only 30 percent of the Christian population remained in Mosul and the villages of north Iraq.²⁰

As a result of this demographic change Patriarch Sheikho moved the seminary to Baghdad and provided many churches in Baghdad for the increasing Christian community.

Despite the changes in Iraqi political leadership, the general pattern was that of a dictatorship.²¹ When the Baath Party took control in 1968 all Iraqis were expected to join and become committed to the Baath beliefs of economic independence through socialism and Iraqi nationalism. Many Christians joined the Baath Party, initially out of conviction but later it became more or less compulsory and lost its appeal. The only Christian party was 'The Assyrian Democratic Movement' formed in 1979 and that was banned and went underground.

The majority of Chaldean Christians were not involved in politics and their identity continued to be focused on Iraqi patriotism and Christian religion. They fought in the Iraq-Iran war side-by-side with their Muslim brethren and their churches were protected.

CHANGES AFTER THE FIRST GULF WAR 1991

During this period, the economic sanctions that were imposed on Iraq had detrimental effects on all classes of society except the very rich and those in government. Impoverished and despondent, people started to lose hope of anything good happening to their country and could see no future for their children. After eight years of war with Iran, they were appalled to see the country engaged in another war

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁰ In the census of 1957 more than half of the Christians of Iraq were in Mosul and surrounding villages, this was reversed in the census of 1977 where the majority resided in Baghdad.

²¹ Between 1958 and 2003 Iraq's presidents were: 1. Abdul al-Kareem Kasim (1958-1963), 2. Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Rahman Arif (1963-1968), 3. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakir (1968-1979) and 4. Saddam Husain (1979-2003).

against Kuwait. Consequently thousands of Christians left the country especially the rich and those with professional qualifications.

To help with the economic hardship that accompanied the sanctions, Patriarch Rafael I Bidawid (1989–2003) founded ‘*Akhwiyat al-Mahabba*’ or *Caritas Iraq*, which was an organisation that helped all Iraqis, Muslims and Christians of all denominations, by distributing rations of food and other necessities through the churches. Bidawid was also active in improving the cultural and educational standards of his Church by obtaining official permission for the publication of a quarterly magazine, *Najm al-Mashriq*, and establishing the ‘Babylon College for Philosophy and Theology’ in 1991. He was also active in ecumenical dialogue with the East, that followed the historical common Christological Declaration on the 11 November 1994 between the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East, Mar Dinkha IV and Pope John Paul II.²² Further dialogue on sacramental theology followed in 1995 and in October 2001. The Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity published guidelines for admission to the eucharist between the two Churches. In 1996 Patriarchs Bidawid and Dinkha inaugurated an official process of co-operation between the two Churches on pastoral and other practical levels. The eucharist could be administered to the faithful by members of each Church in the absence of facilities by their own corresponding Church and relations between the two sister Churches became more amicable. However, the dialogue was suspended in 2005 since Bishop Bawai Soro, the main theologian of the Church of the East who engineered the discussions, tried to convince his Church that there is no theological objection to full communion with the Catholic Church; on 5 June 2008, he was received by Bishop Sarhad Jammo of the Chaldean Church in California together with 1,000 families. Unfortunately he was suspended by his superiors and was not accepted officially by the Catholic Church as it was feared that it would disturb the amicable relations between the two sister Churches.

22 Sebastian Brock, ‘The Syriac Churches in Ecumenical Dialogue on Christology’, in *Eastern Christianity: Studies In Modern History, Religion and Politics*, (ed.) Anthony O’Mahony, Melisende, London, 2004, pp. 44–65; And for a more recent consideration see Kristian Girling, ‘Engaging “the Martyred Church”—The Chaldean Catholic Church, Assyrian Church of the East and the Holy See in Ecumenical Dialogue 1994–2012 and the Influence of the Second Vatican Council’, in *Living Stones Yearbook 2012*, (ed.) Mary Grey *et al.*, Living Stones of the Holy Land Trust, London, 2012, pp. 38–64.

THE INVASION OF IRAQ, 2003

Patriarch Emmanuel III Delly (Dec 2003–Dec 2012) was elected to lead the Chaldean Church as patriarch following the death of Bidawid only three months after the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in March 2003. Delly had to work his way amid the chaos and destruction that followed the invasion. He was personally threatened as well as many of his clergy and numerous houses of worship were attacked and many destroyed.²³ The general devastation that followed the invasion together with direct persecution of the Christians caused displacement on a large scale. Some were threatened and embezzled of large sums of money, others abducted, tortured, raped, and/or killed. In some districts, people were forced from their homes with the threat ‘convert to Islam or ...’. These atrocities were committed by extremist groups from both Sunni and Shi‘ite sects who in turn persecuted each other. Persecution of the Christians occurred mainly in Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah. The result was displacement on a large scale. Some left for neighbouring countries with the aim of reaching the West. Others left for the safer region of Kurdistan where they were welcomed.

Apart from the sectarian division between Shi‘ite and Sunni Muslims and violent extremism on both sides, there was ethnic division between Arabs and Kurds. This led to the division of Iraq into three regional governments: the south for the majority Shi‘ites (55 percent), the north for the Kurds (21 percent), while the Sunni Arabs (18.5 percent) were squeezed in a small area in the west of the country. The division also included a special province for the Christians in the plain of Nineveh.²⁴

A plan was initially engineered by the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) towards the creation of an Assyrian homeland/autonomous region. Christians from other denominations did not have any political party. They had no need of one as they felt part of Iraq and had no ambition for a separate homeland. After the changes that followed the invasion they started to be involved in the political process, as we shall see later.

23 For a list of churches which were attacked and details of abducted clergy see respectively Rassam, *Christianity in Iraq*, pp. 242–246; 239.

24 This is an area in the floodplain east of the river Tigris that includes the majority of the Christian villages but also people from other faiths such as Yezidis, Shabak and Muslims.

The changes in the structure of the country had a far reaching influence on the character and the future of the Christian community in Iraq for several reasons. First, the emphasis on ethnic and sectarian identity weakened the sense of belonging to Iraq. This was especially so for the Christians since in times of difficulty the common national identity was the unifying factor.

Their marginalisation in the political process of the Baghdad central government was another factor that affected their feeling of belonging to the country,²⁵ while in Kurdistan there was an attempt at assimilation.

Second, political involvement amongst the Christians led to divisions, especially in relation to the idea of the creation of an enclave for the Christians. Some Christian political parties wanted it to be under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), while others wanted it to remain part of the Mosul governorate.²⁶ Other parties wanted it to be an independent governorate that connected directly with the Baghdad central government. Many were against the idea of the Christians having a special enclave. They argued that it would alienate them from the Muslim community with whom they had lived together for generations and the area was not sufficient to fulfil the needs of all the Christians of Iraq, especially from the point of view of jobs, schools and other social facilities.

In Kurdistan, Christians started to participate in the political process soon after the first Gulf War in 1991 and won five seats in the new Parliament out of a total of 105. Four of the seats went to the ADM, while the other seat was given to a small party of Kurdish Christians, 'Union of Christians of Kurdistan', founded by an able Christian Kurdish politician, Sarkis Agajan. These parties made some gains during this period such as the recognition of Christian holidays, the commemoration of the massacre of Simmel and the teaching of the Syriac language in a number of schools. The Assyrians were speaking in the name of all Christians and aimed at including them under their umbrella. However, after the invasion of 2003, new Christian political parties were formed amongst different denominations, each challenging and claiming their own specific identity and expressing

²⁵ Christians were poorly represented in the Baghdad central government (formed April 2005). In the elections of 2005, it seems there were electoral irregularities.

²⁶ The plain of Mosul is officially part of the governorate of Mosul, while the Kurds want it to be part of Kurdistan.

their view regarding the presence and control of a special enclave for the Christians.²⁷

Religious leaders objected to the use of 'Assyrian' for all Christians and demanded that the government address the different Iraqi Christian communities through their religious leaders whether Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syrian Orthodox or Syrian Catholics and that these communities should not be lumped under one entity.

After long discussions and wrangling, the term Chaldo-Assyrian found its way into the first draft of the new Iraqi Constitution which received objections from denominations that were neither Assyrian nor Chaldeans. The final Constitution mentions the Assyrians and the Chaldeans as two separate minorities while other denominations seem to have been overlooked.²⁸ Such divisions amongst Christians, whether secular or ecclesiastical, created a further identity crisis within the Christian community.

The clergy made several statements in which they stressed their belonging to the country of their ancestors, and to which they had contributed for two thousand years and demanded from political leaders that their people be treated with respect and equality and asked for full participation in the political process.²⁹ They encouraged the faithful to stay in Iraq and witness to their faith and be signs of hope for reintegration and peace. The most outspoken in this respect was Louis Sako, the Archbishop of Kirkuk.³⁰

27 1. Chaldean Democratic Forum (CDF), chairman: Sa'eed Shamaya. 2. Chaldean Democratic Party (CDP), chairman: Abdul Ahad Afram Sawa. 3. Independent Syriac Assembly Movement (ISAM), chairman: Anwar Matti Hadaya, Syriac Alliance. 4. Mesopotamian Democratic Party or Betnahrein National Party (BNP): chairman: Romeo Hakari. 5. The Assyrian Patriotic Party (APP): chairman: Nimrud Beto.

28 The Constitution provides an ambiguous legal framework. Apart from portending to provide for a democratic plural society Article 2 states that 'no law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established'. 'Final Draft Iraqi Constitution' (Iraqi Constitution Drafting Committee, 2005), http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf.

29 Emmanuel III Delly *et al.*, 'Document of the Chaldean Bishops on the Role of Chaldeans in the New Iraq', 3 September 2003, <http://www.atour.com/religion/docs/20030921a.html>; Emmanuel III Delly *et al.*, 'Declaration from the Spiritual Leaders of the Iraqi Churches Regarding the Drafting of the Constitution of Iraq', 24 June 2005.

30 'In Kirkuk Christian and Muslim Leaders for Dialogue and Reconciliation', *Asianews.it*, 29 August 2009, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/In-Kirkuk-Christian-and-Muslim-leaders-for-dialogue-and-reconciliation-16181.html>.

Since becoming patriarch he has been working hard at reconciliation and ecumenism and encouraging the Christians to stay in Iraq.³¹ The increasing population in Kurdistan and the northern villages of Iraq led to humanitarian and financial problems. Those who suffer most are the poor and those who were relocated to the villages of their ancestors. They have lived in the cities and have lost the skills necessary for an agricultural way of life. There are not enough jobs for them and they continue to live on charity.

The Archbishop of Erbil, Bashar Warda CSsR, has been active in assisting the relocation of families and provided buildings for the Chaldean Seminary and Babylon College of Theology in Erbil which are now fully functioning. He has already built a modern school for all grades of education, is in the process of building a hospital and has the plans for establishing a university in conjunction with the Kaslik in Beirut.

The finance minister of the Kurdish Regional Government, Sarkis Aghajan, helped in financing several projects. New towns and villages were built especially those destroyed during Saddam's rule and numerous residential complexes were built in towns like Qaraqosh and the Christian suburb of Erbil, Ankawa. In addition, ancient churches and monasteries were refurbished, and schools and roads built.³²

In Baghdad services are offered in sixteen parishes out of the original twenty three parishes.³³ In eight parishes for mass there is a resident priest while the other eight are served irregularly by visiting priests and seven churches are officially closed.³⁴

31 'Patriarch Sako Calls on Christians Not to Flee Iraq', *Asianews.it*, 27 August 2013, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Patriarch-Sako-calls-on-Christians-not-to-flee-Iraq-28849.html>; Albert Zarazeer, 'Patriarch Sako Calls on Religious and Political Leaders to Set up a Committee to Promote Dialogue', *Asianews.it*, 11 June 2013, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Patriarch-Sako-calls-on-religious-and-political-leaders-to-set-up-a-committee-to-promote-dialogue-28169.html>.

32 As a token of appreciation, he was awarded 'Knight Commander of the order of Saint Gregory the Great' by Pope Benedict XVI on 1 August 2006.

33 1. The Church of the Virgin Mary 2. The Holy Family 3. Our Lady of Sorrows 4. The Holy Heart 5. Mar Giwargis 6. Our Lady of Good Success 7. Mar Ilya 8. Mar Toma 9. The Church of the Ascension 10. Mar Mari 11. The Holy Trinity 12. Mar Bethun 13. The Queen of the Rosary 14. Mar Poulis 15. Our Lady of Succour 16. Saint Joseph.

34 1. The Church of Holy Providence 2. Our Lady of Sorrows 3. Saint Theresa 4. Al-Tahira 5. Mar Ephrem 6. Mar Yousif 7. Our Lady Protector of Crops.

The city of Mosul has been devastated. Before 2003 there were eleven active Chaldean parishes in the Mosul diocese, while now there are only five parishes that provide services, three regularly and two by a visiting priest.³⁵ Of the remaining six parishes, three are closed and the three parishes in the older part of Mosul have only between twenty-five and fifty remaining families: all live under extreme security risks and do not venture far from their homes daily.³⁶

In Basra and Imara there is one church in each, run by two priests. Bishop Gibrael Kassab was moved from Basrah to Australia in view of the dwindling number of Christians.

Patriarch Emmanuel III Delly led his beleaguered Church during these turbulent times with patience and was honoured by Pope Benedict XVI by promoting him as Cardinal on 24 November 2007. However, in view of his age and frailty he resigned his duties as patriarch on 19 December 2012.

The Synod of the Chaldean Church was convoked in Rome on the 28 January 2013 in order to elect a new Patriarch. After three days the Archbishop of Kirkuk, Louis Sako, was elected as Patriarch Rafael II Sako. Since then he has been busy rebuilding the Church despite continued political unrest in the country. He convoked a synod which met in June 2013 and elected three new bishops, Fr Yousif Toma OP as Archbishop of Kirkuk, Fr Habib al-Nawfali as Archbishop of Basrah and the south, and Fr Saad Sirop as Patriarchal Assistant. He has officially accepted Bishop Bawai Soro as a bishop of the Chaldean Church.³⁷

THE PRESENT SITUATION

In view of the increasing number of Chaldean immigrants to various parts of the world, the Church has become international. Nobody knows the exact number of Chaldeans and other Iraqi Christians in the diaspora, however there remain 300,000 within Iraq.³⁸

35 1. Saint Paul 2. Our Lady of Succour 3. The Church of Deir al-Nasr 4. Miskinta 5. Der Mar Giwargis.

36 1. Mar Isha'ya 2. Mar Yousif 3. The Holy Spirit 4. Al-Tahira 5. Mar Ephrem 6. Miskinta.

37 Bishop Bawai Soro was an Assyrian bishop who joined the Chaldean Church in 2008 but was not officially accepted (see above).

38 Herman Teule, 'Christianity in Iraq: The Development of Secular Christian Political

These figures should be taken with reservation since there has been no definitive census of the immigrants who reached various countries in recent years or of those remaining within Iraq. The figures of the different communities given in the appendix below are obtained either from websites or from the priests available for contact who look after the concerned community and are again estimates. However, the Chaldean Church in Iraq probably still holds the largest single community in the world and remains the cornerstone of the Chaldean Church. In addition to a decrease in number, the demography within Iraq changed as Christians moved from the central and southern parts of Iraq to the north. (50 percent resided in Baghdad, 18 percent in Basra and the rest in the north of Iraq.) Now, as noted, the situation is reversed with the majority in Kurdistan and the plain of Nineveh.

CONCLUSION

The Chaldean Church is essentially and historically an Iraqi Church, and despite the devastation that occurred after the invasion of 2003, and the emigration of a large number of its community, the Chaldean Church still has a significant presence in Iraq.

Patriarch Sako made it clear that the seat of the patriarchate remains in Baghdad and has been working hard to assert the authenticity of the Chaldean Church as an Iraqi Church despite the realisation that it has become an international Church.

Patriarch Sako is a man of great integrity and wisdom and is a source of hope for the beleaguered Chaldean Church in these difficult times. Even before his election as patriarch, he had a clear vision of what should be done and made several bold statements locally and internationally that earned him several awards: from Italy (Defender of the faith), Pax Christi (International Peace Award) and Norway (Saint Stephen Award for Human Rights).

In his homily during the mass of enthronement and in several interviews he proposed the vision and guidelines for his ministry.³⁹

Thinking', *One in Christ* 45, no. 2 (December 2011), pp. 312–20.

39 These are summarised in his pastoral letter on the anniversary of his election to the patriarchate 'The Church: Unity and Communion' (Chaldean Patriarchate, 31 January 2014), <http://saint-adday.com/index.php/permalink/5582.html>.

They include:

Renewal: He promised to update the liturgy and teaching methods, and the structures of the Church according to the spirit of the Second Vatican Council and the Apostolic Exhortation for the Church in the Middle East.

Ecumenism: He strongly proposed the wish to co-operate ‘in all fields with the Assyrian Church of the East to achieve unity.’ He also promised that Easter in Iraq will be celebrated on the same date. He said ‘this is the last year the Church celebrates Easter according to two different calendars.’

Dialogue: Addressing the Muslim community of Iraq, he said ‘It is the will of God for having created us different’, together we will go in depth on the points of convergence between us and we will respect the points of difference.

Originality: He encouraged his flock to stay in the country despite difficulties for Christians to return to their country especially those stranded in neighbouring countries. Sako started visiting his communities in the diaspora reminding all of their originality and the ancient roots of their Church.

Transparency: He has already started a campaign to uproot corruption that has affected the properties of the Church.

Pastoral care: He has housed many poor families in the seminary of al-Dora and in some empty churches.

We will end by one quote from his speech to his community after his inauguration:

I know your fears but I invite you to live reality with faith and hope, ... You are not a minority in this Country, you have been here for two thousand years and are at the origin of this Country. Together with the Muslims who came from the Arabian peninsula you have contributed to the construction of Arab and Muslim culture through translations, writings and the *Bayt al-Hikma* (‘House of Wisdom’). You have lived with them the good and the bad. Why is the little flock still afraid? Do not isolate yourselves and do not emigrate, ... Whatever the pressures you are under, this is your land and the contribution

you can give does not depend on your number but on your attitude. What we have experienced in terms of suffering, tribulation and bloodshed of our martyrs can, if we want, incorporate us into the mystery of Christ, help to recognize the presence of God among us, strengthen our hope that the Holy Spirit changes and improves the hearts of men and women

Hope remains that the long saga of the Chaldean Church will witness a revival and further transformation.

APPENDIX

PRESENT COMMUNITIES

The Middle East

There are dioceses in Syria led by Bishop Antoine Audo SJ, and in the Lebanon by Bishop Michel Kassarji. In Iran, there are two archbishops, one for Tehran, Ramzi Garmo, and one for Urmya, Hanna Zora. Jordan has one priest, Fr Raymond Moussali, whilst Egypt and Turkey are administered by a patriarchal vicar who reports to the patriarch in Baghdad.

The estimated number of the Chaldeans in the Middle East outside of Iraq is c. 50,000.

USA and Canada

There are two large dioceses in the USA, one in Detroit governed by Bishop Ibrahim Ibrahim and another in California governed by Bishop Sarhad Jammo. Both dioceses are estimated to have a total of 200,000 individuals. They have many educational centres and a television station broadcasts from Detroit.

Canada accepted a large number of Iraqi refugees after the first Gulf War and the invasion of 2003. Thus the parish of Toronto was elevated to a diocese, 'The Chaldean Catholic Diocese of Mar Addai', with Youhanna Zora as archbishop. The present estimated number is about 40,000.

Europe

There are patriarchal vicariates that serve the Chaldean communities in France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. There are also a number of Chaldeans in most other European countries that have no priest to serve them, such as Greece, Switzerland, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria.

France has the largest Chaldean community in Europe with three parishes and four serving priests. The next large community is that of Germany with four priests and Belgium and Holland who also have four serving priests.

The total Chaldean population in Europe is estimated at around 50,000 individuals.⁴⁰

Australia and New Zealand

In view of the increasing number of Chaldeans in Australasia (c. 32,000), a new diocese was established in 2006, named 'The Chaldean Diocese of the Apostle Thomas, in order to serve the Chaldeans in these countries. Archbishop Jibra'il Kassab of Basra was appointed Archbishop of Mar Toma the Apostle with his seat in Sydney who with seven priests runs the diocese. In Melbourne there are two churches served by three priests and in Sydney one church where the archbishop resides. In New Zealand a new church was consecrated in Auckland served by one priest: 'The Church of Mar Addai'. It is estimated that there are over 30,000 individuals in this diocese

Georgia

Georgia has an ancient community with one parish served by one priest and a total of 2,000 Chaldeans.

40 Most of the figures given for Europe are obtained from Father Petrus Yousif, the parish priest of 'Our Lady of the Chaldeans' in Paris.

‘PICK UP THE PEARLS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
ADORN OURSELVES WITH THE JEWELRY
OF LITERATURE’:
AN ANALYSIS OF THREE ARAB WOMEN
WRITERS IN *AL-NASHRA AL-USBU’IYYA*

Deanna Ferree Womack and Christine B Lindner

In 1887, a young Arab woman named Mariam Zakka presented a stirring and evocative challenge to the women of Ottoman Syria. The opportunity is ripe for women, Zakka argued, ‘to toil for the defense and vindication of our rights and freedom. Let us strip off our robe of indolence, put on the garment of diligence, pick up the pearls of knowledge and adorn ourselves with the jewelry of literature’.¹ In language that evokes the symbolism of putting on the amour of God (Ephesians 6: 10–18), but recast for the gendered garments of Arab women, Zakka called upon her Arab sisters to rise up and fulfill their role in elevating both themselves and their society as part of the unfolding *Nahda* (the Arab Renaissance).²

1 Miriam Zakka, ‘al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad,’ *al-Nashra al-Ushbu’iyya*, (27 August 1887): 374. All translations are by Deanna Ferree Womack. We thank Uta Zeuge for graciously sharing her research on *al-Nashra*, Kamran Rastegar for information on Farida ‘Atiya’s biography, Ellen Fleischmann for encouragement and insight, and Anthony O’Mahony and Mary Grey for providing us with the opportunity to submit this piece.

2 Foundational texts on the *Nahda* include George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1945; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1789-1939*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; Abdul Latif Tibawi, ‘Some Misconceptions about the Nahda’, in: A.L. Tibawi, *Arabic and Islamic Themes: Historical, Educational and Literary Studies*, Luzac, London, 1976, pp. 304–314. The latter provides an important critique of the former two texts. For an overview and analysis of the current ‘dynamic burgeoning field [of] “Nahdah Studies”’ see Stephen Sheehi, ‘Towards a Critical Theory of *al-Nahdah*: Epistemology, Ideology and Capital’, *Journal of Arabic Literature* 43 (2012), pp. 269–298, especially note 1 for list of major texts within this subject field.

Zakka was not alone in her critique of Arab society and pursuit of cultural revival. Recent studies by Holt³ and Zachs⁴ have illuminated women's participation as both readers and writers during the late nineteenth century, while Lindner⁵ has argued for broadening the definition of the *Nahda* to include women's activities, as teachers and mothers, in creating a society that was knowledgeable of Arabic culture and literature. Although appearing less frequently than the writings of Arab men, articles written by women were published within famous nineteenth-century journals, such as *al-Jinan* and *Lisan al-Hal*.⁶ These important *Nahda* periodicals have been studied to reveal the women's 'subversive voices' and interpretations of the 'modern' family and gender roles within the changing Arab society.⁷

This article aims to continue this analysis of Arab women's writings during the late nineteenth century by considering three articles written

-
- 3 Elizabeth M Holt, 'Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut', *Journal of Arabic Literature*, 40 (2009), pp. 37-70; Elizabeth M Holt, 'Women Readers and the Space of the Garden in 1870s Beirut and 1890s Cairo', [unpublished conference paper] presented at: *Middle East Studies Association Annual Conference*, (Washington, D.C.: 1-4 December 2011).
 - 4 Fruma Zachs, 'Debates on Re-forming the Family: A "Private" History of the Nahda?', *Wiener Zeitschrift Fuer Die Kunde Des Morgenlandes*, (2012), pp. 285-298; Fruma Zachs, 'Subversive Voices of Daughters of the Nahda: Alice al-Bustani and *Riwayat Sa'iba* (1891)', *HAWWA: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World*, 9 (2011) pp. 332-357; Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi, 'From Difa' al-Nisa' to Mas'alat al-Nisa' in Greater Syria: Readers and Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858-1900', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 41(2009) pp. 615-633; Fruma Zachs, 'Growing Consciousness of the Child in Ottoman Syria in the 19th Century: Modes of Parenting and Education in the Middle Class', in: Eli Bodeh and Eyal Ginio (eds), *Researching Ottoman History: Studies in Honor of Amnon Cohen*, Brill, Leiden, 2013, pp. 113-128.
 - 5 Christine B Lindner, "'The woman who rocks the crib with her right hand is the one who shakes the world with her arm': Gender and the performances of the Protestant Nahdawi woman", [unpublished paper], presented at: ARAM Society 37th International Conference: Christian Contribution to Arab Renaissance (Oxford, July 2013).
 - 6 For example, Louisa and Alice Bustani had works published in these journals, which were operated by family members. Holt, 'Women Readers and the Space of the Garden'; Zachs, 'Subversive Voices of Daughters of the Nahda'.
 - 7 Zachs, 'Subversive Voices of Daughters of the Nahda'; Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920*, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles and London, 2001, pp. 146-162; Shereen Khairallah, *The Sisters of Men: Lebanese Women in History*, The Institute for Women Studies In The Arab World, Lebanese American University, Beirut, 1996, pp. 177-234.

by Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri in *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya* (*Weekly Bulletin*), the hitherto understudied newspaper of the Syrian Protestant community.⁸ Previously regarded as the mouthpiece of the American missionaries,⁹ *al-Nashra*¹⁰ occupied a much more intricate position within both the Protestant community in Syria and the *Nahda*. While printed at the American Mission Press in Beirut and edited by American missionaries, opinion articles, Biblical analysis, translations and announcements were often written by members of the Syrian Protestant community, including women. Recent work by Womack¹¹ illuminates Syrian Protestants' divergent opinions about church polity and missionary oversight, indicating that the relationship between Syrian Protestants and foreign missionaries during the late nineteenth century was more complex than scholars have previously articulated. Articles in *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya* should thus be read as part of a dynamic conversation on how modernity should emerge in the region, and how these authors believed that it should be shaped by Protestantism.

We will argue that the three women studied in this article, Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri, were important voices in this conversation. Printed in 1887 and 1888, their articles are among the earliest works identified as being written by women, in a journal that often leaves authorship anonymous. After a brief introduction to the authors, we will summarize their articles and then analyze their content along three themes: the agency granted to individuals (both men and women) for personal and societal reformation; the definition

8 We use the term 'Syrian Protestant' to refer to the members and close associates of the Arabic speaking Protestant churches in the region that is now Lebanon and Syria, which was within the Ottoman region of Bilad al-Sham. Many within the community employed the label '*Suriyya*' (Syria) and '*Suri*' (Syrian) to describe this location and their identity, as Arabs from this specific locality.

9 Marwa Elshakry, 'The Gospel of Science and American Evangelicalism in Late Ottoman Beirut', in: M. A. Doğan and H. J. Sharkey, (eds.), *American Missionaries and the Middle East: Foundational Encounters*, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2011, pp. 184, 195.

10 We use the shortened title '*al-Nashra*' to refer to *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya* in light of the journal's continuity despite its change in titles. For the history of these shifts see our section on 'Women's Texts and Editorial Authority' below.

11 Deanna Ferree Womack, "'We Preach the Gospel to High and Low": Syrian Protestants & the American Missionary Encounter' [unpublished conference paper], presented for the American Society of Church History, Washington, D.C., 2 January 2014.

of 'modernity' that should be pursued; and the role of *adab*, or Arabic culture and literature, in elevating the Syrian society. We will argue that while Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri uphold elements of *Nahda* culture, they present unique interpretations on how Protestants should pursue modernity. Although the subject matter of their articles varies, all three women demonstrate a high regard for Arab heritage. All evoke traditional Arabic sayings and history, but also promote the Bible and women's education as the path towards modernity. At the same time they criticize elements of their contemporary Syrian society, particularly the hindrances to women's enlightenment and what they regard as problematic manifestations of 'modernity'. To conclude, we explore the context in which these three articles were published on the front pages of *al-Nashra*. In light of the challenges Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri posit to their readers, we propose that *al-Nashra*'s editorial staff employed these women's articles to affirm the American missionaries' own position within an unfolding debate on missionary-Syrian relations.

THE CONTEXT OF WOMEN'S *NAHDA* WRITING

During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman region of Syria (present day Lebanon and Syria) witnessed a revival in the areas of education and culture. Previous mediums of education, in the home and at churches, monasteries and mosques, were gradually replaced by the founding of schools funded and operated by foreign missionaries, local communities and the Ottoman government, including a significant number of schools for girls.¹² This complex network of educational services brought forth a noticeable increase in the literacy rate for women in the Syrian region, particularly when compared to adjacent areas.¹³ While many of the prestigious institutions were concentrated in the developing port-city of Beirut,¹⁴ important schools for girls

12 These various transformations are the subjects of study in the forthcoming edited volume, Julia Hauser, Christine B. Lindner and Esther Moller, (eds.), *Entangled Education: Foreign, National and Local Schools in Ottoman Syria and Mandate Lebanon*, Ergon Würzburg (forthcoming). Also see Deanna Ferree Womack, 'Lubnani, Libanais, Lebanese: Missionary Education, Language Policy and Identity Formation in Modern Lebanon', *Studies in World Christianity*, 18:1 (2012), pp. 4-20.

13 Khater, *Inventing Home*, pp. 137-138.

14 The suburb of Zokak el-Blat was home to a number of these new schools and

were also founded in nearby cities, such as Tripoli and Sidon, as well as on Mount Lebanon.¹⁵

The transformations unfolding within the region provided manifold opportunities for Syrians to not only acquire an education, but to also perform it. Through reading at school, composing essays, reciting lessons during public examinations, working as teachers, publishing newspapers, discussing articles by former schoolmates at salons and giving commencement speeches, Syrians affirmed education and literacy as a marker for Arab 'modernity' within both formal and informal settings.¹⁶ Education functioned as a new form of cultural capital, which the emerging middle class employed to set themselves as distinct from both the established elite and the peasantry.¹⁷

The period also witnessed a boom in the number of newspapers, journals and publishing houses founded in the region.¹⁸ This rapid increase reveals both a rise in the number of individuals with the qualifications to write, edit, print and regularly publish journals, and an expanding reading audience to consume these diverse works. While many periodicals lasted for a short period, the success of journals like *al-Jinan*, *Lisan al-Hal* and *al-Nashra al-Usubiyya* reveals the acceptance of this new medium of public education. The *Nahda* of the late nineteenth century was thus a dynamic period when literacy in Arabic became an instrumental and key element of a society undergoing transformation.¹⁹

became a hub of educational activities. See Hans Gebhardt *et al.*, (eds), *History, Space and Social Conflict in Beirut: The Quarter of Zokak el-Blat*, Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, Beirut, 2005.

15 While including only Protestant institutions, Jessup's list of schools illuminates how disperse these new educational institutions were throughout the region. Henry Harris Jessup, *Fifty-Three Years in Syria: Volume I and I*, Fleming H Revell Company, New York, 1910. Also see Khairallah, *The Sisters of Men*, pp. 159–172.

16 Holt, 'Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut', pp. 37–70; Ami Ayalon 'Modern Texts and Their Readers in Late Ottoman Palestine', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 38: 4 (2002), pp. 17–40; Stephan Sheehi, 'Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals: Precedent for Globalization and the Creation of Modernity', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 25:2 (2005), pp. 438–448.

17 This is a major theme of the articles in Hauser, Lindner and Moller (eds), *Entangled Education*.

18 Ami Ayalon, 'Private Publishing in the Nahda', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40 (2008), pp. 561–577; Elizabeth M Holt, 'Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut', *Journal of Arabic Literature*, 40 (2009), pp. 37–70.

19 Ami Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1995, pp. 35–36. Womack, 'Lubnani, Libanais, Lebanese', pp. 15–16.

Protestants, both local and foreign, played an important role in this educational transformation. While the influence of American missionaries has been over-exaggerated (particularly in regard to female education),²⁰ and the impact of other Christian and Muslim communities should not be overlooked,²¹ the role of Protestant educational institutions cannot be underestimated. Schools were often the primary channel through which foreign missions established roots in the region, frequently through the efforts of a 'native assistant' or in response to a community's demand for a school.²² While the schools for the American (Presbyterian) mission are the most well known, this demand also resulted in the founding of schools by other Protestant missionary organizations. These included the non-denominational

20 For example, it is often argued that the American School for Girls in Beirut was the first school for female education in the Ottoman empire. This is based upon a misinterpretation of a memorial column that recognizes the school as 'the first edifice built in the Turkish empire for a girl's school'. This column is still found outside the National Evangelical Church in Beirut. Christine B. Lindner, "'Long, long will she be affectionately remembered': Gender and the Memorialization of an American Female Missionary", *Mission and Social Sciences*, 23:1 (2010), pp. 28-29. Also see Abdullatif Tibawi, 'Some Misconceptions about the Nahda', *Arabic and Islamic Themes: Historical, Educational and Literary Studies*, Luzac & Company, London, 1974, p. 304.

21 Martin Strohmeier, 'Muslim Education in the Vilayet of Beirut, 1880-1918', in C Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Thomas Jefferson University Press, Kirksville, MO/Lanham, MD, 1993, pp. 215-241; Mahmoud Haddad, 'Syrian Muslims' Attitudes toward Foreign Missionaries in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in: R S Simon and E H Tejirian (eds), *Altruism and Imperialism: Western Cultural and Religious Missions in the Middle East*, New York Middle East Institute of Columbia University, Middle East Institute of Columbia University, pp. 253-274; Rafael Herzstein, 'The Foundation of the Saint-Joseph University of Beirut: The Teaching of the Maronites by the Second Jesuit Mission in the Levant', *Middle Eastern Studies* 43:5 (2007), pp. 749-759; Jamila Costi, 'al-Nahda al-Nisa'iyya al-Bayrutiyya: Musahamat al-Mu'assasat al-Tarbawiyya al-Thaqafiyya (Namudhaj Madrasat Zahrat al-Ihsan)', in J Hauser, C B Lindner and E Moller (eds), *Entangled Education: Foreign, National and Local schools in Ottoman Syria and Mandate Lebanon*, Ergon, Würzburg (forthcoming); Deanna Ferree Womack, 'Imperial Politics and Missionary Practices: Comparative Transformations in Anglo-American and Russian Orthodox Missions in Syria-Palestine', *ARAM*, 25 (forthcoming August 2014).

22 This point is emphasized in Jean Said Makdisi, *Teta, Mother and Me: An Arab Woman's Memoir*, Saqi, London, 2005, p. 152. For an example of how the insistence of villagers in Bishmizzen, North Lebanon, for a school to be built created conflict with their bishop, see Khater, *Inventing Home*, p. 138.

(Scotch) Lebanon Schools,²³ the Quaker schools in Brummana,²⁴ the chain of British Syrian Schools,²⁵ the orphanage and boarding schools of the Prussian Deaconesses of Kaiserwerth,²⁶ the Church of Scotland schools,²⁷ and schools run by independent missionaries, like Jessie Taylor and Elisabeth Watson.²⁸ This diversity granted Syrians a level of agency over their educational development, for a person could attend a school run by one organization as a child (for example, the British Syrian School), teach at another as an adult (the Quaker's Girls School in Brummana) and then send her own children to a third (the Deaconesses'school or the American School for Girls in Beirut). These choices were determined by various factors such as the school's location, language of instruction²⁹ and cost of tuition, as well

-
- 23 Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayne, 'The "Lebanon Schools" (1853-1873): A Local Venture in Rural Education', in T Phillip and B Schaebler (eds), *The Syrian Land: Process of Integration and Fragmentation: Bilad al-Sham From the 18th to the 20th Century*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1998, pp. 205-220; Michael Marten, 'The Free Church of Scotland in 19th-Century Lebanon', *Chronos*, 5 (2002), pp. 51-106.
- 24 Theophilus Waldmeir, *The Autobiography of Theophilus Waldmeir, Missionary: Being an Account of Ten Years in Abyssinia, and Sixteen Years in Syria*, S W Partridge & Co., London, 1886, pp. 253-331; Stephen Hobhous (ed.), *The Autobiography of Theophilus Waldmeir, Comprising Ten Years in Abyssinia and Forty-Six Years in Syria with some descriptions of the peoples and religions of these countries*, The Friends' Bookshop, London, 1925, pp. 194-268.
- 25 H B Tristan, (ed.), *Daughters of Syria: A Narrative of Efforts by the Late Mrs. Bowen Thompson for the Evangelization of the Syrian Females*, Seeley, Jackson & Halliday, London, 1872; H B Macartney and S Kassab, *Two Stories from the Land of Promise*, The British Syrian Mission & Marshall Brothers, London, 1906; Frances E Scott, *Dare and Persevere: The story of one hundred years of evangelism in Syria and Lebanon, from 1860 to 1960*, Lebanon Evangelical Mission, London, 1960.
- 26 Julia Hauser, 'An Island Washed by the Crashing Waves of the Ocean? The Kaiserwerth Deaconesses' Contribution to Female Education in Late Ottoman Beirut' [Ph.D.Thesis] (Göttingen: Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2012); Uwe Kaminsky, 'German "Home Mission" Abroad: The *Orientalarbeit* of the Deaconess Institute Kaiserswerth in the Ottoman Empire', in H Murre van-den Berg (ed.), *New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2006, pp. 191-209.
- 27 The Church of Scotland's Mission to the Jews funded these schools. They have received very little academic attention. Henry Harris Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs: With a Chapter for Children*, [ed. C S Robinson and Isaac Riley], Dodd & Mead, Publishers, New York, 1873, p. 214.
- 28 Although independent, both schools collaborated with the American missionaries. Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs*, pp. 204-208, 213-214.
- 29 On students' demand for Arabic, French, and English instruction see Womack, 'Lubnani, Libanais, Lebanese.'

as personal affiliations and affinities.³⁰ As a result, Protestantism became synonymous with education, which served to unify (overcome) this mélange of denominational and theological differences.³¹

It is of no surprise then that members of the Protestant community, official church members or close associates, were active in the Arabic cultural and literary revival (the *Nahda*), of the late nineteenth century. Through establishing schools and presses, Butrus al-Bustani, his son Salim al-Bustani, son-in-law Khalil Sarkis and colleague Nasif al-Yaziji, promoted the study of Arabic culture and literature, alongside the 'translation' of selected elements of Euro-American culture.³² *Nahda* figures, like the Bustanis, Sarkis and Yaziji, believed that these two threads, the restoration of Arab culture and the cautious appropriation of Western culture, would result in the elevation of their Syrian society to a 'modern society'.³³ Education, especially reading and writing, played a key role in the process. However, opinions varied on the way that this process should unfold, particularly the role of foreigners and how Western culture should be adopted.³⁴ Moreover, despite these advances, or possibly because of them, some in Syrian society were hesitant to

30 See the educational biographies given in Maria B Abunнасr, 'The Making of Ras Beirut: A Landscape of Memory for Narratives of Exceptionalism, 1870-1975' [Ph.D.Thesis] (Amherst: University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2013), pp. 139-149, especially that of Amina al-Khuri al-Makidisi, pp. 158-161.

31 Abunнасr sees Arab Protestantism, at least in Beirut, as a form of *habitus*, i.e. a way of engaging in the world, for which education plays a central part. As such, Protestantism is more of a lifestyle, rather than an ecclesiastical affiliation. See Abunнасr, 'The Making of Ras Beirut', pp. 132-183.

32 There are numerous studies of these men and their works, including George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1945, pp. 45-54; Abdullatif Tibawi, 'The American Missionaries in Beirut and Butrus al-Bustani', *St Antony's Papers*, 16:3 (1963), pp. 137-182; Stephen Paul Sheehi, 'Inscribing the Arab Self: Butrus al-Bustani and Paradigms of Subjective Reform', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 27:1 (2000), pp. 7-24; Sharon Halevi and Fruma Zachs, 'ASMA (1873): The Early Arabic Novel as a Social Compass', *Studies in the Novel*, 39:4 (2007), pp. 416-430; Leon Zolondek, 'Socio-Political Views of Salim of al-Bustani (1848-1884)', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2:2 (1996), pp. 144-156; Paul Starkey, 'Nasif al-Yaziji (1800-1871)', in: Roger M A Allen (ed.), *Arabic Literary Biography: 1850-1950*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2010, pp. 376-381.

33 Sheehi, *Foundations of Modern Arab Identity*: 6; Fruma Zachs, 'Under Eastern Eyes: East on West in the Arabic Press of the Nahda Period', in *Studia Islamica. Nouvelle édition* 1 (2011), p. 165.

34 Stephen Sheehi, 'Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals: Precedence for Globalization and the Creation of Modernity', pp. 444-446.

encourage women's full participation in this process, which, as we will see, prompted debate within the *Nahda* press.

WOMEN WRITERS OF *AL-NASHRA AL-USBU'IYYA*: 1887-1888

Arab Protestant women participated in this burgeoning literary environment by contributing to the *Nahda* press. This included *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, the American Syria Mission's Arabic periodical, where translations, announcements, obituaries, articles and speeches by Syrian women appeared intermittently. With the exception of a few issues,³⁵ women's writings were featured on the front page of this periodical only in 1887 and 1888. *Al-Nashra*'s publications during these years are of particular importance for understanding the social visions and religious convictions of Syrian women who were educated in Protestant schools. This section examines the work of three such women – Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri – who were graduates of the American mission's three main institutions of higher education for women in Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut, respectively. While the work of other women writers is also worthy of attention, Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri are the three women whose writings appear most frequently in *al-Nashra* before the turn of the century. Moreover, these three women exerted an additional level of influence over Syrian women and girls through their teaching and lecturing at mission schools.

35 These include Aziza Abbud, 'Ta'thir al-Musiqā', *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, (8 March 1886), pp. 73-74; Alice Bustani, 'Ihtifal Tadhkar', *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, (5 May 1894), pp. 137-138; Rujina Shukri, 'al-Tarbiat al-Husna', *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, (6 October 1899), pp. 387-390. Other front-page pieces by women in 1887 and 1888 include Salma Tannus, 'Khitab', *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, (11 June 1887), pp. 185-187; Farida 'Atiya, 'Khutba al-Duktor Talmij li-Nisa' Amirka', [Part One], *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*, (17 November 1888), pp. 321-323; Farida 'Atiya, 'Khutba al-Duktor Talmij li-Nisa' Amirka', [Part Two], *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya* (24 November 1888), pp. 369-371; Farida 'Atiya, 'Tarjamat Khitab al-Duktor Talmij al-Thani li-Nisa' Amirka', [Part One] *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya* (8 December 1888), pp. 385-387; and Farida 'Atiya, 'Tarjamat Khitab al-Duktor Talmij al-Thani li-Nisa' Amirka', [Part Two] *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya* (15 December 1888), pp. 392-395.

Mariam Zakka: 'Diligence & Perseverance' (1887)³⁶

Like the other two women featured in this study, little written evidence exists with which to reconstruct Mariam Zakka's full biography.³⁷ As a teacher at the American's Sidon Girls' School,³⁸ Zakka followed the path of many other Protestant women who graduated from mission schools in the late nineteenth century.³⁹ In publishing pieces in *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*, however, she set herself apart from her female colleagues, as men authored the majority of the articles published in the *Nahda* press. Her front-page article in *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya* speaks to her experience as an educated Protestant woman, and reveals her wider vision for women in reforming in her society.

Zakka believed that women should be encouraged to engage in intellectual activities alongside men, which was the theme of her 1887 article entitled 'Diligence and Perseverance.'⁴⁰ Zakka's article opens with the statement, 'Diligence (*jidd*) and perseverance (*ijtihād*) are high virtues, praiseworthy attributes and the secret upon which the progress and success of countries hangs.'⁴¹ In her view, these two desirable virtues are sufficient to enable a person to overcome the most difficult of circumstances. She argues that it was through diligence and perseverance that 'the sons of the West came to surpass the sons of the

36 Mariam Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*, (27 August 1887), pp. 363–364.

37 For an analysis on the difficulties and innovative approaches needed to piece together these women's biographies, see Christine B. Lindner, 'Piecing Together the Fragmented History of Esther Mushriq Haddad', *AMEWS E-Bulletin*, 1 (January 2014): pp. 1–3, [online], available at: <<http://iwsaw.lau.edu.lb/publications/amews/amews-ebulletin-2014January.pdf>>

38 Her colleague, Nessim al-Helu, mentions his interactions with the teacher Mariam Zakka at the American school in Sidon. Nessim al-Helu, *Mudhakarat al-Mu'alim Nessim al-Helu: 1867-1951*, [ed. Adnan Badr Helu] Dar Kanaan li'l-darasat wa-l-nashar, Damascus, 2010, pp. 41, 97. For a history of this school see Ellen L Fleischmann, 'Lost in Translation: Home Economics and the Sidon Girls' School of Lebanon, c. 1924–1932', *Social Sciences and Missions*, 23 (2010), pp. 32–62.

39 Zakka was a member of the Evangelical Church in Sidon. n.s., 'Sidon Church —Resident Members,' (1905): Presbyterian Historical Society [Hereafter PHS] 115–15–15. For her account of a commencement at the Boys' School in Sidon, see Mariam Zakka, 'Madrasa al-Sibyan al-'aliya fi Saida', *Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*, (28 July 1888), pp. 234–235. For an example of a short article, see Mariam Zakka, 'al-Amana', *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*, (6 October 1888), pp. 315–316.

40 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', pp. 373–374.

41 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 373.

East' and achieved great prosperity through their scientific discoveries, inventions and industrial advances.⁴² In order to impress upon her readers the truth of this statement, Zakka recounts the trials and successes of Demosthenes, the famed Athenian orator, Bernard Palissy, the French ceramics engineer and George Stevenson, the Englishman who invented the commercial railway engine. All three persevered to overcome overwhelming obstacles and gain success in their fields.

Zakka then shifts from this focus on the accomplishments of Western men to her primary topic of interest: the advancement of Syrian women. First, she brings her readers back to the Arab-Islamic context by quoting an Arabic proverb, 'Whoever is diligent in the things he desires takes patience as his companion and gains nothing but victory.'⁴³ This familiar saying would remind readers that the concept of diligence was not foreign to their own culture. Nevertheless, as Zakka speaks directly to her Syrian women readers, she argues that they have failed to realize their potential because of a false belief that diligence and perseverance are exclusively male virtues. She refutes this notion by turning again to the example of the West, where women have earned a great name for themselves by keeping pace with men in science and learning.

Despite this fact, Zakka says, some still ridicule women and dispossess them of their rights by saying, 'The woman has half a brain and she is not able to do a thing.'⁴⁴ This time Zakka turns not to the contemporary West but, noticeably, to the Bible to assure her female audience that, just like men, they are made in God's image, in cognitive ability, righteousness and holiness. Recasting the creation story in Genesis, she asserts that if it were the case that the Almighty bestowed the man with a complete mind but only gave the woman half of a brain, then she would have received only half of the punishment when the two disobeyed God. However, Zakka insists that God 'prohibited them both from the same food and dealt with both of them in the same way.'⁴⁵ Therefore, innate inability is not preventing the women

42 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 373.

43 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 374. Zakka does not name the source of this proverb, but the same saying appears within a poem in Ahmad al-Hashimi, *Jawahir al-adab fi adabiyat wa-insha' lughat al-'Arab*, vol. 2, Maktaba al-Tijariyya al-Kubra, Cairo, 1962, p. 477.

44 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 374.

45 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 374.

of Syria from progress, civilization and freedom. Rather the problem is their indolence and inactivity – the exact opposite of diligence and perseverance. Spurring her fellow Syrian women to action, Zakka identifies schools as a means toward their success, and with this end in mind, she proclaims, ‘Let us gird ourselves with the sword of perseverance, cut down before us the uselessness of foolishness and indolence and drink from the hot spring of pure knowledge.’⁴⁶

*Farida ‘Atiya: ‘Caution & Attentiveness’ (1888)*⁴⁷

Like Mariam Zakka, Farida Yusuf ‘Atiya was a teacher at a Protestant school for girls, but was also well known as a novelist.⁴⁸ She translated Edward Bulwer Lyton’s *The Last Days of Pompeii* into Arabic in 1889 and published her own novel, *Bayn al- ‘Arshayn* (Between Two Thrones) in 1912.⁴⁹ The American Mission Press in Beirut published ‘Atiya’s ‘prize story’, *The Benefits of Female Education in the East*, in 1893.⁵⁰ ‘Atiya’s family came from Beino, a village northeast of Tripoli.⁵¹ As the daughter of a licensed Syrian Protestant preacher and author, Yusuf ‘Atiya, Farida attended the American School in Tripoli and taught

46 Zakka, ‘al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad’, p. 374.

47 Farida ‘Atiya, ‘al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah’, *al-Nashra al-Ushbu‘iyya*, (February 1, 1888), pp. 41–43.

48 Of the three authors, ‘Atiya is most often included in histories of Arab women’s writings. See Khairallah, *The Sisters of Men*, 209; Joseph T Zeidan, *Arab Women Novelists: The Formative Years and Beyond*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, pp. 291–292.

49 Matti Moosa, *The Origins of Modern Arabic Fiction*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1997, pp. 100, 249.

50 Farida ‘Atiya, *Bahjat al-Mukhadarat fi Fawa’id Ta’lim al-Banat* (American Mission Press, 1893). Also see Khairallah, *The Sisters of Men*, p. 209; n.s., ‘Registry of the American Mission Press, Beirut: 1844 to 1895’, p. 165, Courtesy of Near East School of Theology [hereafter NEST] Special Collections; n.s., *Illustrated Catalogue and Price List of Publications of the American Mission Press*, American Mission Press, Beirut, 1896, p. 74, Courtesy of NEST Special Collections. A later edition of this work appeared as Farida ‘Atiya, *Riwayat Bahjat al-Mukhadarat fi Fawa’id ‘ilm al-Banat*, American Mission Press, Beirut, 1909, Courtesy of NEST Special Collections. More research is needed to determine the nature of the contest that ‘Atiya’s story won, as Atiya’s text and the other ‘prize story’, ‘Hind el-Ghusaneeyah’, are indicated as being sponsored by the London Religious Tract Society.

51 Farida’s nephew, Edward, tells the history of the two branches of the ‘Atiya family in Beino and Suk al-Gharb. Edward Atiyah, *An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties*, Butler & Tanner, Ltd., London, 1946, p. 6.

there after graduation.⁵² She married Matta 'Atiya in 1888, whom she met while teaching in Beino, and they had seven children.⁵³ She also lived for some time in Beirut and Hums.⁵⁴ Farida's pieces for *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya* in the late 1880s are among the first publications in her literary career.

'Atiya's prose shows the mark of one trained in classical Arabic composition. The nature of her article in *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya* reflects the young writer's theological formation within a Protestant family, in mission schools as well as in her experiences within the Syrian Protestant community. While it is not labeled as such, 'Atiya's article, 'Caution and Attentiveness,' bears resemblance to the sermons of Syrian Protestant men published in the journal.⁵⁵ It begins with the text of Jeremiah 4:9, and the prophet's warning to beware of neighbors and kin echoes throughout the piece. 'Atiya employs her own rendition of the story of Cain and Abel to establish her point that all of humanity – from the greatest of kings to her own Syrian readers – must approach every relationship with caution. In her interpretation of Genesis 4:1–8, Satan (*Iblis*) entered Cain's heart and turned him against his brother. After the unsuspecting Abel died by Cain's hand, Satan, 'unsatisfied with Cain's heart' alone, expanded his circle of servants to include men and

52 Farida was teaching in Beino, affiliated with the Tripoli Station, in 1887 when the American Mission confirmed that her diploma from the Tripoli Girls' School entitled her to teach in the Ottoman Empire. n.s. 'Tripoli Field: October 18, 1887 Diplomas,' PHS, 115–17–7; [Henry Harris Jessup], 'Farida Attiye', *List of Schools, Teachers and Diplomas*, [1893]: Courtesy of NEST Special Collections. In a short article, 'Atiya tells of her participation in a women's scientific and literary society made up of graduates of the American School for Girls in Tripoli. Farida 'Atiya, 'Jam'iyya al-Sayyidat al-Na'ilat al-Shahada min al-Madrasa al-Amirkiyya al-'aliya fi Tarabulus', *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya*, (26 May 1888), p. 163.

53 Khairallah, *The Sisters of Men*, p. 209.

54 When the mission polled the Syrian Protestant church membership in 1905, 'Atiya was included on the Beirut Church list as absent in Hums. n.s., 'Beirut Church, 1905': PHS 115–15–15. Brief biographical information on Farida 'Atiya is listed in Zeidan, *Arab Women Novelists*, p. 291–292; Radwa Ashour, Ferial J Ghazoul and Hasna Reda-Mekdashy, (eds), *Arab Women Writers: A Critical Reference Guide, 1873–1999* [trans. Mandy McClure], American University Cairo Press, Cairo/New York, 2008, p. 360; Khayr al-Din al-Zirkili, *al-A 'lam: Qamustarajim li-ashhar al-rijal wa'l-nisa' min al-'Arab wa'l-must'aribin wa'l-mustashriqin*, Dar al-'ilm li'l-Malayyin, Beirut, 1979, p. 145.

55 Like the sermons printed in *al-Nashra*, 'Atiya's article begins with a biblical text. Compare with Rashid Daghir, 'Da'wat Allah li-l-khuta', *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya*, (18 May 1885), pp. 153–154; Yusuf Badr, 'al-Masih Fishna', *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya*, (29 May 1897), pp. 174–175.

women of every rank and file.⁵⁶ Thus, as 'Atiya maintains, no one is safe from the threat of a friend or loved one turned enemy.

The best way to address this danger, in 'Atiya's view, would be for her readers to separate themselves completely from other people and live in isolation.⁵⁷ Since this would be impossible, however, 'Atiya advises her readers to subject all friends, family members and neighbors to a 'prolonged period of testing.'⁵⁸ To assist in this process, she then offers numerous descriptions of the character and actions of untrustworthy people. 'Atiya's comparison of slanderers, gossips, liars and manipulators with smooth, sweet-talking serpents draws her readers back to the earlier passage in Genesis, when Adam and Eve succumb to the serpent's deceit in the garden (Genesis 3). Paraphrasing Jeremiah 9:5, she says humans in her own day have trained themselves to become the masters of lies. Their ongoing acts of fraud, defamation and antagonism have turned 'the garden of peace into hell.'⁵⁹ They are like wolves that attack a wounded member of the pack, capitalizing on the misfortune of those who blindly trust them.

Unlike wolves, however, who only harm the body, human backbiters bring long-term pain to the soul. In light of this reality, caution and attentiveness are all the more important, and friendship must be 'confirmed through repeated testing.'⁶⁰ The dynamic between a person's inner and outer character that runs throughout the piece appears again in 'Atiya's closing words as she defines a true friend as someone who 'is faithful in our presence and defends us while we are absent, rescues us when we fall and shows sympathy and assistance in times of distress.'⁶¹

56 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 41.

57 This emphasis on isolation parallels the thought of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who withdrew from public life amidst spiritual crisis, traveled alone through Syria and Arabia and then lived in seclusion before returning to teaching. Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, second edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, pp. 218, 250. While further research is needed to determine if 'Atiya had read the works of this Arab theologian, philosopher and mystic, her arguments also bear striking resemblance to al-Ghazali's teachings on friendship. Muhammad Abdul Qasem, *Al-Ghazali on Islamic Guidance*, National University of Malaysia, Selangor, Malaysia: 1979, pp. 102, 105, 107.

58 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 42.

59 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 42.

60 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 43.

61 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 43.

Rujina Shukri was already known as an accomplished writer⁶³ by the time of her 1888 article on Syrians' need for literature and books, which was originally an address delivered at the American School for Girls in Beirut.⁶⁴ The editors of *al-Nashra al-Ushbu 'iyya* introduce her with the same customary words of respect afforded to Zakka and 'Atiya, but they also add that Shukri is a writer (*adiba*) and a graduate of the American School in Beirut. Shukri was not a mission school teacher and, in fact, may not have been a member of the Protestant Church, despite the strong Protestant influence revealed in her remarks about the Holy Bible at the end of her address.⁶⁵ Little is known about Shukri's personal background, but her publications in *al-Nashra* and other Arabic periodicals preserve her status as a *Nahdawi* woman: as a columnist, lecturer at girls' schools and member of Syrian women's associations.⁶⁶

62 Rujina Shukri, 'al-Maktab wa Luzumha', *al-Nashra al-Ushbu 'iyya*, (20 April 1888), pp. 121-123.

63 Halevi and Zachs reference Shukri's article in *al-Muqtataf* on the woman's role in creating the ideal home. Shukri presented this argument in an earlier lecture for *Bakurat Suriyya*, one of the first Syrian women's associations. Sharon Halevi and Fruma Zachs, "'The Little Kingdom over Which God made you Queen': The Gendered Reorganization of a 'Modern' Arab Home in Late Nineteenth-Century Beirut," *Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities* 10:2 (2013), pp. 146-147, 150. See Rujina Shukri, 'Farsh al-buyut wa-tartibuha', *al-Muqtataf*, 9 (1885), pp. 743-745. Makdisi mentions that Shukri gave the commencement address at the American Girls School in 1899, during which she 'evoked the same theme that Butrus al-Bustani had evoked exactly fifty years before—female education was the key to national regeneration, and American missionaries were owed a debt of gratitude for taking the first, crucial step in inspiring an entire generation of Arab women and men to improve themselves and for contributing so benevolently to "the benefit of the nation".' Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820-2001*, Public Affairs, New York, 2010, p. 73. The commencement address was published in *al-Nashra*. See Rujina Shukri, 'al-Tarbiat al-Husna', *al-Nashra al-Ushbu 'iyya*, (6 October 1899), pp. 387-390.

64 For a history of the American School for Girls, particularly its relationship with its affiliated institutions in Beirut, see Ellen L. Fleischmann, "'Under an American Roof': The Beginnings of the American Junior College for Women in Beirut", *Arab Studies Journal* 17:1 (2009), pp. 62-84.

65 In this she would have parallel Nasif al-Yaziji, who, despite long term and close connections with Protestants, remained Greek Catholic.

66 Lindner emphasizes the importance of such activities for Syrian Protestant women who enacted the *Nahda*. Christine B. Lindner, 'The woman who rocks the crib with her right hand is the one who shakes the world with her arm'.

Shukri begins her address by stating, 'I cannot find a subject more fitting to the present state of our country than the benefit and enjoyment that reading brings to readers, both old and young.'⁶⁷ Shukri chose libraries as her subject of discussion because of two problems that she identified in her contemporary Syrian society: the lack of interest in reading and the lack of effort to own books. She notes that although students learn to read in school, where they are compelled to study a variety of disciplines, they do not make reading a continued part of their lives outside of school or after graduation. When Syrian students excel in any particular lesson and receive praise from their teachers, Shukri observed that they become prideful and believe that they have mastered the subject. Failing to recognize how useful books are, these literate Syrians do not seek to acquire new books or even to re-read the old ones. In light of this, Shukri emphasizes the 'extreme need of the people of our country to own books and obtain the benefits from reading them.'⁶⁸ Shukri proceeds with an overview of the development of libraries throughout human history, beginning with the ancient library of Alexandria. Noting the hundreds of thousands of books held in each institution, she also mentions the great figures who created private libraries, including the Emperor Constantine and the Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid. She then highlights the libraries maintained by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II after the fall of the Abbasid state, the numerous public libraries in twelfth-century Spain and the impressive modern library in contemporary France. The development of European libraries, Shukri explains, came with the printing press, a modern invention that multiplied the number of books in the world and made their acquisition financially feasible.⁶⁹

Shukri moves then to the heart of her talk, returning to the issue of readers and libraries in Syria. She does not stress the need for large public libraries, but rather underlines the benefit of personal libraries, especially for children.⁷⁰ Parents should consider acquiring a variety of books and simple short stories, Shukri contends, so that their children will gain new knowledge through the use of these small

⁶⁷ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 121.

⁶⁸ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 121.

⁶⁹ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 122.

⁷⁰ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 122. The term *maktab* (pl. *makatib*) may mean library as well as bookshelf, thus forming a link between large public libraries and small collections of books in the home.

family libraries.⁷¹ Reiterating that the Syrians do not appreciate the value of printing and the acquisition of books, Shukri concludes, 'we would all be happier if the people of our country would consider their present condition, wake up from their heavy sleep, notice their extreme shortage of books and say, "enough sleeping for us!"'⁷²

The key for contemporary Syrians, Shukri argues, is to build upon the 'root of knowledge and civilization' within their own history and turn to books. Here they will find a guide 'leading them on the straight path (*al-tariq al-mustaqim*)' as well as a 'friend and companion.'⁷³ After reading the same books over again they will also 'begin to love the people whose life stories they read,' even without meeting them in person. This reference to anonymous characters in books and autobiographies, whom readers might admire and emulate, leads into her next statement that 'the Holy Bible is the most useful, finest and best of books,'⁷⁴ and that it is incumbent upon all Christians to read it. She concludes:

[The Bible] is the one friend and companion to people of all backgrounds, whether young or old, who are suffering under various hardships. In it we also find condolence and comfort, and through it, the One who is higher and more exalted than all tribes and people upon the face of the earth speaks.⁷⁵

Thus ending her exposition on Bible-reading, Shukri assures her Syrian audience that success is within their reach because of the foundation that has already been built through the missionary schools, for which she praises God. She urges her listeners to capitalize upon this opportunity by exhibiting their patriotic fervor (*al-ghayra al-wataniyya*)

71 It is important to note that in their analysis of Shukri's 1885 article that discusses the proper arrangement of a middle class house, Halevi and Zachs note the lack of a library in her description, despite the presence of books that Shukri recommends be placed throughout the house. They posit that this might be due to Shukri's belief that libraries are part of the masculine realm. Halevi and Zachs, 'The Little Kingdom over Which God made you Queen', p. 14.

72 Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123.

73 Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123.

74 Without stating it directly, Shukri implies that readers will find the best and most appealing role models in the Bible.

75 Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123.

while also lifting their palms in prayer to sustain the noble scholars, the Sultan Abdul Hamid and 'all who aim for the success of our country, regardless of national origin.'⁷⁶

ANALYSIS OF TEXTS: AGENCY, MODERNITY AND ADAB

Although differing in style and content, the articles by Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri share a number of themes that locate them within both the *Nahda* and Protestant traditions. They achieve this multi-layered position by emphasizing individual agency to enact change, promoting education as the path to modernity and highlighting positive examples of Arabic culture and heritage to encourage a reformation of their contemporary society. However, in emphasizing the high capabilities of women, but not limiting their messages to the 'private realm' of women, they represent unique voices within this conversation over modernity for the readers of this Protestant journal.⁷⁷

A central tenant of the *Nahda* is the conviction that 'Arabs were active agents in forging modernity in the region'.⁷⁸ *Nahda* thinkers maintained that individuals, regardless of their class and social position, were capable of enacting change, overthemselves and society, through the choices that they made. For many this democratization of agency necessitated education (through schooling and journals), for good choices could only be forged through proper knowledge.⁷⁹ This view is reflected in Shukri's article in which she highlights the benefits of reading and books to lead Syrians 'on the straight path'.⁸⁰ Likewise,

⁷⁶ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123.

⁷⁷ Hitherto, analysis of women's writings in the *Nahda* has concentrated on their debates over women's roles in society, marriage and the household, i.e. 'private' affairs. For example, see Akram Khater, 'En(gendering) the Public Space: *Fin de Siècle* Beirut', in: M. Davie, *Fonctions, Pratiques et Figures des Espaces Publics au Liban: Perspectives Comparatives dans l'Aire Méditerranéenne*, ALBA and Centre d'Histoire de la Ville Moderne et Contemporaine, Beirut and Tours, 2007, pp. 17–42. While this research is important in gendering the *Nahda* and illuminating these women's works, this cursory study of Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri's articles suggests that women's writings also took on a broader focus, thus demanding a repositioning of *Nahdawi* women writers as central to the movement.

⁷⁸ Sheehi, 'Arabic Literary-Scientific Journal', p. 441.

⁷⁹ This was a central element of Butrus al-Bustani's writings, especially in his 'Khutba fi Adab al-'Arab', (1859). Sheehi, *Foundations of Modern Arab Identity*, p. 22.

⁸⁰ Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123.

Zakka argues that through perseverance one can overcome difficulties and achieve a desired goal. Significantly, all three authors underscore that individual choices can also lead to one's downfall. 'Atiya emphasizes individual agency most strongly, for a person had to question the influence of even her closest associates, the family and friends who in traditional society were the primary basis of support. Thus through choosing ignorance, laziness and bad company, these women argue, one chooses the path towards ruin. Conversely, it was through choosing education and reinforcing this choice through other good, educated decisions, that one enacted positive refinement.

Noticeably, in all three cases this agency for change, either positive or negative, was open to both men and women. Both sexes were equally responsible for their futures. While Zakka recognizes the barriers that some men might place in front of women, she urges women to not become lazy and complacent to these obstacles. Rather Zakka demands that women enact their true agency. As such, both men and women are presented as active figures in shaping their lives, as good or bad, which would trickle down and influence society. Similarly, as 'Atiya speaks to the men and women in her reading audience about the human condition, she emphasizes that both sexes can be the agents of sin and destruction.

Moreover, these women's views on individual agency parallel the Protestant message of individual responsibility over salvation. Conversion narratives, particularly those of Syrian Protestant martyrs like As'ad Shidyq, were based upon individual commitment to the faith in the face of persecution.⁸¹ An individual might have to stand up against family and close associates, as 'Atiya suggests, if they are leading the person in the wrong direction. Membership into the Protestant Church in Syria was based upon evidence of personal 'revival', which was displayed through a public examination of one's theology and character. This demanded personal engagement with God, particularly through reading the Bible.⁸² Zakka and 'Atiya demonstrate this tenet

81 As'ad Shidyq was an early convert to Protestantism who died during imprisonment at a Maronite Quzhayya monastery in 1829. The different versions of his martyrdom account, written by the American missionaries and by Butrus al-Bustani in *Qissat As'ad al-Shidyq* (1860) are the subject of analysis in Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2008.

82 Christine B Lindner, 'Negotiating the Field: American Protestant Missionaries in

in their analysis, specifically in their (re)interpretation of Scripture, the effect of which transforms their articles into sermons. Shukri also supports this practice when she states that of all the books available, the Bible is the most beneficial for an individual to determine her correct path in life.

In a similar manner the three articles uphold a second characteristic of the *Nahda* of employing literature to articulate new perceptions on modernity. Many of the *Nahda* thinkers argued that despite the great achievements of Arabs in the past, their culture fell into decline. However, at this present age, they were granted the opportunity, to 'arise...and awake' and participate in the modernity that they saw unfolding in Europe and the United States.⁸³ This stance is most clearly evident in Shukri's article, through her recounting of the achievements of libraries in Arab and Western history. This she contrasts to her contemporary situation, as she criticizes Syrians' lack of interest in books and thus wisdom. Yet like her male colleagues, Shukri believed that knowledge (and thus modernity) was accessible if Arabs were to 'wake from their heavy sleep'.⁸⁴ But as Zakka confirms, this development was not easy, for 'the progress and success of countries hangs' upon the hard work of the people.⁸⁵

However, the definition of modernity that Arabs sought was not unified. As such, *Nahda* authors employed journals to articulate their different views, in the hopes that they could shape the modernity emerging in their society.⁸⁶ One contested element of this modernity pertained to the role of women and the household.⁸⁷ Although not

Ottoman Syria, 1823 to 1860' [Ph.D.Thesis] (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2009), pp. 151-154.

83 This quote 'Arise, ye Arabs, and awake!' is often attributed to a poem by Ibrahim al-Yaziji or an unnamed Muslim sheik recited at *al-Jam 'iyya al-'Ilmiyya al-Suriyya* in 1868. Tibawi, 'Some Misconceptions about the Nahda': 308. A similar sentiment is also found in Butrus al-Bustani, 'Khutba fi Adab al-'Arab' [1859] in: Yusuf Qizma Khuri (ed.), *A 'mal al- al-Jam 'iyya al-Suriyya li-l- 'Ulum wa-l-Funun, 1847-1852*, Dar al-Hamra, Beirut, 1990, pp. 101-117.

84 Shukri, 'al-Makatib wa Luzumha', p. 123. While clearly evoking Yaziji's poem, this cursory study suggests that Shukri, more so than her colleagues, was directly influenced by the writings of Butrus al-Bustani. This observation requires a much more thorough analysis of her articles, and is thus left for a later study.

85 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 373.

86 Sheehi, 'Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals', pp. 446-447; Zachs, 'Under Eastern Eyes', p. 174.

87 Zachs and Halevi, 'From Difa' al-Nisa' to Mas'alat al-Nisa' in Greater Syria'; Zachs,

directly referencing it, Zakka criticizes an emerging role for the modern woman, the *sitt al-bayt*, who enjoys the new freedoms of rest and relaxation (rather than the traditional peasant work) within the new 'modern' homes of the region.⁸⁸ Zakka chides this articulation of modern womanhood as lazy, and challenges women to rid themselves of 'foolishness and indolence' by persevering with knowledge.⁸⁹ Indeed as authors, all three women embody the type of woman that Zakka advocates. Shukri also criticizes the misappropriation of education by those who become prideful after their studies at modern schools and as a result do not gain the full wisdom that reading offers. In a different manner, 'Atiya advocates for modern social relations in which true friendship and loyalty is earned after undergoing a rigorous evaluation. This sharply contrasts the emphasis placed upon familial and clan support within traditional Syrian society,⁹⁰ as well as the close bonds of the nuclear family advocated by other *Nahda* writers, including her colleague Shukri.⁹¹ The authors are unified however, in their use of the Bible in their conceptualization of modernity and in their advocacy of its use by others as a guide to successfully become modern.

Thirdly, each of the authors held high regard for Arab culture and literature, *adab*, and its role in elevating the Syrian people. The *Nahda* is based upon the premise of reviving Arab culture and restoring the Arab people to the glories that marked their history.⁹² One way of

'Debates on Re-forming the Family: A "Private" History of the Nahda?'; Toufoull Abou-Hodeib, 'Taste and Class in Late Ottoman Beirut', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 43 (2011), pp. 475-492.

88 For an analysis of this new option for women see Khater, *Inventing Home*, pp. 118-127.

89 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 374.

90 This breakdown of the extended family network, particularly within the Syrian Protestant community, was criticized by later Syrian Protestant writers. Wanis Sema'an, *Aliens at Home: A socio-religious analysis of the Protestant Church in Lebanon and its Backgrounds*, Longman-Librairie du Liban, Beirut, 1986, p. 90. Recent work has challenged this narrative, however, by illuminating the continuing ties of Protestants with their non-Protestant families and the quick reconstruction of Protestantism as a 'tribe'. See Christine B. Lindner, 'Women in the Early Protestant Church in Beirut', *NEST Theological Review*, 32:2 (2011), pp. 94-96; Lindner, 'The woman who rocks the crib with her right hand'.

91 Halevi and Zachs, 'The Little Kingdom over Which God made you Queen'. These sentiments were particularly evident in the writings of the Bustani family see Zachs, 'Subversive voices', pp. 349-352.

92 Fruma Zachs, *The Making of a Syrian Identity: Intellectuals and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Beirut*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2005, pp. 190-197.

encouraging revival was to promote the study of the Arabic language itself.⁹³ The circulation of journals like *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya* was central in this campaign to stimulate Arabic reading, which Shukri clearly emphasizes in her piece. Shukri also stresses that reading was not a foreign trait, but rather a root of knowledge that was found within Arabs' own history. Thus, illuminating the libraries of the Arab past was a way for Shukri to encourage her Syrian audience to revive *adab* as a central part of their present and future. Noticeably, all three authors employ examples from Arab history, quoting Muslim scholars and the Bible alike and thereby unifying all Syrians, regardless of religious affiliation, as seen with other *Nahda* writers.⁹⁴ While using the Bible to demonstrate the threat of false friends, 'Atiya does not turn to a relevant biblical text to define friendship,⁹⁵ but rather draws from a Muslim poet, with whose verses she closes her article.⁹⁶ Moreover, examples from 'the West', either its history or present, are employed to spur Syrians into action. Zakka highlights the accomplishments of the West, but emphasizes that such progress could also be achieved through the hard work of her Arab brothers and sisters.

Despite the positive regard for Arab culture and history, and their belief in individual agency for Arabs to reform themselves and society, each author criticized the current state of Syrian society. Laziness, lying and ignorance were preventing the restoration of the Syrian people to their former glory. While believing in the capability of the Syrian people to awaken, the authors recognized the challenges Syrian women faced: men who ridiculed women and denied them their full position in society, as noted by Zakka; backstabbers who harboured Satan in their hearts, as warned by 'Atiya; or those who favored pride over knowledge, as highlighted by Shukri. Syrian society, as these three women saw it, was on the cusp of enlightenment, but had not yet reached it.

93 Sheehi, 'Towards a Critical Theory of *al-Nahdah*', pp. 282, 296–297.

94 Historical fiction was a feature of *Nahda* writers, especially Salim Bustani and Jurji Zaydan. See Zachs, *The Making of a Syrian Identity*, pp. 169–170; Thomas Philipp, 'Approaches to History in the Work of Jurji Zaydan,' *Asian and African Studies* 9 (1973), pp. 63–86.

95 For example, in keeping with 'Atiya's argument, Proverbs 16:28 warns that gossip and slander cause discord among friends.

96 'Atiya, p. 43. The author is unnamed in 'Atiya's article, and we were unable to determine the poem's origin.

**WOMEN'S TEXTS AND EDITORIAL AUTHORITY IN
*AL-NASHRA AL-USBU'YYA***

Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri not only offer a unique perspective on Arabic literary culture, Protestant modernity and women's agency, but their work also grants insight on the nature of the Syrian-American missionary encounter. In this section, our focus shifts from the question of what these Syrian Protestant women wrote, to why the missionary editors of *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* chose to feature these particular articles in 1887 and 1888. To address this question, we examine the history of *al-Nashra* and the division of responsibility for its production between American missionary men and its (mostly male) Syrian editors and writers. Recognizing the wider context of disruptions within the Protestant churches of the Eastern Mediterranean in the late nineteenth century, we then explore the ways that *al-Nashra* employed these women's writings to address critical events in the history of the Syrian Protestant community.

The long-running periodical, *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* (*Weekly Bulletin*), originated in 1863 under the title *Akhbar 'an Intishar al-Injil fi Amakin Mukhtalifa* (*News of the Propagation of the Gospel in Various Places*). Being printed monthly by the American Mission, the official title changed in 1868 to *al-Nashra al-Shahriyya* (*Monthly Bulletin*),⁹⁷ then again in 1871 to *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* when it switched to weekly production.⁹⁸ Studies of the Arabic literature have noted *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* as an early publication of the nineteenth century Arab press, but with the exception of Zeuge,⁹⁹ few have studied its history in any depth.¹⁰⁰ Because it was a production of the American

97 *Akhbar 'an Intishar al-Injil fi Amakin Mukhtalifa* was retained as a subtitle until the change to *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* on 17 November 1871.

98 N.s., 'al-Yubil al-Dhahabi li-l-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya', *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya*, (1 December 1915), pp. 177-178. *Al-Nashra* remains the title of the journal published today by the National Evangelical Synod of Syria and Lebanon.

99 We are grateful to Uta Zeuge for sharing an copy of the forthcoming report by Andreas Feldtkeller and Uta Zeuge on the project 'Transatlantische Vernetzung von Institutionen des Wissens am Beispiel der Syriamission des American Board' Faculty of Theology, Department for Religious Studies and Intercultural Theology, Humboldt University of Berlin.

100 *Al-Nashra al-Uṣbu'īyya* and its predecessors are mentioned by Philip di Tarrazi, *Tarikh al-Sihafa al-'Arabiyya*, vols. 1 and 2, al-Matba'a al-Adabiyya, Beirut, 1913 and 1914; Ayalon, *The Press in the Arab Middle East*; Holt, 'Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut'; Elshakry, 'The Gospel of Science'.

Mission Press, many studies do not include *al-Nashra* as a journal of the *Nahda*, however, with the noticeable exception of Holt.¹⁰¹ This view is reinforced by missionary references to *al-Nashra*, which prioritize its American editors: Cornelius Van Dyck (1863-1879), William Eddy (1880-1883) and Samuel Jessup (1884-1889).¹⁰²

However, *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu ‘iyya* was the medium for a much more complex intercultural exchange. The journal’s ‘Golden Jubilee’ article in 1915 honours both its missionary editors and Syrian Protestant intellectuals as being ‘responsible for its production.’¹⁰³ The latter include the notable scholar and poet Ibrahim Hurani, who served as copy editor from 1880 until 1915, and Niqla Ghabril, who shared this work from 1913 to 1915.¹⁰⁴ Noticeably, the number of articles attributed to Syrian authors increased in 1880, when William Eddy became managing editor and Ibrahim Hurani copy editor. Throughout these changes, *al-Nashra* maintained its character as a religious periodical, in contrast to the more secular literary and scientific journals run by other Syrian Protestant intellectuals, such as *al-Jinan*, *Lisan al-Hal* and *al-Muqtataf*.¹⁰⁵ The 1880s also saw an expansion in terms of content to include sections on current events and articles on chemistry, engineering and medicine.¹⁰⁶ These shifts, along with the inclusion of original poetry and other literary pieces, reflect the intellectual training and interests of the Syrian writers as well as the changing taste of readers. In comparison to other periodicals, 1,100 copies of each issue of *al-Nashra* were printed between the mid-1880s and the

101 Holt, ‘Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut’.

102 For example, the mission’s annual report in 1886 highlights Samuel Jessup as the editor of *al-Nashra* and names the other American men engaged in the work of the press. Syrian editors and writers are not mentioned. n.s., ‘Mission in Syria,’ *The Forty-Ninth Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America*, Mission House, New York, 1886, pp. 67-68. Later editors of *al-Nashra* included missionaries Henry Jessup (1889-1902), Francis Hoskins (1903-1908) and William March (1909-1915). n.s., ‘al-Yubil al-Dhahabi’, p. 178.

103 N.s., ‘al-Yubil al-Dhahabi’, p. 178.

104 Assistant editors included Ibrahim Sarkis, Rizq Allah al-Barbari, As‘ad Shadudi, Elias Bahna, Iskander Saf and Nessim al-Helu. n.s., ‘al-Yubil al-Dhahabi’: 178; Helu, *Mudhakarāt al-Mu‘alim Nessim al-Helu*, p. 20; Feldtkeller and Zeuge, ‘Report’.

105 Articles from *al-Jinan* and *Lisan al-Hal* were frequently reprinted (with credit) in *al-Nashra al-Uṣbu ‘iyya*.

106 Feldtkeller and Zeuge, ‘Report’. Other changes included a minor increase in page size, the inclusion of more images and the change in title front piece.

mid-1890s, placing it between *al-Muqtataf's* subscription rate of 3,000 and *Hadiqat al-Akbar's* rate of 500.¹⁰⁷

This increase in Syrian influence, in shaping *al-Nashra* as both writers and readers, demands that we view the periodical as an American-Syrian Protestant collaboration. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the American missionary editor maintained ultimate authority over the journal, which he marked with the appearance of his name in boldface to close every issue. A more detailed study of *al-Nashra's* history would be necessary to discern how these power dynamics came into play as the missionary managers selected or excluded the work of particular authors to reinforce their own arguments. In situations of disagreement and division, such as the infamous 'Darwin Affair,' it appears that the missionaries exercised their editorial authority to guide the Syrian readers to reject the teaching of evolution. The Darwin Affair pertains to the crisis that followed Edwin Lewis' 1882 commencement speech at the Syrian Protestant College (SPC) in which he supported Darwin's theory of evolution. Outraged, the SPC administration, spurred by the American missionaries, many of whom sat on the SPC Board of Managers, forced Lewis to resign his post as professor of geology and chemistry. A large number of Syrian and American students and faculty protested and subsequently resigned from the college. This included Faris Nimr and Yaqub Sarruf who used their journal *al-Muqtataf* to not only support Darwin but to denounce the college and the mission.¹⁰⁸ In response, *al-Nashra* featured the work of Ibrahim Hurani and other Syrian scholars who supported the SPC administration and the mission's viewpoint.¹⁰⁹ It is our contention that *al-Nashra al-Usubu 'iyya's* editors employed the same strategy in the late

107 N.s., 'Registry of the American Mission Press, Beirut: 1844 to 1895': Courtesy of NEST Special Collections. Compare with the rates presented in Sheehi, 'Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals', p. 448, appendix I.

108 For more on the Darwin Affair and its impact see Betty S. Anderson, *The American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2011, pp. 40–50; Elshakry, 'The Gospel of Science', pp. 190–196; Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2010, pp. 48–49.

109 Ibrahim Hurani's response was serialized in no less than fifteen issues of *al-Nashra* in 1886. These were published under the title *Manahij al-hukm fi nafi al-nushu' wa-l-irtiqa* by the American Mission Press, Beirut in 1885 and 1886; n.s., 'Registry of the American Mission Press, Beirut: 1844 to 1895', pp. 113, 117. Courtesy of NEST Special Collections. Also see Elshakry, 'The Gospel of Science', pp. 195, 210.

1880s to respond to a less-publicized movement of dissent, which the missionaries viewed as a threat to the Syrian Protestant community and their position within it.

Viewing the work of Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri in light of internal disturbances within the Syrian Protestant community helps to uncover, at least in part, why the writings of Syrian women gained such prominence in 1887 and 1888. Although Protestant women were writing in earlier periods of the nineteenth century, this first cohort of women to publish articles in *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya* represent a new generation of Syrians educated in mission schools. For second-generation Protestants, like Farida 'Atiya, issues of Syrian agency and independence from missionary authority took on new significance. Such questions, which had been raised previously by figures like Butrus al-Bustani and John Wortabet,¹¹⁰ became even more pressing after the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions took over the Syria Mission from the Congregationalist American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) in 1870 and implemented a Presbyterian system of church government. While some Syrian Protestants voiced protestations against this transference, which was agreed upon without their consideration, divisions became more pronounced after the American Mission created the first Syrian Presbytery in 1883.¹¹¹ Those who disagreed with the mission's moves felt that the Americans were imposing unnecessary control over Syrian churches, which increasingly regarded themselves as independent entities.

Issues of American oversight of the American Mission Press and the restructuring of Protestant churches in Syria relate to the larger question in some Syrian Protestants' minds of whether the American missionary presence in Syria was still necessary for the continued advancement of the church and Syrian society. The premise behind the American Mission's policy towards the 'native' church was the 'three-self' theory of Rufus Anderson, the powerful secretary for the ABCFM during much of the nineteenth century. Anderson's ultimate goal for missions was to encourage indigenous churches to become 'self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating'. Until the church

110 Uta Zeuge, 'Misinterpretation of a mission policy? The American Syrian Mission's conflict with Butrus al-Bustani and John Wortabet', [unpublished paper] presented at the Near East School of Theology, (Beirut: 6 March 2014).

111 Womack, 'We Preach the Gospel to High and Low', p. 9.

could stand on its own, however, missionaries would provide support and guidance.¹¹²

The 1880s appears to be the period when 'native' Protestants throughout the Eastern Mediterranean region felt that their churches had reached maturity. In 1882, members of the Evangelical Armenian Church in Anatolia circulated a petition against the American missionaries who refused to recognize Armenian Protestants ordained in seminaries in the United States as their equals, thus keeping them and the church in a subservient position.¹¹³ While Armenian and Arab Protestants raised similar protests over missionary authority in the late nineteenth century, the situation in Syria was compounded by the shift to Presbyterian Board oversight.¹¹⁴ In the view of some Syrian Protestants, the presbytery system, which linked all Syrian Protestant churches to a central authority, became another mechanism for missionaries to exert their control, thereby stifling independent Syrian leadership.¹¹⁵ In a similar way, scholars have interpreted the Darwin Affair as partially a conflict over SPC's refusal to employ Arabs, specifically Nimr and Sarruf, as full time (and thus equal) professors, which undergirded their resignation of protest.¹¹⁶

It was within the context of this heated debate over the 'maturity' of the Syrian Protestant community to self-support, self-govern and self-propagate, that the three articles by Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri were printed in *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*. In their criticism of their

112 Paul William Harris, *Nothing But Christ: Rufus Anderson and the Ideology of Protestant Foreign Missions*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1999, pp. 46, 99, 113. Noticeably, in 1886 the American Mission Press printed tracts that have been translated as 'Church Government' and 'Self-Support', in addition to Ibrahim Hurani's 'Reply to Materialism'. n.s., 'Registry of the American Mission Press, Beirut: 1844 to 1895', pp. 117-118, Courtesy of NEST Special Collections.

113 N.s., *Controversy between the Missionaries of the American Board and the Evangelical Armenian Churches in Turkey*, Armenian Young Men's Christian Association, New York, 1882.

114 Unlike the Protestant Church in Syria, the Evangelical Armenian Church in Anatolia remained under the ABCFM's Congregationalist system, in which decision-making occurs at the level of the local congregation rather than in a higher church body.

115 Such feelings intensified in the 1890s and early 1900s, when a vocal minority in Beirut claimed that the recent generation of Presbyterian missionaries 'came by force to compel the churches to accept the rule of Presbytery.' n.s. 'Syria and the Mission Work', (n.d.): PHS 115-4-4. Also see Womack, 'We preach the Gospel to High and Low', p. 13.

116 Anderson, *The American University of Beirut*, pp. 46-47.

contemporary Syrian society, it appears that the three writers support the idea that the Syrian Protestant community could not fulfill these three responsibilities. In this regard, Zakka's criticism of those who prevent women's educational development is particularly important, as both American missionaries and Syrian Protestants employed the level of women's education as a marker of civilization.¹¹⁷ Although her audience is unclear, it appears that Zakka's criticism targets those from within the Syrian Protestant community who ridicule women as being half as intelligent as men. Likewise, 'Atiya's caution against the evil intent of others, even close associates, can be read as a reflection on the events of the 1880s, when important members of the Protestant community showed their 'true character', one which the American missionaries perceived to be prideful and manipulative.¹¹⁸ Zakka's warning would thus be applied even to those within the Protestant community, who, if their motives were not discovered, would 'turn the garden of peace into hell'.¹¹⁹ Noticeably, all three women applauded the positive influence of schools,¹²⁰ but Shukri in particular closed her talk with praise to God for the work of the missionaries who, through their schools, laid the framework upon which an Arab revival could take place. While expressing pride in Arab culture, the three authors nevertheless maintain that their contemporary Syrian society had not quite achieved modernity, thus leaving the reader to conclude that they were still in need of missionary guidance.

Although the three women's arguments should be read as genuine calls for women to participate in the *Nahda* and for men to recognize women's rights, this alternative (ulterior) motive cannot be overlooked. Further research is needed to verify whether the women shared this

117 Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs*: especially the preface; Butrus al-Bustani, 'Khitab fi ta'lim al-Nisa', [1849], in Yusuf Qizma Khuri (ed.), *A'mal al-Jam'iyya al-Suriyya li'l-'Ulum wa-l-Funun, 1847-1852*, Dar al-Hamra, Beirut, 1990, pp. 45-53.

118 Pride was a criticism often voiced by the American missionaries against Syrian Protestants, whom they felt wielded too much power. See criticism of Butrus al Bustani in Daniel Bliss, *Letters from a New Campus: Written to his wife Abby and their four children during their visit to Amherst, Massachusetts, 1873-1874*, [ed. Douglas and Belle Dorman Rugb and Alfred H Howell], American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1994, pp. 254-255

119 'Atiya, 'al-Hidhr wa-l-Intibah', p. 42.

120 'Atiya does so less explicitly in this featured article than in some of her later pieces. See Farida 'Atiya, 'Jam'iyya al-Sayyidat al-Na'ilat al-Shahada', *al-Nashra al-Ushbu'iyya*, (26 May 1888), p. 163.

motive during the penning of these papers, but this appears to be the American mission editors' justification for publishing these articles. In this case, the publication of these works in *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya* was not necessarily a pro-*proto*-feminist position of the editors, but rather, an employment of these women's works to strengthen the missionaries' position during a period of trial within the Protestant community, when their very purpose was under threat.¹²¹ This is not to belittle the women's writings, or their arguments, but rather to illuminate the complexities surrounding their writing, and particularly their publication. While Arab (and Armenian) men felt that they had achieved an equal level to American missionaries, these women disagreed. Possibly writing in response to the hypocrisy of Arab men, who on the one hand proclaimed for themselves 'modernity' and 'civility', but on the other hand denied those very same rights for their Arab sisters, Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri commanded Syrian men and women to arise and 'drink from the hot spring of pure knowledge',¹²² Recast by the American editors of *al-Nashra*, this spring of knowledge should be based upon Arab heritage and tradition, but still guided by the American missionaries.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this article was to introduce the writings of three women, Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri, that were published in the Protestant journal, *al-Nashra al-Usubu'iyya*.

In our analysis of their texts, which appeared as front pieces in the years 1887 and 1888, we highlighted the women's emphasis on human agency to enact revival, their desire for Syrian society to become modern and their high regard for Arab *adab*. By focusing on these 'universal' themes of the *Nahda*, we identified these articles as central

121 In a similar vein, Lindner has argued that by the early twentieth century, American missionary men were redundant within the life of the mission, and in an effort to hold onto their position of authority, created new organizations and movements through which to reassert their elevated position. Christine B. Lindner, 'Charles Dana and the game of 'American' relief in WWI Lebanon', [unpublished conference paper], presented at: *CASAR 5th International Conference: Transnational American Studies*, (Beirut: 6-9 January 2014).

122 Zakka, 'al-Jidd wa-l-Ijtihad', p. 374.

within the discourse of *Nahda* literature, rather than marginal studies of the 'private' realm or over 'the women question'. While research on these latter topics is vital to uncover the gendering of this dynamic period (particularly the reconstitution of patriarchy), there is a danger that research on women writers during the *Nahda* will be reduced to this narrow arena of the 'private realm' if we do not highlight women's writings that engaged with broader topics.

Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri positioned themselves as central to the *Nahda* by employing universal language in their calls for reformation. In their articles, men and women were equally encouraged to overcome adversities, surround themselves with honorable colleagues and thus awaken from their slumber of ignorance. It is in this regard, by including women as active agents in renewing Arab culture, that Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri were subversive. They subversively included women by employing the language of Protestantism, which treats all people (theoretically) as equal in the eyes of God.¹²³ Despite this proclamation, mission history demonstrates how Protestantism may bare the human trap of inequality when manifested. In the Syrian Protestant churches of the nineteenth century this was actualized as a gendered and racialized hierarchy: white missionary man over Arab Protestant man over Arab Protestant woman (with white women occupying an unstable, fluctuating position in between white men and Arab women).¹²⁴ Thus, when Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri prepared their articles to be published within this journal of the Protestant community, they affirmed the ecclesiastical (and patriarchal) authority of the ordained ministers (both American and Arab), while at the same time challenging it. They did this by holding all individuals regardless of gender (and race) as equally responsible to study and (re)interpret the Bible in order to find the true path towards modernity.

These women's theological assertions deserve a more detailed analysis, which must be reserved for a later study. Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri's writings should be compared not only to other 'sermons' written by men in *al-Nashra*, but to the other types of Arabic Protestant literature. A cursory analysis of the literature printed at the American

123 Fleischmann explains the evangelical Protestant view of Christianity as 'a universal, transnational identity with no national bounds.' Ellen Fleischmann, "'I only wish I had a home on this globe': Transnational Biography and Dr Mary Eddy," *Journal of Women's History*, 21:3 (2009), p. 118.

124 Lindner, 'Negotiating the Field', pp. 108-117.

Mission Press suggests a division between pieces of 'High Theology' (i.e. works on Systematic Theology) for a narrow audience of missionaries and theological students, and works of 'Low Theology' (i.e. tracts and sermons) for popular consumption.¹²⁵ As *al-Nashra* falls into the latter category, more research is needed to determine how these women's works were thus received, theologically, within this Syrian community. Likewise, Zakka, 'Atiya and Shukri's work, as articulate and educated 'theologians' should be compared to the religious work of other women, particularly 'Biblewomen'. These were paid female evangelists, who tended to be less educated and socially marginalized, although this was not always the case.¹²⁶ While occupying a key role as mediator for the church, they were often relegated to a low position within the church hierarchy.¹²⁷ Reflecting this marginal status, Biblewomen are rarely named within missionary reports, yet research on the dynamics amongst Protestant religious women would be incomplete without further attention to these women.¹²⁸

Despite Zakka's caution about the possible ill intent of family members and associates, the social capital of these three women

125 The American Mission Press Catalogs divide published works into the following categories 'Educational and Scientific Works', 'Religious Works', 'Tracts and Pamphlets' and 'Leaflets'. The category of 'Religious Works' appears to follow an unstated subdivision which prioritizes works of Systematic Theology and Bible Exegesis over works of devotional literature and sermons, which includes *al-Nashra* and the articles written by women. See n.s., *Illustrated Catalogue and Price List of Publications of the American Mission Press, Beirut*, (Beirut: American Mission Press, 1891) and n.s., *Illustrated Catalogue and Price List of Publications of the American Mission Press of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, Beirut, Syria*, (Beirut: American Mission Press, 1896): both courtesy of the NEST Special Collections. It appears that items within the latter category, of devotional literature and sermons, were those recommended by Shukri to form family libraries, although further study is needed to confirm this.

126 One noticeable exception is Ester Mushriq Haddad, who left the position of teaching to become a Biblewoman. See Lindner, 'Piecing Together the Fragmented History of Esther Mushriq Haddad'.

127 Syrian Biblewomen performed a role equivalent to that of male evangelists, though typically outside of formal worship settings. It was not until the twentieth century, however, that Biblewomen became known as women 'evangelists.' Frances E. Scott, *Dare and Persevere*, p. 28.

128 Deanna Ferree Womack is currently investigating the activities of Syrian Biblewomen for her doctoral dissertation at Princeton Theological Seminary. The work of 'Maalmy Helloun,' the Biblewoman who worked alongside Dr Mary Eddy, is recognized in Fleischmann, 'I only wish I had a home on this globe', p. 117.

also requires further analysis. Preliminary studies by Lindner¹²⁹ and Womack¹³⁰ suggest that social relations within the Protestant community had a strong impact not only on the ideas the women upheld, but also upon the channels through which these ideas were articulated. Many scholars have noted the close personal and familial ties amongst *Nahda* thinkers, although few have studied the nature of these ties in their own right¹³¹ (curiously many studies leave the women—who often hold key positions as interlockers—unnamed).¹³² Moreover, the study of *Nahdawi* family history could be an important channel to commence the gendered analysis of *Nahdawi* masculinity, a hitherto overlooked element of this era.

Lastly, in positing an explanation of why these women's articles were published in an otherwise conservative journal, we employed a post-structuralist approach to analyze the power dynamics behind their publication and their discursive role within a larger debate over American missionary-Syrian Protestant authority. In this we harkened to the work of Makdisi, in his analysis of the (competing) martyrdom accounts of Syrian Protestant As'ad Shidyaq,¹³³ as well as Lindner's investigation of the ever-changing memorialization of the American missionary Sarah Smith.¹³⁴ Further research is needed to confirm our hypothesis as well as to uncover the responses of *al-Nashra*'s readers to these women's articles. *Al-Nashra* did not print reader's comments, which have proven fruitful to determine the reception of articles printed by other *Nahda* journals.¹³⁵ This requires the use of alternative sources, similar to Fleischmann's analysis of American missionary

129 Lindner, 'The woman who rocks the crib with her right hand is the one who shakes the world with her arm'.

130 Deanna Ferree Womack: 'Arab Women & Protestant Missions: Gendered Practices of Reading, Writing, and Preaching in Ottoman Syria, 1870-1914', to be presented at Yale-Edinburgh Group Meeting: Gender and Family in the History of Missions and World Christianity (forthcoming 26-28 June 2014).

131 The most often identified are the Bustani-Sarkis family links and Yaziji family. ex. Zachs, 'Subversive Voices of Daughters of the Nahda'; Khairallah, *Sisters of Men*, pp. 201-203.

132 Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean*: 189 note 70 names some, but not all of these key women.

133 Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven*.

134 Lindner, 'Long, long will she be affectionately remembered'.

135 See Holt, 'Narrative and the Reading Public in 1870s Beirut'; Zachs and Halevi, 'From Difa' al-Nisa' to Mas'alat al-Nisa' in Greater Syria'.

women's impact on Syrian female students,¹³⁶ to investigate how women like Mariam Zakka, Farida 'Atiya and Rujina Shukri, served as role models for subsequent generations of Syrian women through work as writers, teachers and speakers at female schools. Some of these students performed *Nahdawi* womanhood and became important educationalists, like Amina al-Khuri al-Makidisi,¹³⁷ Emilia Badr¹³⁸ and Mary Kassab.¹³⁹ Others sought to renovate their society through medicine, like Hilana Barudi¹⁴⁰ and Emma Ata,¹⁴¹ or as ordained ministers and missionaries, like Adele Hajjar.¹⁴² While sources on women such as these are difficult to find, it is with perseverance and diligence (as Zakka would encourage) that scholars can uncover these connections, and thus (re)position Zakka, 'Atiya, Shukri and other Syrian women writers as central figures not only within the *Nahda* and Protestant traditions, but in the creation of a modern Arab society.

136 Ellen Fleischmann, 'The Impact of American Protestant Missions in Lebanon on the Construction of Female Identity, c. 1860–1950', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 13:4 (2002), pp. 411–426.

137 Abunnasr, 'The Making of Ras Beirut', pp. 158–161.

138 Makdisi, *Teta, Mother and Me*, pp. 199–206.

139 Khairallah, *Sisters of Men*, pp. 238–239.

140 Khairallah, *Sisters of Men*, pp. 250–251.

141 Lindner, 'The woman who rocks the crib with her right hand is the one who shakes the world with her arm'.

142 Rima Nasrallah Van Sanne, 'Adèle Jureidini Hajjar (1893–1971): The First Ordained Female Minister in Lebanon', *Theological Review of the Near East School of Theology*, 27:2 (2006), pp. 76–90.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEOLOGY OF ROWAN WILLIAMS: THE QUESTION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS

Philip Ind

Understanding how the pastoral concerns of the Archbishop have developed theologically to include focus on inter-religious relations is of considerable importance. In his analysis of the theology of Rowan Williams, Benjamin Myers 'follows a chronological path' which, he claims, 'may be said to fall into three broad periods.'¹

The first, an early period from the 1970s to the late 1980s, was dominated by response to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's questions concerning the relation between language and sociality. This supports Williams' search for assurance that Christians and Muslims can find 'enough of a common language' for working together as citizens of Britain living in harmony, and to promote world peace with justice for the common good of humanity worldwide.

The second, a middle period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, is dominated by the Hegelian question: Is society more than (simply) the sum of its parts? How can citizens of distinct communities contribute effectively to the whole of society?

The third, a period from the late 1990s to the present, is dominated by the Freudian question asking whether human desire is necessarily trapped in selfish fantasy or can human beings enter into that mode of relating which the New Testament calls 'love'. The resonance (and assonance) of ideas about the love for God and neighbour in Christianity and Islam will be central to the discussion.

1 Benjamin Myers, *Christ the Stranger: The Theology of Rowan Williams*, Continuum, T&T Clark, London, 2012, p. 6.

SEEKING A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE WITH ISLAM

Out of the discussion of the Christian-Jewish relationship Williams recognises that the freedom of the Spirit in all relationships is established through an irrepressible philosophy of hope.

One of the difficulties in developing an appropriate relation 'with Islam' is its tendency in many Muslim cultures towards 'politicisation' — to return to the *salafi*, 'Islamist' ideology of *Dār al-Islām*, and resume various 'fascist', propagandist strategies of closure to religious dialogue. Williams is fully aware of this. It is difficult to find a focus for dialogue with Sunni Islam in particular because there is no focus for authority: on the contrary, there are competing claims. There are also fierce discrepancies between Sunni and Shi'i Muslim ideals.

However, the title page of the Journal *al-Mawrīd* ('Resurgence') from the Institute of Islamic Studies, in Lahore reads:

Al-Mawrid is a unique institution that envisions the revival and perpetuation of the rich intellectual heritage of the Muslim *Ummah*. At the beginning of the fifteenth century post-*Hijrah*, (twenty-first century AD) this institution owes its establishment to the perception that the process of attaining the true understanding of Islam is not being carried out in our *Ummah* in a judicious and appropriate manner. Lost in the maze of sectarian prejudices and political wrangling, the true message of Islam based only on the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* has become alien to Muslims. The *Qur'an*, which is the basis of Islam, is only being used for recitation and committal to memory. No longer is it resorted to for guidance toward moral reformation and intellectual motivation, which could have been obtained only from it. In religious seminaries, those disciplines have become an end in themselves which could have been best served as means toward understanding the Holy *Qur'an*. [...] *Al-Mawrid* has been established to redress and reform this state of affairs².

2 Jehangeer Hanif, 'A Summary of the Islamic Shariah', *Renaissance: Al-Mawrīd: A Monthly Islamic Journal*, Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Studies (August 2008), inside title page.

A special issue of the journal *Renaissance*³ presents Javed Ahmad Ghāmīdī's exposition of the legal code of Islam (both in *al-Kitāb* and *al-Sharī'a*) belonging to the reformist tradition of Islamic sciences.⁴ This statement comes not from an external 'Western' source but from an institution in Lahore, Pakistan, which is critical of the 'Islamism' which represents universal Islam as a political 'Orientalist' ideology.⁵ It is a self-criticism (evidence of intra-religious friction within Islam) and confirms that there is indeed a contemporary resurgence of the traditionalist identification of the House of Islam (*Dār al-Islām*) as the House of War (*Dār al-Harb*).

However, in the majority of Muslim communities in the West there is a growing preference for the use of the expressions: *dār al-'ahd* (the house of covenant), *dār al-shihāda*⁶ (the house of witness), *dār al-sulh* (house of treaty), especially in the multicultural, metropolitan cities of the West where Muslims (with 'Western' passports) may live as minorities in states with democratically elected parliaments. There is a developing desire in Muslim institutions to encourage an objective academic study of other religions on their own terms (not simply from the perspective of the Qur'an).

Although the 'Islamism' of al-Qā'ida and the Taliban is influential among some Muslims (mistakenly according to Ghamidi Ramadan, Saeed, and others), justifying terrorism in resistance to all things 'Western' (especially, the presence of NATO and ISAF forces in 'Muslim' countries—Iraq and Afghanistan), others understand the meaning of *jihād* with reference to the spiritual struggle of the Muslim in overcoming human weakness, seeking to live a sincere life of excellence, nobility, and integrity with 'wholesomeness of heart', following the example of the Prophet Muhammad.⁷ This understanding rejects the need for the Islamic state to defend itself with violent suppression of

3 *Renaissance: Al-Mawrīd*, Institute of Islamic Studies Lahore, August 2008.

4 I received this from Dr Henna Khan of Slough in 2008 and it was recommended to me again by Revd Rana Youab Khan of The Network for Inter-faith Concerns (NIFCON), at the Anglican Central Office, London, in February 2011.

5 Andrew Shanks, *Against Innocence*, SCM Press, London 2008, p. 28. Rose claims that propagandist 'Orientalism', like that of *al-Qā'ida* and other forms of 'fascism', allows its protagonists to think of themselves as innocent victims, or else as innocent defenders of victims, in this case against former imperialist Western powers.

6 Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim 'Who Are We?'*, The Islamic Foundation, Markfield, Leicester, 2005, pp. 4 and 165.

7 Qur'an 33.21.

human rights and freedom of speech, repressing Christian worship. It is opposed to the 'Blasphemy Laws' by which a *fatwā* approving the death penalty can be pronounced on anyone who allegedly dishonours the Prophet Muhammad or blasphemes the Qur'an. Often this has in effect led to the dispossession of Christians on false charges.⁸ On 4 March 2011 it was claimed to legitimize the murder of the Minister for Minorities in Pakistan, Shahbaz Bhatti, because he supported the abolition of the Blasphemy Law.

Kenneth Cragg has discussed the relation of the sacred to the secular, and religion to political power in 'Christians and Muslims face to face'.⁹

He concludes his discussion of the position of Muslims vis-à-vis Christians thus:

All must finally turn on how we reckon with 'the greatness of God'. For Christianity, in its defining origins, it was a greatness utterly generous in its creative magnanimity and even more so in stooping to 'our low estate' in the self-imagining so greatly given in the incarnate and redemptive Messiah Jesus, as the 'Word made flesh'. Islam 'makes Him greatly great' in the benediction of our human guiding by the textuality of the sacred *tanẓīl* (sending down) and the summons into obedience by the discipline and the nurture ordained for us in the Qur'an and the Sharī'a.

Two faiths are one in the mystery of our created human trust in human privilege in the world of our mortal regime on His behalf. For each of us it is a divine 'greatness' great enough to delegate, great enough to risk the risk we constitute. As for how that risk proceeds in the scenarios of history we are—in part—at odds about 'education' or 'redemption', and in consequence, about how political power belongs with our entrusted truth.¹⁰

8 Michael Nazir-Ali in Patrick Sookhdeo, *Freedom to Believe*, Isaac Publishing, Maclean VA, 2009, Foreword, pp. 7–11.

9 Michael Igrave, ed., *The Road Ahead* (Building Bridges 1), Church House Publishing, London 2002, pp. 15–23.

10 In BB1, p. 23.

The critical issue between Islam and Christianity arises in the understanding of *Tawḥīd* (the Unity of God) and the role of the Prophet, and the supposed need for *political* victory in vindication of the Word of Allah. Cragg's argument is that a strong faith does not need the full backing of political power to survive and where faith is buttressed by political ideology there is serious danger of corruption of that faith, a theme which emerges frequently in Williams' thought. There is insufficient space here to discuss this further but the subtleties of the relationship are discussed fully by Kenneth Cragg in *Muhammad and the Christian: A Question of Response*.¹¹ There he discusses the meaning of *taṣliyah*, the spirituality surrounding personal veneration of the prophet Muhammad, which developed with the passage of time. The confession 'Muhammad is the messenger of God' became, in the 'soul-dimension' of Islam, much more than a statement. It has become through long centuries a source of both mystery and ecstasy.

This is no more, no less, than a deep religious sense of what those large, round, equal discs convey to the Muslim believer—in the Arabic script *Allah, Muhammad*—as they adorn the mosque. To divest them of their Sufi subtlety might leave them merely as placards.¹²

The second, more irenic and 'contemporary' Muslim approach to 'the People of the Book' (i.e. the People of the Scriptures, Jews and Christians, which claims a very broad authority) is represented by the authors of 'A Common Word between us and you'. It will be examined later in conversation with Munastir Mir and Tariq Ramadan, who represent the reforming Qur'an-centred jurisprudence of Ghamidi for Muslims living in faith communities in Europe and the West—but who nevertheless feel free, possibly more free than in many Islamic majority states, to live as Muslims.¹³ Another European Muslim, Mustafa Cerić writes:

11 Kenneth Cragg, *Muhammad and the Christian: a Question of Response*, Oneworld, Oxford 1999, pp. 53–65.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

13 Tariq Ramadan, *To Be a European Muslim, 'Who Are We?'*, The Islamic Foundation, Markfield, Leicester, 1999, pp. 153–212; see also, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, OUP, Oxford, 2004, and *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, OUP, Oxford, 2009.

It is my dream that Europe will recognize and accept my Islamic identity in accordance with the real spirit of its democracy and human rights. Indeed my dream is to live in a Europe as genuinely European as I am a genuine Muslim. Therefore any hostility towards European values of democracy and human rights disturbs me as much as any prejudice against Islam and Muslims. My dream is [...] that never again will the European people to whom I belong by my faith, nationality and culture experience the pain of Srebrenica.¹⁴

This attitude represents decades of *rapprochement* between members of the Muslim ‘*ulamā*’ and Christian theologians in different parts of the world. The reasons for the difficulty in reaching this relationship will be discussed more fully below in the section, ‘*Is there a Common Word?*’

Williams believes that dialogue between Christians and Muslims can go further and (as has been said above) he quotes with approval the principles of dialogue presented by the Vatican in 1991 as a guide. An example of Williams’ recognition of the possibility in practice of an embassy of hospitality to British Muslims is found in his lecture to the Royal Courts of Justice on 7 February 2008, where he considered Tariq Ramadan’s explication of *shaṭṭ’a* as applied to Western Muslims and the possible accommodation of *this* understanding of *shaṭṭ’a* in British Common Law as a means of alternative dispute resolution,¹⁵ in much the same way as aspects of Rabbinic Law have been accommodated for Jews.

ANGLICAN PRINCIPLES OF DIALOGUE

There have been many publications offering guidance for good relations with those of other faiths. *Generous Love: the truth of the Gospel and the call to dialogue*, was published by NIFCON in 2008. Rowan Williams’ approach to dialogue with Islam is presented clearly in ‘A Common

14 Mustafa Cerić, ‘Christians and Muslims Face to Face’, in *The Road Ahead*, ed. Michael Ipgrave, p. 8.

15 Ahmad Thomson, ‘Accommodating Difference’, review of Mohamed M Keshavjee’s, *Islam Sharia and Alternative Dispute Resolution* (I B Tauris) in www.lawgazette.co.uk [accessed 21 October 2013].

Word for the Common Good'¹⁶ under the sub-title 'Seeking together in the way of God.' Williams writes:

This is a good moment to attempt to co-ordinate a way forward for dialogue. We suggest an approach drawing on *Dialogue and Proclamation*, a 1991 Vatican document whose four categories of inter-religious dialogue have been found widely helpful. They are:

- the dialogue of life, 'where people strive to live in an open and neighbourly spirit';
- the dialogue of action, 'in which Christians and others collaborate for the integral development and liberation of people';
- the dialogue of theological exchange, 'where specialists seek to deepen their understanding of their religious heritages';
- the dialogue of religious experience, 'where persons rooted in their own religious traditions share their spiritual riches';

In the Building Bridges Seminars (see below) the third and fourth styles of dialogue have been remarkably successful. This typology can be applied more generally to the whole pattern of encounter between Christians and Muslims, even where this is not directly described as 'dialogue'. Three responses in action are suggested by this:

- to strengthen grass-roots partnerships and programmes between our communities that will work for justice, peace and the common good of human society the world over;
- to intensify the shared theological discussions and researches of religious leaders and scholars who are seeking clearer insight into divine truth, and to realise this through building and sustaining groups marked by a sense of collegiality, mutual esteem, and trust;
- to deepen the appreciation of Christian and Muslim

16 Rowan Williams, 'A Common Word for the Common Good', 14 July 2008 <www.archbishopofcanterbury.org>, [accessed 12 August 2008].

believers for each other's religious practice and experience, as they come to recognise one another as people whose lives are oriented towards God in love.

A footnote adds:

This will necessitate spending time in each other's presence, exploring the depth of each other's spirituality, and acknowledging both the variety and the depth of prayer, remembrance and celebration in both faiths.¹⁷

The Building Bridges Seminars which have taken place over the past ten years fulfil these conditions precisely. In his summing-up, the Archbishop writes,

Given the variety of forms of encounter which are to be held together [...] we can identify three main outcomes which we might seek together. These are:

a) Maintaining and strengthening the momentum of what is already happening and ensuring that those involved at local level are aware of the wider picture of Christian-Muslim encounter, positioning themselves in relation to it, and learning from both the achievements and the setbacks. The recent gathering of Muslim religious leaders and scholars in Mecca and the subsequent convening of a conference in Madrid, for example, are promising developments.

b) Finding safe spaces within which the differences—as well as the convergences—between Christians and Muslims can be honestly and creatively articulated and explored. For the health of our encounter we should find ways of talking freely yet courteously about those differences; this has been described as the most certain sign of maturity in dialogue.

c) Ensuring that our encounters are not for the sake of participants alone, but are capable of having an

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

influence which affects people more widely. Christians and Muslims at the level of our local communities are also those engaged in the wider realities of our societies and our world. Seeking the common good is a purpose around which Christians and Muslims can unite, and it leads us into all kinds of complex territory as we seek to find ways of acting effectively in the world of modern global and democratic politics.

This realism, progressing from principle to practice, recognizing the need for collaboration in a plural society, is a consistent aspect of Williams' political theology. Again, in the 'Building Bridges' Seminars most of these aims have not only been pursued, but in large part also achieved, though it will always be necessary to press on patiently. In his conclusion he writes with a clear sense of reality:

We believe that 'A Common Word between us and you' opens the way for these steps to be approached in a new spirit. The limitations of making further statements or sending further letters in advance of meeting together are obvious, however good and friendly the intentions. We greatly look forward therefore to discussing *face to face* some of the questions arising from these exchanges of letters, exploring—as was said earlier—both the concepts that have been sketched and the new possibilities of creative work together for the good of our world. [...] So to your [Muslim] invitation to enter more deeply into dialogue and collaboration as a part of our faithful response to the revelation of God's purpose for humankind, we say: Yes! Amen. In the love of God, + Rowan Cantuar.¹⁸

In this reply the Archbishop did not emphasize the negative, nor labour the point that many of these suggestions were already in practice as a result of Christian initiatives in Britain. (One of the most important of these initiatives was 'The Archbishop of Canterbury's Listening Initiative in Christian-Muslim Relations 2001-2004', which led to the formation of 'The Christian-Muslim Forum', and another

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

was that which encouraged 'The Building Bridges' seminars, begun in 2002 and reconvened annually since then until 2012.)

THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S LISTENING INITIATIVE

Since 2001, the Archbishops of Canterbury have sponsored a joint Christian-Muslim initiative for listening and discerning how best to respond to the developing context of Christian-Muslim relations in Britain. The initiative can be traced back to a reception in 1997, held at Lambeth Palace for the Sheikh al-Azhar of Cairo. On that occasion, the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, spoke in general terms of the importance of finding ways to progress towards a structured dialogue of Christians and Muslims in Britain. His remarks were received warmly by British Muslim leaders present and subsequently several community leaders wrote proposing that the Archbishop follow up his suggestion by convening a meeting of Christians and Muslims to establish a joint national organisation of some kind.

One model suggested was that of the Council of Christians and Jews (established in 1942), of which the Archbishop is a joint president. In 1998, Dr Manazir Ahsan wrote to the Archbishop underlining the importance of involving the Muslim community from an early stage in the consultations.¹⁹

In reply the Archbishop reaffirmed his commitment to forging closer links between Christians and Muslims but suggested that the model of The Council of Christians and Jews might not be appropriate in the very different setting of Christian-Muslim relations. He went on to emphasise the need for careful and extensive consultation before setting up any national framework for Christian-Muslim meeting and dialogue. In October 2000, Archbishop George Carey drew together at Lambeth an ecumenically-based group of Christians to discuss a response to these possibilities. He asked the Anglican Bishop of Aston, the Rt Revd J M Austin, to chair a small working group to plan and oversee a process of consultation with a wide range of people from *both* faiths. The Planning Group was established under the Bishop of Aston's

¹⁹ *The Archbishop of Canterbury's Listening Initiative in Christian-Muslim Relations 2001-2004: Final Report of the Planning Group*, Church House Publishing, London, June 2004, p. 5.

chairmanship in 2001. Its importance was recognised in government by the allocation of funding and by the secondment of a civil servant, Julian Bond, to provide administrative assistance. In addition to this Planning Group, a more broadly constituted Reference Group, drawing together a range of senior Muslim and Christian religious and community leaders, was also formed to act as an occasional consulting body to advise the Planning Group. This consisted of six Muslim and six Christian members with professional expertise in the areas of community and public affairs, education, family issues, women and men's relations, media and communications, and international issues. The engagement of women in the process was deemed crucially important.

After patient preparatory meetings in significantly multicultural urban areas—Nelson, Blackburn and Oldham, Bradford, Leicester, East and North West London, the Reference Group met twice for a process of listening and reflection. The Final Report was presented in 2004 to Archbishop Rowan Williams, recommending the formation of the Christian-Muslim Forum, with ecumenical representation of Christians and Muslims, men and women, from a wide spectrum of traditions, which would continue to keep in touch with local multicultural communities. By engendering trust, this has been instrumental in providing advocacy in the resolution of delicate issues in local politics and whenever inter-religious tensions have developed.²⁰

THE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FORUM

This describes its mission as:

providing safe spaces for living with difference and healing relations. Its values are described as the creation of strong personal relationships, based on faith in God with the participation of *young people, women* and believers of all traditions.²¹

The Community and Public Affairs Sub-Group of The Christian-Muslim Forum has, to date, organized conferences for leadership

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–31.

²¹ The Christian-Muslim Forum, <http://www.christianmuslimforum.org> (see above).

training in Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester and London. The Education Sub-Group followed arrangement of a Christian-Muslim Teachers' Conference on 'Belief and Being' in 2008 with a conference on 'Faith Schools', in partnership with the Las Casas Institute in Oxford. The Families Group meets regularly in Oxford and Brent. A member of the Family Forum has written: 'We learn a lot about ourselves through our children.' (Brent, January 2010) The group concerned with International Issues hosted a meeting in 2010 with Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan Minister for Minority Affairs, when Pakistan interreligious issues, including the abuse of the Blasphemy Law, were discussed. Shahbaz Bhatti was tragically assassinated later, in 2011, by extremists in Pakistan. The Archbishop attended his memorial service in St Margaret's, Westminster. In partnership with other groups they also arranged a memorial service for Iraqi Christians killed in Baghdad (November 2010). These instances show how very problematic relations can still be in some parts of the Muslim world.

In 2010 *The British Attitudes Survey* reported negative attitudes towards Muslims in the media and this provoked a 'Social Attitudes Seminar' where concerns about the sale of *halal* meat in supermarkets led on to *The Halal Meat Statement* in December 2010 by the Media Group. The Women's Group organized a women's retreat for the Brixton-based Faith and the Environment Group (LIFE) in 2010 and in the same year the first men's retreat, 'Following in the Footsteps of Abraham' took place in North Wales based on Hawarden. 2010 was also a busy year for the Youth Group, 'MYX', which launched *myxencounter.org* in October for Christian and Muslim Youth Workers, offering resources for dialogue with young people. They are now developing an accredited training scheme for youth workers.

The Archbishop of Canterbury was asked to assume the presidential role as its initiator and he entrusted the Bishop of Bolton, the Rt Revd David Gillet, with the responsibility of taking forward the recommendations of the Listening Initiative and establishing the work of the Forum which now meets regularly three or four times a year. It has the full-time support of an administrative office and Julian Bond is now permanent director.

THE ‘BUILDING BRIDGES’ PROJECT

The ‘Building Bridges’ Project was also initiated by The Most Reverend George Carey, now Lord Clifton, when he was Archbishop of Canterbury, on 17/18 January 2002 at Lambeth Palace.

The gathering, hosted by the Archbishop, was truly international in character. HRH Prince al-Hassan bin Talal of Jordan was joined by Muslim scholars from ten other countries with six from the United Kingdom; Christian participants came from eight countries. This range was important in ensuring that the discussion was focused on the relations of ‘Muslims and Christians’, rather than ‘Islam and the West’. The latter is the rhetorical framework—sometimes expressed in terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’—within which much debate has taken place recently, particularly since September 11th 2001. The involvement in this dialogue of Muslims living in the West and non-Western Christians is a reminder of the inadequacy of any such simplistic approach.²²

The presence of the Prime Minister of the UK at that time, the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, who addressed the seminar, indicates how:

It was regarded politically and by participants as a bridge-building project of both significance and considerable potential. It was not of course the only such project under construction but it had a special, symbolic significance as evidence of an energy for meeting in dialogue and interaction in the field of Christian-Muslim endeavour because of its location.²³

²² Ipgrave, ed., *The Road Ahead* [BB1], p. 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

SETTING THE AGENDA FOR ‘THE ROAD AHEAD’²⁴

Chapter five of the report on the First Building Bridges Seminar begins with the question, ‘How can Christians and Muslims together identify and act on an agenda for the future?’

Michael Nazir-Ali, with the perspective of a Bishop from the Anglican Church of Pakistan, reminds readers that:

in different ways both faiths see human beings as stewards of God in the context of creation as a whole, and in terms of human society. Christians and Muslims have a long history of living together but in our own days such living together has extended beyond Asia, Africa and parts of the Balkans to other parts of the world.²⁵

Living as members of minority communities Muslims are challenged to make sense of a new situation and to contribute to society by recognizing *dār al-ṣullḥ* (or the place of reconciliation and peace).

Where Christians are in a minority, there may be a need to move beyond a *dhimmī* (protected) mentality and to see themselves as not merely tolerated and protected people but as full *citizens* with freedom of expression, belief and worship.²⁶

Nazir-Ali states that both Muslims and Christians must argue for the importance of religious guidance for the building of society. There cannot, however, be a justifiable case for theocracy: religions should seek to inspire and guide rather than coerce. Christians will welcome much of the understanding of *sharī‘a* set out in the Muslim contributions to the Building Bridges Seminar.

They provide a reminder that the *Shari‘a* is not to be understood as a series of legal, religious, social and penal

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 95–118.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

prescriptions but as a way of remaining faithful in the totality of life.²⁷

He acknowledges the value of diversity but cautions that this cannot be sheer diversity. It is controlled not only by the nature of the revealed texts themselves but also by the needs of the individual and the common good. Looking forward to continuing on the journey, Nazir-Ali asks,

Should Muslims and Christians work jointly on matters like citizenship? There is a need to hear more about the ways in which thinking about development in Islamic law is actually affecting the legal situation in different countries. There is a need for further work in both the West and in Islamic countries on the question of discrimination on the grounds of religion. And how do Islam and Christianity understand human responsibilities and rights? How does this relate to international and national human-rights legislation? Have the two faiths anything distinctive to say—and can they say at least some of this together?²⁸

At the seminar, (he claims), we (the participants included Rowan Williams) took a significant step in travelling together. The journey, however difficult it may prove to be, must continue for the sake of the world's future.

THE BUILDING BRIDGES JOURNEY

Professor Gillian Stamp,²⁹ from the Brunel Institute of Organizational and Social Studies, was invited to the seminar as facilitator, a role in which she has widely appreciated skills. In her summing up of the value of the Seminar she spoke of it as *the beginning of a journey*, or rather four distinctive but interwoven journeys: the historical, the public, the private and the reflective journeys of the participants.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 112-118.

The historical journey includes recognizing the tensions due to the view that there is in some way a single path to 'progress' that Christianity has trodden and that Islam will follow. There is also the legacy of colonialism in many parts of the world, and thought was given to how the history of Europe has been the background for facing the challenges of secularism, materialism and economic inequalities in both faiths.

The public journey for each faith and each individual includes recognition of what commitments are made, what is achieved, and what others perceive. It is this work that the 'hinterland' of hope and meaning, and also unease and suspicion, will see, respond to, criticize, feel involved in, excluded from and heard or not heard.

The public journey enters directly a world where human interconnectedness is stretched to—perhaps even beyond—its limits. The context is of globalization, i.e. of information, investment flows, and impacts of events. A key responsibility of leaders is to translate one to the other, cultivating 'growing edge' people and accepting the censure of those who are far from the edge. (And there will be many!)

The private journey was the base for 'collegiality', the growth of mutual understanding and respect between people. Initial wariness moved on to quieter, stiller listening, to gentle venturing into sensitive areas, to warmer, less detached interest in different beliefs. Values could be seen as less 'exotic', less a matter of curiosity, more one of respect.

The reflective journey. Like the image of the journey, reflection is of the essence in both faiths in that it makes possible a more attentive way of life—to do anything reflectively is to nurture the connection with a deeper self. This journey pauses, considers, tends the other journeys and holds them together when, as so easily happens, they slip apart.

Appreciative conversation is an important countervailing influence to the tendencies to polarization and stalemate inherent in the contemporary world. The reflective work needed to sustain the relationship is thus also of the essence.

Possible next stages of the journey. Islam and Christianity both face the challenges of secularism: both face the dilemma of assimilation versus isolation. Discussion of these issues could be a deep and productive theme to explore for both, and this lends itself readily to translating, bridging scholarly and personal experience and thinking,

and so could be a way forward that would link the public journey to the ‘minute particulars’ of people’s daily lives. It could be a strong base to reach out from and gather in experiences of daily reality—examples of hurt and confusion as well as of living together and of active cooperation. The stages of the journey from 2002 to 2012, under the primacy of Archbishop Williams, have shown some measure of success. They have also shown a full awareness of the seduction of fantasy.

SCRIPTURES IN DIALOGUE?

At the second Seminar in Doha, Qatar, 7-9 April 2003, ‘*Scriptures in Dialogue*’, The Most Revd and Rt Hon Dr Rowan Williams—by now Archbishop of Canterbury—presided, and expressed his gratitude to His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, the Amir of Qatar, for his hospitality to the seminar. Here, for the first time, the process of ‘Scriptural Reasoning’ was applied in practice at the highest level in discussion of ‘*Scriptures in Dialogue: Texts and Context*’. Rowan Williams commented after the meeting:

Significant inter-faith encounter arises from our being able to see each other doing whatever it is that we do as well as possible—teaching, worshipping, reflecting, serving. For me, one of the most important encounters I ever had was this spring in Qatar, when I was part of an international group of Muslims and Christians meeting to read their Scriptures together and discuss them; we Christians were able to benefit enormously from watching Muslims do what Muslims do with love, intellectual rigour and excitement. It proved a deeper and more truly respectful meeting of minds than any attempt to find a neutral common ground. We met as theologians, committed to exploring the reality of what truthful and holy lives might look like and how they might be talked about. And so, we were able not to see each other as competing to answer the same examination paper. At times there was deep convergence, at times monumental disagreement. But I suspect that we all emerged with a

sharper sense of what our traditions have to deal with, of the complexity of our world and the difference of our questions. My hope for the future of dialogue is for more such exchanges at every level.³⁰

The Third Seminar in the 'Building Bridges Project', 'Bearing the Word: Prophecy in the Biblical and Qur'anic Perspective', was held at Georgetown University, Washington DC, between 30 March and 1 April 2004. In it Mustansir Mir, Professor of Islamic Studies, Youngstown State University, Ohio, read the second paper: '*Scriptures in Dialogue: Are we reckoning with the host?*' In it he asks: 'does the Qur'an allow dialogue with the People of the Book, that is, Jews and Christians?' He points out that the Qur'an with its high degree of self-assurance:

invites people to accept it as the word of God and challenges those who dismiss it as a human project.³¹ It rejects the possibility of any compromise between *ḥaqq* (truth) and *bāṭil* (misdirection), saying 'And what is left there after the truth except misguidance?'³²

His paper is important because it challenges the idea that serious dialogue can be restricted merely to 'friendship tea parties'. It is necessary to engage realistically with the problems of finding a sound methodology.

Mir examined the standard texts from the Qur'an, which have recently been quoted as Muslim sources of approval for 'dialogue' with the 'People of the Book'. They are al-Baqarā 2.62 and Āl 'Imrān 3.64. The first, he asserts, is taken to be:

The Qur'anic *magna carta* of religious diversity and religious dialogue. It is interpreted to mean that belief in God, belief in the afterlife and good works are sufficient for salvation, irrespective of whether such belief and

30 Michael Ipgrave, ed., *Scriptures in Dialogue* [BB2], Church House Publishing, London, 2004, p. 140.

31 Michael Ipgrave, ed., *Bearing the Word* [BB3], Church House Publishing, London, 2005, pp. 13–20.

32 Qur'an, Yūnus, 10.32

works belong in Islam, in Judaism, in Christianity, or in Sabaeism—or, by extension, in any other religions.³³

He goes on to show the vulnerability of the text which was later used in ‘A Common Word between us and you’ on the grounds that it does not mention belief in Prophets and Scriptures and does not care to define the substance of ‘righteousness’. And in context, Mir shows that the verse appears to have an exactly opposite meaning to that assumed when the verse is taken in isolation and out of context. The entire passage is actually written in criticism of the Jews throughout the course of history and, in addition, he writes:

If not only Islam but other religions (also) are equally valid paths to salvation, then one wonders why the *Qur’an* is, at times, severely critical of the People of the Book and why it emphasizes that it is necessary for the People of the Book to believe in Muhammad and the *Qur’an*.³⁴

After the Hijra, the migration of Muhammad’s followers from Mecca to Yathrib (later called simply al-Madina), an attempt to establish a city with equal civil rights for Jewish and Muslim citizens failed and the revelations recorded in the *Qur’an* become gradually more critical because there was a failure in trust of ‘the People of the Book’. This term by that stage had often become ambiguous: sometimes it applies to Jews alone, sometimes to Christians as well as Jews. Kenneth Cragg is also dismissive of the use of this verse (al-Baqarā, 2:62) as a basis for dialogue between Muslims and Christians, but for other reasons.³⁵

The second verse Mir considers is that referred to in ‘A Common Word between us and you’, from Āl ‘Imrān, 3.64.

Say: ‘People of the Book! Come now to a word common between us and you, that we serve none but God, and that we associate not aught with Him, and do not some of us take others as Lords, apart from God.’ And if they turn their backs, say: ‘Bear witness that we are Muslims’.

33 Michael Ipgrave, ed., *Bearing the Word* [BB3], p. 14.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

35 Kenneth Cragg, ‘Islam and Other Faiths’, *Studia Missionalia*, 42 (1993), pp. 257–270.

In its origins there is evidence that the Qur'an has an intimate relationship with Jewish and Christian texts, which are referred to in the Qur'an as *al-Tawrā wa'l-Injīl*, (the Torah and the Gospel). The relationship is expressed as a negative reaction, possibly to a Gnostic or oral Christian tradition, but the relationship cannot be ignored however hard traditionalist Muslims may try.

The context in this case is that of a discussion between Muhammad and the visiting Christians from Najran. Āl 'Imrān 3.64 is part of a Muslim 'exclusivist' debate. In the context of the preceding and following verses, serious indictment of the 'People of the Book' is offered. Christians specifically are warned that deification of Jesus is unjustified. The argument that his birth without a father justifies recognition of his divine nature is parried with reference to Adam, who had neither father nor mother but was never claimed to be divine. Munastir Mir writes:

The Arabic phrase *kalima sawā'* ('a common word') does not mean that the Christian and Muslim understandings of monotheism are to be added and then divided by two in order to arrive at a mean that would be acceptable to both parties. Simply put, the phrase urges the claims of the Muslim interpretation of monotheism over against those of the Christian interpretation.

However, Mir fails to refer to the overall Medinan context of this *āya*, the visit of a Christian delegation from Najran who rejected the invitation to accept Islam. In spite of this, when they sought a separate place for their celebration of the Eucharist, Muhammad invited them to celebrate in his own mosque. The overall atmosphere then was one of hospitable respect for the Melkite Christians of Najran.³⁶ It was not uncompromisingly negative.³⁷

The third text he considers is:

Say, People of the Book, you do not stand on anything

36 Chris Hewer speaking at 'A Common Word Five Years On', 24 October 2012, Heythrop College, Kensington, London.

37 Reza Shah-Kazemi, 'The Use of Scripture in "A Common Word"', in *Communicating the Word* [BB7], pp. 158–162.

until you perform the Torah and the Gospel, and what was sent down to you from the Lord.³⁸

This verse is frequently quoted as positive affirmation of Judaism and Christianity in almost absolute terms, consequently implying that Islam can hold dialogue with the two religions in whatever form they might exist. 'Again, [he writes] this interpretation completely misses the thrust of the verse.'³⁹ It argues that Jews and Christians are not following their *own* scriptures, a point made only two verses earlier with the words 'Had they performed the Torah and the Gospel.'⁴⁰

Mir writes:

In my view, this *failure* to ground dialogue credibly in the Qur'an is due primarily to a failure to develop a 'Qur'an-based theology' of interfaith dialogue. Instead of fumbling for odd or isolated Qur'anic verses on which to base the case for dialogue, we need to look at the *Qur'an as a whole*, perhaps Archimedes-like standing 'outside the Qur'an', in order to take an integral look at it and then to elicit, in light of its overall ethos, its response to our questions.⁴¹

Bearing the Word, from which these quotations are taken, has the subtitle 'Prophecy in Biblical and Qur'anic Perspective'. This, the nature of Prophecy, is the focus of the Seminar. Mir, of course, considers the subject from a Muslim, Qur'anic perspective:

Being God's direct appointee and serving as his mouthpiece, the prophet speaks in decisive, black-and-white terms precisely because he is possessed of a special authority.⁴²

He gives examples from Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Jesus in the ISV version of the Bible:

38 Qur'an, al-Mā'idā 5.68.

39 Ipgrave, *Bearing the Word* [BB3], p. 16.

40 Qur'an, al-Mā'idā 5.66.

41 Ipgrave, *Bearing the Word* [BB3], p. 18.

42 Matthew 7.28.

This does not mean that ordinary believers cannot have a strong faith commitment; it only means that they cannot act on behalf of God, as would a prophet. The post-prophetic period, it seems to me, is in some sense qualitatively different from the prophetic period, and it is in the distinction between the two periods that the clues to an authentic theology of interfaith dialogue may be found and developed. What we need, then, is a post-prophetic theology of inter-faith dialogue.⁴³

Mir is convinced that such a theology is possible, and although his apparently dismissive attitude to the use of isolated verses of the Qur'an as foundation for dialogue with the 'People of the Book' may have given a negative impression—even of a lack of enthusiasm for inter-religious dialogue—this conviction gives the explanation for his presence at this Seminar. He continues his argument from a meditation on the Qur'an's statement that Abraham 'came to his Lord with a wholesome heart' (*qalb salīm*)⁴⁴ and that, on the Day of Judgement, salvation will belong to all 'those who possess a wholesome heart.'⁴⁵

The Qur'an's emphasis on the wholesomeness of the heart ties in with its emphasis on individual accountability. With reference to the Day of Judgement, God will say to human beings: 'Now you have come to us one by one, as we created you upon the first time.'⁴⁶ The notion of individual accountability signifies that, in the final analysis, it is the worth of the individual before God that matters. Here, I believe, is room for developing what I have called a post-prophetic theology of inter-faith dialogue.⁴⁷

The basis for dialogue, then, is founded upon the sincerity (*ikhhlās*) and 'wholesomeness of heart' of the participants as they strive for peaceful co-operation for the common good, rather than on an ability to pluck verses from Scripture (Muslim or Christian) to justify the

43 Ipgrave, *Bearing the Word* [BB3], p. 19.

44 Qur'an, al-Şāffāt 37.84.

45 Qur'an, al-Shu'arā' 26.89.

46 Qur'an, Saba' 34. 46.

47 Ipgrave, *Bearing the Word* [BB3], pp. 19–20.

process. The Archbishop of Canterbury in his reply showed an awareness of this argument in 'A Common Word for the Common Good'.⁴⁸

When we compare 'the wholesomeness of heart' of Muhammad as portrayed by Tariq Ramadan in *The Messenger: The Meanings of the Life of Muhammad* with the concept of 'Christianness' in Raimundo Pannikar⁴⁹ admired by Williams, at the same time recalling Williams' own writing on the Beatitude, 'Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God',⁵⁰ it seems this quality of 'wholesomeness' of those seeking to be 'pure in heart' encourages Williams to quote Ramadan's authority on *uṣūl al-fiqh* (jurisprudence) and Quranic *ijtihād* (exposition), suggesting the accommodation of aspects of Ramadan's particular understanding of *sharī'a* within English Common Law.

THE BACKGROUND OF 'A COMMON WORD BETWEEN US AND YOU'

It has been suggested that after a series of terrorist attacks—the 9/11 attack, the July 2007 London suicide-bombings—and after widespread over-reaction to the Danish cartoons insulting the Prophet Muhammad, and to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg lecture, where he made reference to an earlier Byzantine Emperor who described Islam as 'a religion of the sword', the majority of Muslims were feeling very vulnerable and criticised. The idea prevailed that Islam was 'scorned' by the West. However, in an address at Heythrop College, 24 October 2012, Sheikh Hakim al-Murad (Tim Winter), who was a signatory to 'A Common Word between us and you' in February 2007, expressed the view that Prince Gazi al-Hashami of Jordan was more motivated by the sense of threat from American military power after the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan (a sense reinforced by American support for Israel), and fear of political instability in Syria and Lebanon leading to an influx of refugees into Jordan from Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. There was a real sense that right-wing evangelical Christians in America had a deep distrust of all things Muslim, identifying them with al-Qā'ida. In consequence, the possibility of military conflict with

48 Williams, 'A Common Word for the Common Good', footnote 35, p. 15.

49 Williams, 'Trinity and Pluralism', *OCT*, Chapter 11, pp. 167–180.

50 Rowan Williams, *The Truce of God*, Fount Paperbacks, London, 1983, pp. 84–103.

Islam more generally was intensified.

In reaction to this anxiety Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan invited 138 muftis and grand-muftis from a wide range of Muslim communities around the world, to meet at the Al al-Bayt in Amman in February 2007. They signed an open letter to the leaders of Christian communities, including the Pope, the Orthodox Patriarchs and the Archbishop of Canterbury, with the title 'A Common Word between us and you'. As mentioned above: the title is based on an *āya* in the Qur'an.⁵¹ Seeking a basis for developing trust between Christians and Muslims, the authors quoted from St Mark's Gospel 12.29-31, which they understood to encourage agreement about the 'Great Commandment' for Christians, Jews and Muslims. The authors demonstrated how the Qur'an corroborates their understanding of Jesus's teaching in the commandment to love God alone and 'to love your neighbour as your self'.

One of the difficulties in Christian-Muslim relations, as has been stated earlier, is the *lack of centralized authority* in Sunni Islam. There is no single authority to represent Islam in the way that the Pope can speak representing the Catholic tradition, or the Archbishop of Canterbury can speak representing (in a very different sense) the Church of England and the Anglican Communion. But the cultural diversity of acknowledged Islamic scholars, called together by a member of the Hashemite family (which claims descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad) suggests an attempt to reflect something approaching a broadly representative teaching (*ijmā'*) of the whole Muslim community (*umma*).

As we have seen, Christian-Muslim initiatives in dialogue had already been developing in several parts of the world before this. In many British cities, interfaith dialogue groups had been operating for twenty five years or more but as has been argued, two initiatives in Britain deserve particular mention from an Anglican perspective. Both emerged on the initiative of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The first, 'The Christian-Muslim Forum', has importance for relations in Britain, while the second, the 'Building Bridges' project, has international importance.

⁵¹ Qur'an, Āl 'Imrān 3.64.

**‘A COMMON WORD BETWEEN US AND YOU’:
THE MUSLIM OPEN LETTER**

This open letter, coming as it did from a Muslim initiative—an assembly of Muslim scholars in Amman in February 2007—was entirely unprecedented. It based its invitation on a reading of the Christian Scriptures of the New Testament (Mark 12.29–31). In the past, discussions of Christian beliefs as Muslims understand them, have frequently been centred on texts from the Qur’an, which have variant narratives from those of the Bible about ‘Biblical’ personalities. This has inhibited dialogue. Dialogue has also been blocked by the Muslim claim, made in the *tafsīr* of traditional commentators, that ‘The People of the Book’ have corrupted their scriptures⁵² and that there is therefore no common basis for dialogue. ‘A Common Word between us and you’ marks a clear departure from that precedent. In the ‘Summary and Abridgement’, at the beginning of the Muslim letter, we read: ‘The basis for this peace and understanding exists. It is part of the very foundational principles of both faiths: love of God and love of the neighbour.’

To support their thesis the authors show how the teaching of ‘The Great Commandment’ agrees with the teaching of the Qur’an. They demonstrate the absolute centrality of the command to worship one God (*tawḥīd*) sincerely, not just as an expression of emotion but with all one’s heart, mind, soul and strength, and the necessity for Muslims ‘to love one’s neighbour as oneself’ in response to the teaching of the Qur’an. However, to prioritize one’s own argument for holding a point of view on the basis of another’s Scriptures, does not provide the ideal initiative for dialogue on sensitive issues. As Kenneth Cragg wrote in 1993:

Muslims are liable to speak of their *Qur’an* and the faith it underwrites as having the inevitability of a geometric theorem. Emphasis is on *shahadah*—witness, and *da‘wah*—mission. It makes for a posture that demands from others that same submission by which Islam lives, and not a temper of mutual study or patient reconciliation. The

52 Philip Ind, ‘Scriptural Corruption in Christian-Muslim Dialogue’, *One in Christ*, 41, No 4 (2006).

term *balagh* implies communicating the word, announcing the truth. They do not debate it.⁵³

This being the case, the initiative demonstrated in ‘A Common Word between us and you’ shows a remarkable change of attitude. There is now a courageous inclination towards a public change of practice—to genuine dialogue.

The hermeneutical method for dialogue used by the Qur’anic scholars—a repetitious quotation of texts, without always sufficient attention to their contexts—attracts criticism even from other Muslims. We saw how opposition to this method was expressed earlier by Mustansir Mir, a Muslim academic, writing in 2004.⁵⁴ He commented on the fragility of the reasoning from texts detached from their contexts. He asserted that the invitation to ‘A Common Word between us and you’ without contextualizing the verse, fails to express the true meaning of the Qur’an, a point recognised in the Archbishop’s reply where he is rigorous in contextualising the quotation from St Mark’s Gospel, comparing it with parallel passages in Luke, and relevant texts in Matthew’s Gospel, in order to expound Jesus’ meaning more fully.

Mir was considering the verse from Āl ‘Imrān 3.64 (see above), which provides the title of the document.

While the document, now referred to as ‘A Common Word’, treats this as a Qur’anic call to recognise common ground between Muslims and Christians, Mir has argued earlier that Āl ‘Imrān 3.64, is in fact part of an exclusivist argument. Mir appealed for the development of a theology that takes into account the overall attitude and teaching of the entire Qur’an and is dismissive of the fragile argument based on the quotation of isolated texts out of context. He claims that by following Abraham’s example of ‘wholesomeness of heart’⁵⁵ both participant groups fulfil the requirements authenticating genuine dialogue. This desire for a theology encompassing the broad teaching of the Qur’an is not peculiar to Mir and is characteristic of the integrity of many papers delivered by Muslims at the Building Bridges seminars. It

53 Cragg, ‘Islam and Other Faiths’, *Studia Missionalia*, Vol 42 1993, pp. 257–270.

54 Mustansir Mir, ‘Scriptures in Dialogue: Are We Reckoning with the Host?’, in *Bearing the Word: Prophecy in Biblical and Qur’anic Perspective*, Michael Ipgrave (ed.), Church House Publishing, London, 2005, pp. 13–19.

55 Afifi al-Akiti (presented to students from Ripon College, Cuddesdon, Oxford Islamic Centre, 10 January 2011).

refers to the Muslim belief that man is born with a 'pure heart', the natural relation of humanity to Allah (*al-fitra*), but that the turmoil of life can gradually darken the heart and distort the natural spiritual relationship of love for and submission to God. By devotion in prayer and contemplative remembrance of the names of Allah in the Qur'an (*dhikr*) in the relationship of wholesomeness of heart (*qalbun salimun*) Muslims (and Christians according to Mir) may find purification and mercy by coming in prayer with modesty, sincerity and humility to ask forgiveness from a merciful God.

**THE ARCHBISHOP'S REPLY:
'A COMMON WORD FOR THE COMMON GOOD'**

In his reply, 'A Common Word for the Common Good',⁵⁶ Rowan Williams acknowledged the positive, respectful and irenic approach of the authors.

The Archbishop of Canterbury invited a group of Anglican bishops to discuss a reply. Most responded positively to a draft letter and felt, like Richard Chartres, Bishop of London, that 'such a substantial letter demands a substantial Christian response.' But *A Common Word between us and you* was seen by Michael Nazir-Ali⁵⁷ (former Anglican Bishop of Rochester) to be imposing the terms of dialogue and for this reason he was not entirely happy with the Muslim approach. Michael Nazir-Ali's cultural origin is in the Anglican Church of Pakistan. His father was a convert in the diocese of Raiwind, Lahore. He wrote a letter separately to *The Times* (of London) entitled '*The Two Faiths' understanding of God's one-ness is not the same*'.⁵⁸ Richard Chartres (Bishop of London) expected the reply 'to stimulate both conversation and cooperation'⁵⁹ and despite the misgivings of some, there is concrete evidence, from High Wycombe and Reading, that Christian-Muslim dialogue has already been stimulated successfully at local level in Britain by 'A Common Word'. As a result of the exchange, the letters are beginning

56 Williams, 'A Common Word for the Common Good'.

57 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I Smith, 'The Quest for a Common Word: Initial Response to a Muslim Initiative', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 20, No. 4 (2009), pp. 369–388.

58 Haddad and Smith.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 370.

to be used as a basis for discussion in mixed Christian-Muslim groups and, at the time of writing, are studied as a voluntary module in at least two Anglican theological colleges.⁶⁰

Archbishop Rowan Williams wrote personally in answer:

In your invitation to 'come to a common word' we find a helpful generosity of intention. Some have read the invitation as an insistence that we should be able immediately to affirm an agreed and shared understanding of God.

Perhaps this implies acknowledgement of Michael Nazir Ali's reservations. Williams continues:

But such an affirmation would not be honest to either of our traditions. It would fail to acknowledge the *reality of the differences* that exist and that have been the cause of deep—at times in the past—even violent division. We read your letter as expressing a more modest but ultimately more realistic recognition that the ways in which we as Christians and Muslims speak about God and humanity are not simply mutually unintelligible systems. We interpret your invitation as saying, 'let us find a way of recognising that on some matters we are speaking *enough of a common language* for us to be able to pursue both exploratory dialogue and peaceful cooperation with integrity and without compromising fundamental beliefs'.⁶¹ [My italics]

Archbishop Williams has advisors who are competent in reading Arabic, have studied the Qur'an and lived in Muslim countries, and are thoroughly conversant with the literature of Christian-Muslim relations. He has been personally involved in the Building Bridges Seminars for ten years now (2012) and is well aware of the resonances and dissonances between Christian and Muslim theologies. His reply is

60 Interfaith Modules available at Ripon College, Cuddesdon, Oxford, England, Jan 10–14, 2011 and St Stephen's Hall, Oxford, 2012.

61 Williams, 'A Common Word for the Common Good', Preface p. 1.

hospitable but discerning. It can be seen not simply as a reply, but also as Christian commentary⁶² on ‘*A Common Word between us and you*’, which he sees as the opening of a process of dialogue, but certainly not the final offer.

He affirms the absolute centrality for Christians of worship of the one God, clarifying the Christian understanding of how God has revealed himself as Trinity in Unity to humanity through the incarnate Word, Jesus, the fulfilment of God’s promises in the prophets. Williams firmly witnesses to his own faith.

He also explains how, for Christians, God who *is* Love, has shown this free grace—sovereign, indestructible and unconditional love—in the sacrificial life and death of Jesus⁶³ in total conformity with the will of the Father: how, in an act of new creation, Jesus Christ is raised from death and known as the living Lord in the community of disciples, the Body of Christ, and is able through his Spirit to interpret divine love both in the individual and in the Community of Christ’s disciples (John 13.34). In response, they seek to reflect the love of Christ for their neighbours in the wider family of mankind.

62 Conversation with the Revd Canon Dr Guy Wilkinson, Lambeth Palace, Tuesday 30 November 2010.

63 1 John 4. 9–10.

THE LEGACY OF CHARLES DE FOUCAULD

Ariana Patey

As he celebrated the centenary of the ordination of Blessed Charles de Foucauld (1858–1916), Pope John Paul II remarked:

Today Bro. Charles invites all the faithful to draw from the contemplation of Christ and a deep relationship with him, new strength to nourish their spiritual life and to proclaim the Gospel to the people of our time; thus they will become the servants of the meeting between God and humanity, called to salvation.

Indeed Foucauld continues to be a source of inspiration for Christians and Muslims¹ almost one hundred years after his death. Through his geographical and linguistic work,² as well as his witness to the faith, the memory of Foucauld continues on in the country to which he dedicated his life—Algeria.³ His spiritual vision has expanded

-
- 1 Although the impact of Foucauld on Islam and on Muslims, particularly in Algeria, is not inconsiderable, it is not the focus of this paper. For more information see Ali Merad, *Christian Hermit in an Islamic World*, trans. by Zoe Hersov, Paulist Press, New York, 1999. For a discussion of his continuing influence in the Amazigh nationalist movement see J J H. Rossetti, 'Christian Marabout, Soldier Monk: Charles de Foucauld between the French and the Tuareg', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 19 (2008), pp. 381–396.
 - 2 For a discussion of Foucauld's geographic work see Sanford Harold Bederman, Oscar MacCarthy, *Charles de Foucauld and the Geographic Exploration of North Africa*, Georgia State University Press, Atlanta, 1983. The results of the exploration were originally published under two titles in 1888 and recently republished as *Reconnaissance au Maroc (1883-1884)*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1998, the same year it was published in Arabic.
 - 3 Henri Tessier and Antoine Chatelard, *Histoire des chrétiens d'Afrique du Nord*, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1991. And Henri Tessier, *Chrétiens d'Algérie*, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 2002. His textual preservation of the Touareg dialect can be found in Charles

beyond the bounds of North African or French Christianity to give him an appeal worthy of his famous title of 'universal brother'. Today there are, spread throughout the world, ten religious congregations and nine associations of spiritual life in the Foucauldian spiritual family. One of their most prominent members was Jacques Maritain, Catholic theologian, philosopher, and a drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴ Foucauld was also an inspiration for Jules Monchanin and fellow Trappist Thomas Merton in their Catholic responses to Hinduism and Buddhism.⁵ His greatest influence, however, has been in the sphere of Muslim-Christian relations as exemplified by the work of Louis Massignon, The Little Brothers of Jesus, and the Community of Khalil.

Charles de Foucauld was born in Strasbourg in 1858. Orphaned at six years of age, he and his younger sister were raised by their grandfather. Foucauld went on to become an officer in the French army, and it was in this capacity that he was sent to Algeria in 1881. He went on to achieve distinction on expedition in southern Algeria and, after he left the army, through his exploration of Morocco in 1883-4. Shortly thereafter, at the age of twenty-eight he converted to the Catholicism of his youth and decided to dedicate this life to God. A Trappist monk for seven years, after leaving the order he lived as a hermit in Nazareth until his ordination. In 1901 he returned to North Africa where he offered hospitality and friendship to the Muslims amongst whom he lived, first at Beni-Abbès and then at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. Foucauld was killed by a bandit in 1916 at the age of fifty-eight. While the nature of Foucauld's relationship with non-Christians has not been without its critics,⁶ his commitment to

de Foucauld, *Dictionnaire touareg-français, dialecte de l'Ahaggar*, 4 vols., Imprimerie nationale de France, Paris, 1951, and *Poésies touarègues. Dialecte de l'Ahaggar*, 2 vols., Leroux, Paris, 1930.

4 Petits Frères de Jésus. *Jacques Maritain*, Petits Frères de Jésus, Toulouse, 1973.

5 Thomas Merton, *Learning to Love*, ed. Boden, Harper, San Francisco, 1997, p. 137, and *Witness to Freedom*, (ed.) Shannon, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1994, pp. 204, 270; J G Weber, *In Quest of the Absolute*, Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo, 1977, p. 51.

6 Jean-Marie Muller, *Charles de Foucauld, frère universel ou moine-soldat?*, La Découverte, Paris, 2002; for an overview of the early debates surrounding this topic, see Jacques Keryell, 'Louis Massignon et l'Association Charles de Foucauld', in *Louis Massignon au coeur de notre temps*, (ed.) Keryell, Karthala, Paris, 1999, pp. 173-193.

brotherhood and fraternity,⁷ support of local culture,⁸ and interfaith prayer⁹ provides us with a picture of someone passionate about pushing the parameters of interfaith connections.

His Catholic faith and, consequently his mission of silent evangelization, were based on two pillars: the Eucharist¹⁰ and the imitation of Christ.¹¹ Foucauld located his conversion in the afternoon of October 1886 when he received the sacraments of Confession and Eucharist. When Foucauld returned to Algeria he did so with a zeal to 'sanctify the infidel populations by bringing into their midst Jesus present in the most Blessed Sacrament' which he intended to accomplish 'in silence and enclosed'.¹² Foucauld was not opposed to the use of preaching in evangelization, but he was adamant that his vocation was not one of travel and mission, but stability and prayer.¹³ Yet within the first year he began to become aware of something he had not anticipated. To his sister he wrote, 'With surprise I'm seeing myself pass from the contemplative life to a life of ministry. I've been led to it in spite of myself by people's needs'.¹⁴

He became convinced that missionary work in Algeria could not be conducted in the traditional manner.¹⁵ It would, as he had originally thought, be an issue of the sanctification of the region through Christ's

7 Ian Latham, 'Charles de Foucauld (1858-1916): Silent witness for Jesus "in the face of Islam"', in *Catholics in Interreligious Dialogue: Studies in Monasticism, Theology and Spirituality*, (eds) O'Mahony and Bowe, Gracewing, Leominster, 2006, pp. 54-55.

8 Rossetti, pp. 394-6.

9 René Bazin, *Charles de Foucauld*, 2nd ed., trans. Keelan, Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd, London, 1943, p. 282.

10 Maurice Bouvier, *Le Christ de Charles de Foucauld*, Desclée, Paris, 2004; Hubert D'hammonville, 'L'euchariste dans la vie de Charles de Foucauld', *Collectanea cisterciensia* 67, no. 4 (2005), pp. 259-265; Michel Nurdin, 'Le Père de Foucauld et Jésus', *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* (2005), pp. 365-376.

11 Ariana Patey, 'God Made Man: Charles de Foucauld, a Catholic Imitation of the Qur'anic Isa', forthcoming, 'Sanctity and Mission in the Life of Charles de Foucauld', *Studies in Church History* 47 (2011), pp. 365-375, 'Making Christ Present: The Concept of Holy Land and Charles de Foucauld's Mission to Algeria', *ARAM* 25 (2013).

12 Bazin, p. 145.

13 Charles de Foucauld, *Correspondances Sahariennes*, eds Philippe Thiriez and Antoine Chatelard, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1998, p. 528; *idem*, *Père de Foucauld, Abbé Huvelin*, ed. Jean-François Six, Desclée & Co., 1957, pp. 208-211.

14 Annie of Jesus, *Charles de Foucauld, In the Footsteps of Jesus of Nazareth*, trans. Little Sisters of Jesus, New City Press, Hyde Park, NY, 2004, p. 53.

15 Preachers 'would be received as Turks coming to preach Mahomet in Breton villages', *ibid.*

presence. Called to travel between the hermitages he had established in the extreme ends of the country, Foucauld acknowledged that the Eucharist could not be the only method of sanctification. He was called to union with Christ, to become for the people a Living Gospel.¹⁶ Foucauld's model for mission was not about changing other people but focused primarily on transformation of the self.

This transformative mission continues to inspire people, in no small part, thanks to the efforts of Foucauld's disciple and friend, Louis Massignon (1883-1962).¹⁷ An esteemed Islamist, Massignon is perhaps the most recognized and respected Catholic voice on the issue of Christian-Muslim relations. He has made a considerable impact on the field of Islamic studies¹⁸ and has been instrumental in the construction of the Catholic Church's response to Islam in the twentieth century.¹⁹ The relationship between Massignon and Foucauld

16 Charles de Foucauld, *The Spiritual Autobiography of Charles de Foucauld*, trans. J Holland Smith, The Word Among Us Press, New York 2003, p. 144.

17 Paolo Dall'Oglio, 'Massignon and *ghihad* in the light of de Foucauld, al-Hallag and Gandhi', in *Faith, Power, and Violence*, (eds) John J Donohue and Christian W Troll, Pontificio Istituto Orientale, Rome, 1998, pp. 103-114; Hugues Didier, 'Louis Massignon et Charles de Foucauld', in *Louis Massignon et ses contemporains*, ed. Jacques Keryell, Karthala, Paris, 2004, pp. 93-110; Louis Massignon, 'An Entire Life with a Brother Who Set Out on the Desert: Charles de Foucauld', in *Testimonies and Reflections*, (ed.) Herbert Mason, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1989, pp. 21-31; *idem*, 'Les maitres qui ont guidé ma vie (1957)', *Horizons magrebins. Louis Massignon. Hommes de dialogue des cultures*, no. 14-15 (1989), pp. 156-160; Ariana Patey, 'Louis Massignon and Charles de Foucauld: An Eremitic Response to Islam', *ARAM* 24 (2013); Lucienne Portier, 'Louis Massignon et Charles de Foucauld', in *Louis Massignon*, (ed.) Jean-François Six, Éditions de l'Herne, Paris 1970, pp. 349-358.

18 His influence was particularly felt in France; see Edward Said, 'Islam, the Philological Vocation and French Culture: Renan and Massignon', in *Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its Problems*, ed. Malcolm H Kerr, Undena Publications, Malibu, California, 1980, pp. 53-72. For a discussion of his friends and students see Maurice Borrmans, *Prophètes du dialogue islamo-chrétien*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2009, and Jacques Keryell, ed., *Louis Massignon et ses contemporains*, Karthala, Paris, 2004.

19 Robert Caspar, 'La vision de l'Islam chez Louis Massignon et son influence sur l'Eglise', in *Louis Massignon*, (ed.) Jean-François Six, Édition de l'Herne, Paris, 1970, pp. 126-147; Albert Hourani, *Islam in European Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 43-49; Anthony O'Mahony, 'Catholic Theological Perspectives on Islam at the Second Vatican Council', *New Blackfriars* 88 (July 2007), pp. 385-398; *idem*, 'The Influence of the Life and Thought of Louis Massignon on the Catholic Church's Relations with Islam', *The Downside Review* 126 (2008), pp. 169-192; Neal Robinson, 'Massignon, Vatican II and Islam as an Abrahamic Religion', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 2 (1991), pp. 182-203; Andrew Unsworth, 'Louis Massignon, the Holy See and the Ecclesial Transition from "Immortale Dei" to

was formed, strengthened, and continued after the latter's death by the belief in a mystical bond between them. Massignon described it as 'the unforeseeable, irreversible, and irrefutable coincidence (at least for the two of us) that has woven a constellation of tiny weblike threads between our two vocations and our two destinies.'²⁰

They first met by correspondence, the younger Massignon requesting information from the great explorer of Morocco he had thought was dead but was instead living as a hermit in the Sahara.²¹ Foucauld's polite response, culminating in a blessing, took on an otherworldly significance for Massignon during his conversion several years later, during which he nearly died. When Massignon was in great torment during his conversion, he felt that he was being assisted by figures who were interceding on his behalf. There were ten intercessors, and amongst them was Charles de Foucauld. The young convert saw the prayers that Foucauld had offered for him as having been crucial to his survival and conversion.²² In the following eight years, the men became very close, and it was Foucauld's wish that Massignon join him in his vocation in Algeria. Although Massignon chose marriage, he always felt that 'Foucauld supported me like an older brother'²³ and in another thread of destiny, he learned of Foucauld's death on the anniversary of his marriage.²⁴

Although Massignon did not join Foucauld in his monastic life, in the hermit priest he found someone who could pass on to him an 'experiential knowledge' of relating to Islam:

I needed him to communicate to me, through spiritual contact, in very simple words, by interviews and letters,

"*Nostra Aetate*": A Brief History of the Development of Catholic Church Teaching on Muslims and the Religion of Islam from 1883 to 1965', *ARAM* 20 (2008), pp. 299-316.

20 Massignon, 'Entire Life', p. 23.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 24.

22 Paolo Dall'Oglio, 'Louis Massignon and *Badaliya*', *ARAM* 20 (2008), pp. 329-336, 330; Six, *L'amour*, pp. 47-49.

23 Quoted in Mary Louise Gude, *Louis Massignon, The Crucible of Compassion*, University of Notre Dame Press, London, 1996, p. 86.

24 'On January 27, 1917, the anniversary of our marriage, a letter from my wife included a clipping from the *Temps: Foucauld killed in Sahara*. Beside myself, I climbed onto the parapet of the snow-covered trench, seized by a feeling of sacred joy, and cried out: "he found his way, he succeeded!"' Massignon, 'Entire Life', p. 28.

his experiential initiation into the real understanding of the human condition, his experiential knowledge of the compassion which drew him and committed him to the most abandoned of human beings.²⁵

Interfaith encounters were not only an interest or mission, but also the foundation of Foucauld's religious life; Foucauld developed his spirituality through his relationship with the Muslims with whom he shared his life. As a young man he was without faith, but it was while exploring Morocco in his early twenties that he began to believe that God might exist. It was the sight of believing Muslims, 'of those souls living in the continual presence of God [that] made me see something greater and more real than worldly occupations.'²⁶ He even confided in a friend that he had considered converting to Islam.²⁷ When he returned to North Africa eighteen years later as a Catholic, it was not only to evangelize but also to live in the presence of God as He worked through the Muslims of the region.²⁸

To contemplate the life of Jesus was, for Foucauld, a continual meditation on God's descent into humanity, focusing heavily on abjection. In a letter to Massignon he explained that no other Gospel verse had changed his life more than 'as you did to the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.'²⁹ Jesus in His humanity was most clearly embodied by those who were forgotten in their poverty. Foucauld chose to live in North Africa because 'No people seemed to me more abandoned than those.'³⁰ Believing that an imitation of Christ should be physical as well as spiritual, he assumed the lifestyle of North African Muslims: their poverty, diet, language, and dress as an imitation

25 *Ibid*, p. 22.

26 Charles de Foucauld, *Charles de Foucauld: Lettres à Henry de Castries*, Grasset, Paris, 1938, p.86.

27 Jean-François Six, *Itinéraire Spirituel de Charles de Foucauld*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1958, p. 44.

28 Charles de Foucauld, *Règlements et Directoire*, Nouvelle Cité, Paris, 1995, p. 589. Ian Latham, 'Charles de Foucauld (1858-1916): Silent witness for Jesus "in the face of Islam"', in *Catholics in Interreligious Dialogue: Studies in Monasticism, Theology and Spirituality*, pp. 54-55.

29 Jean-François Six, *L'Aventure de l'amour de Dieu*, Seuil, Paris, 1993, p. 210; Matt. 25:40.

30 Bazin, p. 141.

of Jesus in this impoverished reality.³¹ He happily accepted the title of 'marabout',³² a Muslim holy man,³³ and when he learned that his Islamic counterparts travelled by foot, he decided to walk everywhere.³⁴

Massignon understood Foucauld's response to Islam as a paradigmatic response. He believed that a person intent on understanding Islam could not judge it from the outside, but must undergo a 'mental de-centring in line with Copernicus' to enable them to enter into 'the very axis of Muslim doctrine, that virgin point of truth which is at its centre, which makes it live and from which invisibly and mysteriously everything takes sustenance'.³⁵ Massignon also credited Foucauld with giving him an understanding of religious brotherhood: 'Foucauld was given to me as a brother, and led me to find my brothers in all persons, beginning with the rejected'.³⁶ It is from this Foucauldian position that he called for all Christians to treat Muslims 'as brothers in Abraham, not born of the same blood (*nasab*), but of the same Spirit of faith and of sacrifice'.³⁷

After his friend's death, Massignon took personal responsibility for Foucauld's legacy. It weighed heavily upon him and he considered it a God-given duty to protect and disseminate Foucauld's beliefs.³⁸ He commissioned the seminal biography of Foucauld by René Bazin, offering its author access to private letters.³⁹ Massignon translated Foucauld's prayers into Arabic,⁴⁰ and personally introduced Foucauld's work to his various influential and famous friends, such as Jacques Maritain⁴¹ and Thomas Merton.⁴² It was Massignon who acted as

31 Charles de Foucauld, *Lettres à mes frères de la Trappe*, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1969, p. 274; Bazin, pp. 111, 163 and 243.

32 Bazin, p. 350; Latham, p. 54; Merad, Chapter II.

33 The French transliteration of the word 'murabit', a holy man. See Michael Brett, 'Islam in North Africa', in *The World's Religions: Islam*, (ed.) Clarke, Routledge, London, 1988, pp. 23-47.

34 Bazin, pp. 188-189.

35 Quoted in O'Mahony, 'Influence', p. 179.

36 Quoted in Richard Wheeler, 'Louis Massignon and Al-Hallāj—an Introduction to the Life and Thought of a 20th Century Mystic', *ARAM* 20 (2008), pp. 221-243, 230.

37 Quoted in O'Mahony, 'Common Fidelity', p. 177.

38 Keryell, 'l'Association', p. 184; Portier, 'Massignon et Foucauld', p. 354.

39 Rene Voillaume, *Charles de Foucauld et ses premiers disciples*, Bayard Éditions, Paris, 1998, p. 39.

40 Keryell, 'l'Association', p. 179.

41 *Ibid.*, pp. 176-7.

42 Sidney Griffith, 'Merton and Massignon and the Challenge of Islam', in *Merton and Sufism*, (eds) Rob Baker and Gray Henry, Fons Vitae, Louisville, 1999, pp. 51-78, 53,

executor of Foucauld's spiritual legacy.⁴³ While Foucauld had never fulfilled his desire to see monastic communities flourish under his Rules, through the assistance and mentorship of Massignon the Foucauldian spiritual family was able to develop both religious and secular wings.

In 1933, inspired by Bazin's book and assisted in their endeavours by Massignon, five young French priests, led by Rene Voillaume, established their first fraternity at El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh, Algeria on the edge of the Saharan desert. Called the 'frères de la Khaloua', the Brothers of Solitude, they set out to establish a life of perpetual enclosure, silence, and prayer⁴⁴ based primarily on the Rule written by Foucauld in 1899 for his proposed monastic order, the Little Brothers of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.⁴⁵ They underwent a complete reorganization after the Second World War—taking off their habits, breaking down their community structure into smaller groups, and foregoing their enclosure to live in the world.⁴⁶ The Little Brothers of Jesus based their renewal on Foucauld's life, rather than his written Rules. In doing so they anticipated, by almost two decades, changes ushered in after Vatican II.

Anthropologist Judith Shapiro, based on her own ethnographic research, has characterized the work of the Little Brothers of Jesus as 'one of the most important [missionary] innovations in the Roman Catholic Church in the twentieth century'.⁴⁷ The attitudes of the congregations have allowed them to remain in countries when other missionary groups have been expelled.⁴⁸ She has identified those characteristics of the group that have contributed to its success, including the organization of the congregation into small groups, evangelization by example, and a contemplative life that focuses on 'individual communion with God'.⁴⁹ All of these characteristics were

and 'Mystics and Sufi Masters: Thomas Merton and Dialogue between Christians and Muslims' in *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 2004), pp. 299–316.

43 Keryell, 'l'Association', pp. 173–193. Also Voillaume, *Disciples*, pp. 33–57.

44 *Cry the Gospel With Your Life*, p. 137; Voillaume, *Disciples*, pp. 212–218.

45 Foucauld, *Règlements*, pp. 37–93.

46 *Cry the Gospel With Your Life*, p. 139; Voillaume, *Disciples*, pp. 329–336.

47 Judith Shapiro, 'Ideologies of Catholic Missionary Practice in a Postcolonial Era' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, No. 1 (Jan. 1981), pp. 130–149, 131.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 136.

inspired by Foucauld's solitary life of silent evangelization through the Eucharist and the imitation of Jesus.

The devotional life of each small fraternity is based on the culture in which they are situated. After his experiences in Syria, Foucauld became concerned with the accessibility of devotional practices: 'Children, the ignorant, the illiterate, are often strangers to the European languages, we cannot think of reciting the Divine Office. We replace it with the adoration of the exposed Blessed Sacrament, prayer, and the recitation of the Holy Rosary.'⁵⁰ This has always been of primary importance to the Brothers. The first Brothers studied Arabic and Islamic culture with Massignon, based their chapel on Saharan customs and borrowed music from the Melkite, Syrian and Chaldean rites to allow them to sing parts of the Office in Arabic.⁵¹ Today, some fraternities have adopted other rites including the Byzantine, Coptic, Syrian, Chaldean and Armenian. This not only allows the fraternities to become integrated with the local culture, it has also helped with ecumenical relations between the churches.⁵²

One of the most recent manifestations of Foucauldian spirituality is the Community of al-Khalil (Abraham) founded in Syria, but with a presence in Rome. It was in Syria, at the monastery of Notre-Dame du Sacré-Coeur in Akbès (in what is now Turkey), that Foucauld lived out his vocation to the Trappist Order. It was there, experiencing first-hand the Hamidian massacres of the Ottoman empire,⁵³ that he began to conceive of a new way to live out his vocation to Islam. The earliest reference to a religious community at the site of Deir Mar Musa, where the community of al-Khalil was founded, is from the sixth century at which time it was an established lavra of hermits. It is apropos that the current community, so influenced by Foucauld and dedicated to a monastic spirituality authentic to its regional and historical context, should be founded on eremitic ground.

50 Foucauld, *Règlements*, p. 27.

51 *Ibid.*, pp. 223-4.

52 Rene Voillaume, *Seeds of the Desert: The Legacy of Charles de Foucauld*, trans. Willard Hill, Burns & Oates, London, 1955, p. 36; Jacques Keryell, 'Louis Massignon et le problème d'inculturation de la fraternité d'El Abiodh Sidi Cheikh (Algérie)', in *Louis Massignon au cœur de notre temps*, ed. Jacques Keryell, Karthala, Paris, 1999, pp. 211-229, 229.

53 Bazin, p. 97.

The monastic community is situated in and inspired by the Syriac Christianity of the region, which exists with a substantial degree of integration into the surrounding Arab milieu. Syriac remained a liturgical language for the Christians of the region, but over the centuries the local Christian communities have participated in Arab culture and made it their own. The monastery, which is now the motherhouse of the community, was established in late antiquity dedicated to Deir Mar Musa el-Habashi, Saint Moses the Ethiopian. Although the dedication is not to the Biblical or Qur'anic Moses, but rather to a Desert Father, its reference to a Musa has given it added significance for Muslims in the region.⁵⁴ Despite this, it was abandoned in the early nineteenth century following regional conversions from the Syrian Orthodox Church to Catholicism.⁵⁵

The current community was established in the monastery of Deir Mar Musa in 1991. It was founded on three 'apostolic directives': contemplation rooted in a Christianity that holds a common life with Islam, manual labour to make one more like Jesus of Nazareth, and Abrahamic hospitality.⁵⁶ The community consists of both men and women from different Catholic and Orthodox Oriental and Occidental Churches. It is 'the spiritual home of those Christians, disciples of Christ, who feel a vocation of deep and humble love for Muslims and for Islam, as much as a spiritual port for Muslims feeling a vocation for deep friendship with Christians.'⁵⁷ Dedicated to interreligious dialogue and consecrated to hospitality, the monastery is a site of pilgrimage for Muslims and Christians, as well as any curious travellers, welcoming around 50,000 people a year. They work closely with the local villages on environmental projects, fostering grassroots dialogue by highlighting what they see as a shared responsibility for the earth and for each other.

54 For a discussion of the Qur'anic Moses, see: P Dall'Oglio, *Speranza nell'Islam: Interpretazione della prospettiva escatologica di Corano XVII, I*, Casa Editrice Marietti, Genoa, 1991, and B Wheeler, *Moses in the Qur'an and Islamic Exegesis*, Routledge Curzon, London, 2002.

55 For a history of the monastery, see H Kaufhold, 'Notizen über das Moseskloster bei Nabek und das Julianaskloster bei Qaryatain in Syrien', *Oriens Christianus*, 79 (1995), pp. 48-119.

56 P Dall'Oglio and E Loosely, 'La communauté d'Al-Khalil: une vie monastique au service du dialogue islamo-chrétien', in *Proche Orient Chrétien* 54 (2004), pp. 117-128.

57 P Dall'Oglio, Synod for the Middle East, Heythrop College, London, accessed 4 September 2013, <http://www.deirmarmusa.org/node/184>

They also organise seminars and workshops on issues important to interreligious dialogue.

Considering themselves as ‘walk[ing] on the path of St Francis of Assisi, Ignatius of Loyola, Charles de Foucauld, Louis Massignon and Mary Kahil’⁵⁸ the community has acted as a host for members of the Foucauldian spiritual family, as well as incorporating the writings of Foucauld into their daily prayers. The diversity of the community at Deir Mar Musa, in particular its steady stream of pilgrims and guests of all ages, nationalities, and religions, has spread an understanding of Foucauld amongst a large population. The community continues their relationship with Foucauldian spirituality because Foucauld’s embodiment of the life of Jesus at Nazareth is particularly suited for their special combination of lay and religious people: ‘it puts at the center the testimony of lay Christians in Muslim society, without weakening the role of the sacraments and thus the priesthood or the monks and nuns.’⁵⁹

The monastery was founded and led by Fr Paolo Dall’Oglio SJ, who nurtured a connection with Foucauld from his youth. During his novitiate, Fr Dall’Oglio felt a call to ‘transform the presence of the Church *in* the Islamic world into a Church *for* the Islamic world.’⁶⁰ In his determination to ‘understand the apostolic priorities for disciples of Jesus, both men and women, in this suffering Middle East’⁶¹ he has responded with the Community of al-Khalil, his academic work, and his commitment to peace.⁶² Since 2010, the activities of the community relating to interreligious dialogue, sustainable development and peace have been halted by the government. Although they continued to contribute to reconciliation initiatives after the start of the uprising in Syria, Fr Dall’Oglio himself was expelled from the country in June

58 Quote from *ibid*. See also P Dall’Oglio, ‘Louis Massignon and *Badaliya*’, *Aram* 20 (2008), pp. 329–336, and ‘Massignon and jihad, through De Foucauld, al-Hallaj and Gandhi’, in *Faith, Power and Violence*, (eds) J J Donahue and CW Troll, Pontificio Istitutio Orientale, Rome, 1998, pp. 103–114.

59 Community at Deir Mar Musa al-Habashi, ‘Charles de Foucauld à Deir Mar Musa, Syrie’, <http://www.deirmarmusa.org/fr/node/83> (accessed 10 September 2013).

60 P Dall’Oglio, Synod for the Middle East, Heythrop College, London, accessed 4 September 2013, <http://www.deirmarmusa.org/node/184>

61 *Ibid*.

62 P Dall’Oglio and Églantine Gabaix-Hialé, *La rage et la lumière*, Éditions de l’Atelier, Ivry-sur-Seine, 2013.

2012.⁶³ Despite this, he risked returning to Syria three times to meet with opposition groups. In meetings with different factions, including 'militarized extremists', he has attempted to help foster reconciliation between them in preparation for the rebuilding of Syria after the anticipated end of the war. In an interview only weeks before his third visit to the country he stated, 'I am fully engaged in Islamic-Christian harmony building, but today I'm also in the service of Islamic-Islamic harmony building. We want next Ramadan to be a time for prayer and action for the reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites.'⁶⁴ On 29 July 2013 Fr Dall'Oglio was kidnapped in Raqqa, Syria. The monastery of Deir Mar Musa continues in its mandate of prayer and hospitality, protected by the surrounding Muslim population.

While the fate of Fr. Dall'Oglio is still unknown,⁶⁵ there is no denying that the path of Foucauld is not any easy one. Whether considering Massignon, assaulted for his views on Algerian independence, the religious men and women of Algeria, who came together to mark the anniversary of Foucauld's death only months after their brothers were killed in Tabhirine,⁶⁶ or the life and death of Foucauld himself, the vocation he articulated is one of total self-giving. To go to the most abandoned is often to be called into places of suffering, violence and turmoil. To offer oneself as a bridge between peoples is to accept the possibility that those who thrive on those tensions will resent it. However, it is in this legacy that sometimes has ended in violent death that Foucauld's desires are most clearly visible. He lived his life in the hope that someday people would no longer see him, but Jesus Christ: abject, humble, crucified love. In their reflections on the writings of Charles de Foucauld in 2003, the community at Deir Mar Musa found that:

After all is said and done, in the a world which claims
an absence of persuasive ideologies, we thought that

63 Jose Vericat, 'Interview with Father Paolo Dall'Oglio on the Syrian Crisis', *Global Observatory*, 8 August 2012.

64 Jeffrey T Iverson, 'Father Paolo Dall'Oglio and Syria's Disappearing Priests', *Syria Deeply*, 10 July 2013.

65 Junno Arocho Esteves, 'Holy See: No Confirmation on Jesuit Priest's Death', *Zenit*, August 12, 2013.

66 Robert Fisk, 'Clerics Keep Watch for the Hour of Death', *The Independent*, 5 December 1996, p. 14.

Foucauldian evangelical transparency introduced magnificently the notion of sacrifice which is in the heart of the message of Christ [...] It proposes that those who burn with great love among the disciples of Jesus who are in Muslim areas, especially Eastern Christians, to lose the self to the Other. It is a language of love.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Charles de Foucauld à Deir Mar Musa, Syrie, <http://www.deirmarmusa.org/fr/node/83>